Tagged: domestic prosecution

The ICC’s Principle of Complementarity and Domestic Prosecutions

POST WRITTEN BYProf. Peter Widulski, Assistant Director of the First Year Legal Skills Program and the Coach of International Criminal Moot Court Team at Pace Law School.

Before a matter can be fully pursued by the International Criminal Court, the ICC Prosecutor must first in the course of a preliminary examination determine, among other jurisdictional requirements, whether national authorities are actively pursuing a case of potential concern to the ICC. This is because the principle of complementarity, set forth in the Preamble of the Rome Statute and given specificity in Article 17 of the Rome Statute, debars the ICC from pursuing possible crimes within its subject matter jurisdiction if a State that can assert jurisdiction over the matter is doing so.

Article 19 of the Rome Statute provides additional force to the complementarity principle. It states that “[t]he Court shall satisfy itself that it has jurisdiction in any case brought before it” and that “[t]he Court may, on its own motion, determine the admissibility of a case in accordance with Article 17.” Article 19 also allows certain individuals and States to challenge the admissibility of a case.

In one of its first cases, the ICC prosecuted Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, the leader of a group pursuing violent opposition to the government of the Congo – despite the fact that the Congo was pursuing charges against him for genocide and crimes against humanity. Because these charges did not specifically include the crime of enlisting children under age 15 to participate in hostilities (a crime within ICC’s subject matter jurisdiction), the ICC determined that it could pursue that charge against Lubanga, without violating the principle of complementarity. ICC prosecution of Lubanga on this charge resulted in 2012 in the first conviction achieved by the ICC.

In an October 2015 report, ICC Prosecutor Fatou Bensouda needed to address the complementarity issue when requesting authority from a Pre-Trial Chamber to open an investigation into 2008 conflict in the South Ossetia region of Georgia. As written earlier, this conflict includes possible crimes committed by South Ossetian forces rebelling against Georgia and by Georgian forces in response, and – potentially – by Russian forces that intervened in support of the rebels.

In August 2008, Prosecutor Bensouda’s predecessor opened a preliminary examination of this matter. ICC Protocol regarding preliminary examinations requires the Prosecutor to first determine whether there is a reasonable basis to believe that crimes within ICC jurisdiction have been committed. The OTP recently made an affirmative determination regarding the Georgian situation prior to 2015. In her October 2015 Request for Authorization, Prosecutor Bensouda mentions that the seven-year delay in presenting her request was caused by the need, pursuant to Article 17’s complementarity requirement, to monitor efforts by national authorities in Georgia and Russia undertaking investigations of crimes of concern to the ICC.

The Prosecutor further states that Russia’s investigations appear to be proceeding. However, although Georgia had been engaging in investigations since 2008, Georgian officials notified her Office in March of this year that, because of several difficulties, Georgia was discontinuing its investigations. Because of this discontinuance, the Prosecutor concludes that there is at this time no complementarity objection that would defeat her request to open an investigation into the Georgian situation.

An ICC Pre-Trial Chamber must now decide whether to authorize the Prosecutor to open an investigation. The Trial Chamber will determine, among other jurisdictional issues, whether an investigation comports with the principle of complementarity. As noted above, even should the Chamber grant the Prosecutor’s request, challenges to admissibility may be raised at later stages.

The International Criminal Court Issues a Ruling in the Situation in Libya

POST WRITTEN BY: Prof. Peter Widulski, Assistant Director of the First Year Legal Skills Program and the Coach of International Criminal Moot Court Team at Pace Law School

On May 21, 2014, the ICC Appeals Chamber, in a divided vote, rejected Libya’s appeal of an ICC Pre-Trial Chamber’s May 31, 2013, ruling that Libya’s criminal investigation of Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi was not sufficient to bar the ICC from conducting its own criminal proceedings against him. On February 26, 2011, the U.N. Security Council, pursuant to Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter and Article 13(b) of the Rome Statute, adopted Resolution 1970 referring the situation in Libya to the ICC for investigation of the violence occurring since 15 February 2011 between the Libyan government, then headed by Muammar Gaddafi, and anti-government protesters. In UN S.C. Res. 1970, the Security Council

[d]eplor[ed] the [Libyan government’s] gross and systematic violation of human rights, including the repression of peaceful demonstrators, [expressed] deep concern at the deaths of civilians, [and] reject[ed] unequivocally the incitement to hostility and violence against the civilian population made from the highest level of the Libyan government.

Following an investigation by the Prosecutor’s Office, on June 27, 2011, an ICC Pre-Trial Chamber issued arrest warrants for Muammar Gaddafi, his son Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi, and Gaddafi’s brother-in-law Abdullah Al-Senussi, on charges of crimes against humanity for murder and persecution. On November 22, 2011, the ICC terminated its case against Muammar Gaddafi following his death.

On May 13, 2014 (a week before the Appeals Chamber announced its ruling), the ICC Prosecutor reported to the Security Council on the situation in Libya and asserted that

Libya continues to be under a pending obligation to surrender [Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi] to the Court [and that] [t]he Government of Libya should immediately surrender Saif Al- Islam Gaddafi to the Court or give reasons for its inability to do so.

An issue on appeal was the proper interpretation of Article 17(1)(a) of the Rome Statute, which requires the ICC to find that a case is not admissible to the ICC when “[t]he case is being investigated or prosecuted by a State which has jurisdiction over it.” Article 19(2)(b) provides that such a State may raise an admissibility challenge in order to retain exclusive jurisdiction of the case. It was undisputed in the appeal that Libya was proceeding with an investigation of Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi that included some incidents referred to in the ICC’s arrest warrant for him. A significant issue on appeal was: How much similarity and overlap between the matters investigated by a domestic jurisdiction and an ICC investigation was required in deciding whether the scope and contours of a domestic investigation would render a ‘case’ inadmissible to the ICC under Article 17?

Libya argued that when interpreting Article 17, the principle of complementarity creates a strong presumption favoring domestic prosecution. By a 4-1 decision, the Appeals Chamber rejected Libya’s argument and held that the evidence provided by Libya regarding its investigation was insufficient to demonstrate that the actions for which Libya was investigating Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi included all matters for which the ICC sought to prosecute him.

In her dissenting opinion, Judge Ušacka explained that the majority’s interpretation of Article 17 did not give sufficient consideration to the importance of the complementarity principle. After reviewing the ICC’s previous admissibility decisions, she asserted in paragraph 39 of her dissent that Libya’s appeal

is the first admissibility case before the Court in which a State has submitted a wealth of information about its ongoing proceedings and has clearly expressed the will to investigate and prosecute the same suspects as well as conduct that is arguably even broader than that contained in the warrants of arrests.

Judge Ušacka added in paragraph 65 “as a concluding remark on the subject of complementarity,” that “the overall goal of the [Rome] Statute to combat impunity can … be achieved by the Court through means of active cooperation with the domestic authorities.” Judge Ušacka would have remanded the case to the Pre-Trial Chamber for consideration of the admissibility issue under a standard that she thought gave more adequate consideration to the Article 17 principle.