Tagged: constitutional rights

Second Circuit: Admittance of Co-Defendant’s Redacted Confession Violated Confrontation Clause

A recent decision by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals may provide guidance to criminal defense practitioners seeking to (1) suppress the involuntary confession of a client, and (2) limit the impact of a co-defendants’ redacted confession being admitted at trial. The Second Circuit, sitting en banc, affirmed a panel’s decision to vacate the convictions of three defendants found guilty of conspiring to commit a Hobbs Act robbery, among other things, and brandishing a firearm in furtherance of a crime of violence. The Court had been asked by the government to review a panel decision that had formerly held that the “confession” of one of the defendant’s was involuntary and should not have been admitted against the declarant at trial. The government also sought review of the panel’s determination that the admission of the “confession” was also prejudicial to the declarant’s co-defendants, requiring a new trial. United States v. Taylor, 736 F.3d 661 (2d Cir. 2013).

A panel of the Court had held that the defendant’s Miranda waiver was not knowing and voluntary, given that the defendant was clearly mentally incapacitated during his interview with federal agents. Id. at 669. The panel noted that the defendant had ingested a quantity of Xanax pills immediately before his arrest, and not long before the interrogation by the FBI had begun. The panel pointed out that the defendant was “in and out of consciousness while giving his statement, and in a trance or a stupor most of the time when not actually asleep.” Id. at 670. As such, the panel determined that “the officers’ persistent questioning took undue advantage of [the] [defendants’] diminished mental state, and ultimately overbore his will.” Id. The panel concluded that the admission of the defendant’s involuntary confessions was a critical part of the prosecution’s case, and could not be deemed “harmless error beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. at 672.

Notably, the Second Circuit (en banc) withdrew the panel’s prior decision, and issued a superseding opinion. States v. Taylor, 2014 WL 814861, (2d Cir. 2014). It not only reaffirmed the panel’s prior decision in all respects, but further held that the admission of the defendant’s “confession” at trial violated the Confrontation Clause rights of the other co-defendants. The Court ruled that the redacted confession simply did not comply with Bruton, and made it obvious to jurors that the declarant had implicated his co-defendants in the crime. The Court explained that the redacted version of the defendant’s statement suggested that the original statements contained actual names.

The Court took observance of the fact that the redacted statement had contained both the declarant’s name and the name of the government’s cooperating witness (“Luana Miller”), while referencing the other co-defendants by “two other individuals” or “driver.”  Id. The Court reasoned that the redacted confession allowed jurors to notice that “Miller is the one person involved who was cooperating, and [] infer that the obvious purpose of the meticulously crafted partial redaction was to corroborate Miller’s testimony against the rest of the group, not to shield confederates.” Id. at *11. The Court noted that “[i]f the defendant had been trying to avoid naming his confederates, he would not have identified one of them-Miller-in the very phrase in which the names of the other confederates are omitted.” Id.

The Court explained that “[o]nce it becomes obvious that names have been pruned from the text, the choice of implied identity is narrow. The unnamed persons correspond by number (two) and by role to the pair of co-defendants.” Id. at *12. The Court noted that the “obviously redacted confession … points directly to the defendant[s], and it accuses the defendant[s] in a manner similar to … a testifying codefendant’s accusatory finger.” Id. (quoting Gray, 523 U.S. at 194).  The Court concluded that the “awkward circumlocution used to reference other participants, coupled with the overt naming of Luana Miller (only), is so unnatural, suggestive, and conspicuous as to offend Bruton, Gray, and Jass.” Id.

While the Second Circuit’s decision is applaudable, it may leave many criminal defense practitioners pondering over the slew of similar cases that have come before the Circuit in the past without any success on this  issue. Both the language and form (identifying by name the declarant & cooperator(s), while others as “person/individual”) that the Court identified in Taylor appears to have been customarily approved by the Courts. Indeed, Federal prosecutors have routinely been able to utilize such redacted confessions, although the defense has routinely objected to its admission based upon the obvious nature of the redaction and the likelihood that the jury will infer that their client had been implicated by their cohort.  Nevertheless, the Second Circuit has finally spoken against this once unfettered practice, and provided some much needed guidance on the issue.

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Search of Closed Containers Incident to Arrest: Is a Cell Phone Just Another Container? by Thomas Kapp

The Pace Criminal Justice Center is honored to feature an article by Thomas Kapp,  Search of Closed Containers Incident to Arrest: Is a Cell Phone Just Another Container?  Thomas Kapp is the Senior Investigative Attorney at the Bronx County District Attorney’s Office and a member of the Pace Criminal Justice Center Advisory Board. In his article, he

review[s] the current federal standard for a search incident to arrest of containers and how some federal and other state courts have addressed the search of a cell phone.  In addition, [he] discusses the development of the law in New York of the right of police to conduct a search incident to arrest of a closed container and will also address whether that right includes the search of a cell phone incident to arrest, an issue which may be ripe for our courts.

As the article notes, this issue will be decided this term by the United States Supreme Court.  Mr. Kapp concludes his analysis by assessing the future of searches of cell phones incident to arrest in the State of New York.

Enjoy reading the full article: Thomas Kapp – Search of Closed Containers Incident to Arrest: Is a Cell Phone Just Another Container?

