Tagged: Ivory Coast

ICC Opens Another Preliminary Examination – Burundi

Fatou Bensouda, the ICC’s Prosecutor, announced in her statement that a preliminary examination has been initiated into Burundi on-going crisis, allegedly involving more than 430 persons killed, at least 3,400 people arrested, and over 230,000 Burundians forced to seek refuge. As reported in an earlier post, the Prosecutor has been watching the ongoing situation in Burundi since early 2015, commenting on the then-upcoming election, fulfilling the OTP’s early warning function and preemptively calling for peace and cease of violence. It appears however, that her prevention efforts within Burundi, a State Party to the Rome Statute, unfortunately fell short because about a year later, she is initiating a preliminary examination.

Preliminary examination may be initiated by the Prosecutor, referral from a State Party or Security Council, or a 12(3) declaration by a State that is not a Party to the Rome Statute. In this case, the Prosecutor exercised its vested authority to begin examination. The purpose of such examination is to review and assess information available so far to determine whether a reasonable basis to proceed with investigation exists. Article 53(1) of Rome Statute requires Prosecutor to consider issues of jurisdiction (often focusing on the Court’s subject matter jurisdiction), admissibility (comprising of both complementarity and gravity determination often focusing on the domestic prosecutorial and investigative efforts) and overall interest of justice.

Not every preliminary examination leads to authorization to investigate. In situations of Honduras, Republic of Korea, and the Vessels of Comoros, the Court found no reasonable basis to proceed with investigation, as required by art. 53(1), and concluded its preliminary examinations without prejudice, leaving the possibility to re-open examination available should additional information and evidence surface. On the other hand, in situations of Libya, Ivory Coast, Mali, Georgia, and CAR II, for example, the Court moved forward, finding reasonable basis to proceed and securing pre-trial chamber’s authorization to open investigation in these situations.

The ICC has seven open preliminary examinations at this time, making Burundi the eighth one. Three situations, Palestine, Ukraine and Iraq, are currently in Phase 2 – having the Court consider subject-matter jurisdiction. Four situations, Afghanistan, Colombia, Guinea, and Nigeria, have moved to Phase 3 – having the Court consider issues of admissibility. The Court issues reports on its preliminary examination conclusions each year sharing its findings in each situation and ensuring so the much needed transparency.

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ICC Confirms Case Against Simone Gbagbo

POST WRITTEN BY: Prof. Peter Widulski, Assistant Director of the First Year Legal Skills Program and the Coach of International Criminal Moot Court Team at Pace Law School.

On May 27, 2015, the Appeals Chamber of the International Criminal Court (ICC) issued a decision confirming that the ICC case against Ivory Coast national Simone Gbagbo is not jurisdictionally barred to the ICC because of efforts undertaken by Ivory Coast to conduct its own criminal investigations against her.

As discussed in our previous post, the ICC confronted a situation regarding the three Ivory Coast nationals for whom it issued arrest warrants, all of whom were charged with responsibility for alleged crimes against humanity (including murder, rape and other forms of sexual violence, persecution and other inhumane acts) committed by supporters of defeated President Laurent Gbagbo against civilians in the aftermath of the Ivory Coast presidential election in November 2010. This violence resulted in the death of more than three thousand people.

Pursuant to the ICC arrest warrants, Ivory Coast (Côte d´Ivoire) authorities delivered Laurent Gbagbo and militia commander Charles Blé Goudé to The Hague for ICC prosecution on the crimes alleged in the warrants. But Ivory Coast refused ICC orders to deliver Simone Gbagbo and instead asserted that, pursuant to Articles 17 and 19 of the ICC Statute, her case was not admissible to the ICC on the ground that Ivory Coast was investigating and preparing to prosecute her.

After reviewing Ivory Coast’s arguments and supporting documents, an ICC Pre-Trial Chamber rejected the admissibility challenge because the Chamber determined that although Ivory Coast submitted evidence indicating that it was investigating Ms. Gbagbo for economic crimes, crimes against the State, and certain other matters, it was not prosecuting her for the crimes against humanity for which the ICC sought to prosecute her.

Ivory Coast appealed this decision in an effort to deny ICC jurisdiction over Ms. Gbagbo. In arguments to the Appeals Chamber, it employed several tactics, which included (1) submitting evidence of its investigative actions against Ms. Gbagbo that it undertook after the Pre-Trial Chamber’s decision, (2) attempting to challenge several points made by the Pre-Trial Chamber not as factual findings but as legal rulings (which would require more exacting review by the Appeals Chamber), and (3) characterizing acts for which it was investigating Ms. Gbagbo as “preparatory acts” for crimes within ICC jurisdiction.

