Tagged: evidence

I Am Sure That’s Him … I Think – Eye Witness Identification: Improper Showups

POST WRITTEN BY: Maria Dollas (’16), J.D. Pace Law School

Often, there are no witnesses to a crime other than the victim. Given the stress and state of the victim the question arises whether such conditions affect this lone witness’s ability to accurately recall the assailant. Things become more muddied when the police apprehend an assailant (not necessarily THE assailant who committed the crime in question) and the police proceed to do more than to merely present the alleged assailant to the victim.

In a 3-1 majority the Appellate Division Second Department recently held that the use of showup identification by police was unduly suggestive and that the victim’s identification testimony should have been suppressed. People v. James, ___ N.Y.S.3d ___ 2015 N.Y. Slip Op. 03864 (App. Div. 2d Dep’t May 6, 2015).

The discrepancy in the attributes of the person the victim described and the person actually caught were significant:  they varied in age, height, and attire. The victim described her assailant as about 20 years old, 6 feet tall, wearing a brown and white striped shirt. The person apprehended by police was 13 years older and 4 inches shorter. A striped shirt of a different color combination, in this case a red-and-blue striped shirt was found near a parked vehicle and not on his person. Nonetheless, the police presented the person apprehended in handcuffs to the victim. That alone might have signaled guilt. It was particularly suspicious since the person arrested was walking shirtless in the area.

Still, the victim was not able to identify her assailant. It was only when the police purposely placed the miscolored striped shirt across the defendant’s chest that that the victim conceded that he was her assailant. The victim did not request the shirt to be placed upon the apprehended individual. Initially, she could not and did not identify him. It was only after the police officer took active steps that the victim said he was the one.

There is no doubt that the crime was committed. There is however doubt as to the reasonableness of the police tactics in presenting the apprehended individual to the victim. Showups and other identification procedures are not to be so unduly suggestive as to violate due process. The primary evil to be avoided is a “very substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification.” Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 384 (1968).

The law is not concerned with the number of witnesses but rather with the quality of the identification given. Even a slight deviation from permitting the victim to objectively determine whether the person presented to her as the assailant taints the process. The circumstances in this case are not free from coaxing the victim even so slightly as to whether the right shirt and therefore the right person is in custody.

Additionally, the identification here may have been a cross-racial one:  the assailant was described as a light skinned black male, the victim was only described as a 22 year old female and her skin color was not noted. Ordinary human experience indicates that some people have greater difficulty in identifying members of a different race than they do in identifying members of their own race. See Gary L. Wells & Elizabth A. Olson, The Other-Race Effect in Eyewitness Identification: What Do We Do About It?, 7 Psychol., Pub. Pol’y & L. 230 (2001).  Here, an already challenging identification may have been even more problematic by irresponsible police tactics.

The people’s burden is not only to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that a crime was committed but justice requires that the defendant is indeed the person who committed the crime. One person wrongly identified is one person too many whose liberty and life may be irrevocably altered because of the procedural missteps of others. Misidentification and its consequences can also happen to you and me.

Related Readings:

Supreme Court Reverses Conviction in Facebook-Threats Case

In a follow up to our previous post, the Supreme Court has now decided Elonis v. United States, reversing the conviction based on threats the defendant posted on Facebook against his ex-wife and others.  The Court held it was error for the lower court to instruct the jurors that the defendant could be convicted if the posts would be considered by a reasonable person to be threatening, characterizing that standard as one of traditional civil negligence.  The Court did not address the First Amendment issues concerning the criminalization of Facebook posts.

Related Readings:

Update: Proceedings for a Special Prosecutor in Ferguson

As we reported last week, a hearing was held on Friday, May 29 on the motion for appointment of a special prosecutor in Ferguson. After a contentious discussion the Judge Joseph L. Walsh III agreed to consider the expert affidavit of Prof. Bennett Gershman on the issue of prosecutorial misconduct in the grand jury.

Gershman complained about a “gross deviation from proper standards of conduct,” saying he never before saw prosecutors go to “extraordinary lengths to exonerate a potential defendant.”

Proceeding Seeking a Special Prosecutor in Ferguson

This Friday, May 29, 2015, a hearing will be held in Missouri State Court in the matter of  State of Missouri ex inf. Montague Simmons, et al., v. Robert McCulloch, St. Louis County Prosecuting Attorney, seeking appointment of a special prosecutor to investigate the St. Louis County Prosecutor’s conduct in the grand jury in State of Missouri v. Darren Wilson  (previously discussed here). The Wilson matter arose from the death of Michael Brown. After a grand jury presentation, the grand jury failed to indict Officer Wilson in the death of Mr. Brown.

Missouri has an interesting statute, Missouri Revised Statutes §§ 106.220–106.290, that allows a private citizen to bring an action for an investigation to determine if a sitting prosecutor’s conduct  constituted a failure to perform the duties of his public office. If so found, a special prosecutor would be appointed with authority to file a writ of quo warranto action seeking ouster of the sitting prosecutor from office.

The motion is supported by the affidavit of Prof. Bennett Gershman, from Pace Law School, who addresses the questions of serious misconduct in the presentation of the case to the grand jury.

Related Readings:

Online Resolution of Disputes

A recent UK report recommending the adoption of on-line resolution of low-value civil disputes contains a fascinating look at various online dispute resolution systems currently operating in various jurisdictions, including one involving the resolution of traffic infractions. These systems are designed to improve access to justice for those who cannot afford the exorbitant cost of in-court litigation. The UK Traffic Penalty Tribunal enables appellants to appeal, upload evidence and follow their cases, and allows adjudicators to manage their cases, view evidence, and communicate with parties. Hearings are done by telephone conference, at which all participants can view the same evidence under supervision by the adjudicator. To be sure, there are pros and cons.

Food for thought, though, for anyone who has participated in the in-court adjudication of a traffic infraction; more importantly, since the unavailability of affordable legal solutions in the United States now extends beyond the traditionally poor and well into the middle class.

To read the full report, including a survey of current on-line dispute resolution processes worldwide, click the below:

Online Dispute Resolution Advisory Group, Online Dispute Resolution for Low Value Civil ClaimsCivil Justice Council (February 2015).