Symposium on the Future of Stop and Frisk

The Criminal Justice Society at Pace Law School held a symposium last Tuesday (Oct. 22, 2014) on the future of stop and frisk in New York City.  Prof. David Dorfman moderated, and the panelists were Prof. Randolph McLaughlin, of Pace Law School; Mayo Bartlett, a Pace alum and private criminal defense attorney in White Plains; Heather MacDonald, a fellow at the Manhattan Institute;  and Police Officer David Rullo, a Pace student and a police officer in New Jersey.

The panelists began by debating the merits of Judge Scheindlin’s decision in Floyd, finding that the NYPD’s stop and frisk practices unconstitutional.  The disagreement was not so much over the Judge’s holding as it was over the facts upon which it rested, with Ms. MacDonald asserting that some of the fact finding was not supported by the evidence.  There was also disagreement about whether the Judge was correct in concluding that the racial breakdown of stop and frisk should reflect population demographics, as opposed to the demographics of who commits crimes.

Substantial discussion concerned the need for training police officers: Officer Rullo thought training on the constitutional dimensions of stop and frisk was inadequate and Ms. MacDonald thought the police should have training on how to treat people with respect.  Ultimately, Ms. MacDonald raised a concern that hamstringing the police in stop and frisk would lead to more crime, while Mr. Bartlett and Prof. McLaughlin focused on how many innocent people are arrested under current stop and frisk practices.  All of the panelists were concerned about the impact of stop and frisk – or of stopping the stop an d frisk policy – on the community.

The panelists also proposed solutions. Mr. Bartlett emphasized the need for incorporating police officers into the community.  A reform of the stop and frisk policy based on police presence would foster community relationships that could help police officers deter crime.

With the NYC mayoral election looming, many people worry about whether the crime rate will rise after Floyd and with a new administration.  Many people are debating whether we should reintroduce community policing and, if so, what the impact will be on the community.

Moving Toward a Solution: Monitoring the NYPD

On two separate occasions last month it was suggested that a court-appointed entity monitor the actions of the New York Police Department. In the first instance, the U.S. Justice Department suggested a monitor to address the racial implementation of stop and frisk procedures by select NYPD officers. The U.S. Justice Department announced that

it would support a decision by the judge to appoint a monitor to ensure compliance with any reform of police practices ordered by [the judge].

In the second instance, Civil Rights Groups  suggested a monitor of the NYPD’s Muslim Surveillance Program, an intelligence program designed to foil terrorist plots. Members of the Muslim community argue that the Surveillance Program hinders their constitutional right to worship.

The New York City Council responded to the call for an NYPD monitor by

approv[ing] some of the most sweeping plans in years to impose new oversight over the NYPD.

The two bills passed recently

expand the definition of racial profiling and… establish an inspector general with subpoena power to recommend changes to the NYPD’s policies and practices.

Those in favor of the NYPD monitor contend that the monitor will regulate police procedures to prevent, or at the very least diminish, racial and religious discrimination by the NYPD. Those against the NYPD monitor, most notably Mayor Bloomberg and Police Commission Ray Kelly, argue that a monitor would prevent police officers from doing their jobs effectively because it would cause hesitation among police officers in carrying out procedures vital to fighting crime.

Whether monitoring the NYPD is the right approach remains to be seen. However, the mere suggestion of an NYPD monitor indicates that society is moving toward a solution to a problem that has hindered the NYPD and society for decades.

Court of Appeals Scrutinizes 18-b Rules

Of particular interest to criminal practitioners handling assigned cases, the Court of Appeals decided a case from Onondaga County where an assigned counsel lawyer challenged  the County’s interpretation of County Law 18-b, arguing that the rules hurt clients and served no purpose other than controlling costs. Roulan v. County of Onondaga, No. 62, NYLJ 1202598140845, at *1 (Ct. of App., Decided April 30, 2013).

NYCLU senior staff attorney Corey Stoughton, who is heading the Hurrell-Haring litigation brought to force reforms to New York’s indigent defense system, described the significance of the Roulan case in an Op Ed piece in last week’s New York Law Journal.

The assigned counsel challenged three rules. The first rule denied counsel to persons under 21 who cannot produce evidence of their parents’ indigence. The second rule prohibited persons who become indigent in the course of a criminal proceeding from requesting that the court pay their current counsel through the 18-b system. The third rule prohibited representation of a non-incarcerated client prior to a final determination by plan administrators of the client’s financial eligibility.

En route to the Court of Appeals, the Appellate Division, Fourth Department struck down the third of the challenged rules as unconstitutional, agreeing that it “requires attorneys to violate the indelible right to counsel that attaches at arraignment.” As to the first two rules, however, the Fourth Department found no constitutional violation.

The Court of Appeals decided that the Fourth Department should not have passed judgment on the constitutionality of the first two rules as counsel had no standing to raise the issues, and, significantly, left undisturbed the Fourth Department’s order declaring the delayed representation rule unconstitutional, noting that the respondents had failed to cross-appeal from that part of the order.

According to Stoughton’s Op Ed piece:

By leaving in place the Fourth Department’s rejection of the delayed-representation rule, the Court of Appeals preserved Roulan’s victory for indigent, presumptively innocent people who find themselves stranded and alone when facing a prosecutor’s accusation of crime. And, by reversing the Fourth Department’s endorsement of Onondaga County’s restrictions on eligibility and continuity of counsel, the court neutralized what otherwise would have been a defeat for the right to counsel for the poor.

Assigned counsel plan rules can impact the quality of representation provided to the poor in criminal cases. Are there assigned counsel rules in the county where you practice that adversely impact the representation you can provide your clients?  Are there changes you would suggest that might improve your assigned counsel plan? Let us know.

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