In addition to Ivory Coast’s arguments, the Appeals Chamber considered arguments by all other concerned Parties. Given the Pre-Trial Chamber’s findings that procedural activities undertaken by Ivory Coast judicial authorities were “sparse and disparate” and did not cover the serious matters that the ICC sought to prosecute, it is perhaps not surprising that Ms. Gbagbo advanced arguments “fully supporting the Appeal.” On the other hand, the ICC Prosecutor and the Office of Public Counsel for Victims (representing victims of the Ivory Coast violence) provided arguments supporting the ICC’s admissibility of the case.

In its May 27 decision, the Appeals Chamber rejected all of the arguments submitted by Ivory Coast and by Ms. Gbagbo and confirmed the Pre-Trial Chamber’s decision that the ICC case against Ms. Gbagbo is admissible.

In rejecting Ivory Coast’s submission of evidence of its investigations subsequent to the evidence it presented to the Pre-Trial Chamber, the Appeals Chamber stated that by making such submissions Ivory Coast was “attempt[ing] to seek a new ruling on admissibility, rather than a review of the proceedings before the Pre-Trial Chamber.” The Appeals Chamber noted that under Article 19(4), “[t]he admissibility of a case … may be challenged only once.” Accordingly, the Chamber held that Ivory Coast couldn’t use this additional information to support what would in effect constitute a second challenge to admissibility. However, an ICC press release reporting on the Appeals Court’s decision notes that Article 19(4) also states that “[i]n exceptional circumstances, the Court may grant leave for a challenge to be brought more than once.”

Ivory Coast became a State Party to the ICC in February 2013. Article 89 of the Rome Statute requires “State Parties [to] comply with [ICC] requests for arrest and surrender.” It will be interesting to see whether Ivory Coast complies with this obligation, or whether it seeks to make use of the “exceptional circumstances” provision to make a second challenge to the admissibility of this case.

ICC Calls for Surrender of Two Suspects

POST WRITTEN BY: Prof. Peter Widulski, Assistant Director of the First Year Legal Skills Program and the Coach of International Criminal Moot Court Team at Pace Law School.

On December 10 and 11, 2014, Pre-Trial Chamber I of the International Criminal Court (ICC) issued decisions calling for delivery to the ICC of two persons under its arrest warrants.

The December 10 finding of non-compliance by Libya, under article 87(7), relates to Saif al-Islam Gaddafi, for whom the ICC issued an arrest warrant in May 2011, charging him with crimes against humanity allegedly committed by Libyan security forces under his command during anti-government protests. The December 11 decision on the admissibility relates to Simone Gbagbo, for whom the ICC issued an arrest warrant in February 2012, charging her with responsibility for crimes against humanity regarding violence committed by government forces against political opponents of her husband, former President Laurent Gbagbo, relating to the November 2010 Ivory Coast presidential election.

Ivory Coast was asserting its right under Rome Statute articles 17 and 19 to challenge the admissibility of Simone Gbagbo’s case on the ground that it was prosecuting her for the same crimes charged in the ICC arrest warrant. In the Gaddafi case, ICC courts had previously rejected Libya’s challenge to the admissibility of the ICC case against him and reminded Libya of its obligation to surrender him to the Court. Libya is not a State Party to the Rome Statute, but in February 2011 the U.N. Security Council acting under its Chapter VII powers issued a Resolution 1970 referring the Libyan situation to the Court and requiring Libyan authorities to fully cooperate with the ICC. The issue before the Court was whether Libya failed to comply with this obligation.

In the Ivory Coast situation, as blogged about earlier, the ICC issued arrest warrants against Ivory Coast nationals Laurent Gbagbo, Simone Gbagbo, and Charles Blé Goudé – all on the same charges relating to the same events. The Ivory Coast government chose to surrender Laurent Gbagbo and Charles Blé Goudé to the ICC, but not Simone Gbagbo. The government’s reasons for this selection are not fully apparent from court documents. Nevertheless, the Ivory Coast decided to challenge the admissibility of Simone Gbagbo’s case. The Court rejected this challenge, finding that the Ivory Coast government failed to show that it was investigating and prosecuting Gbagbo for the same criminal conduct alleged by the ICC Prosecutor. The Court concluded that Ivory Coast must “surrender Simone Gbagbo to the Court without delay.”

With respect to the Gaddafi case, the Court found that Libya failed to comply with repeated requests to deliver Gaddafi to the Court and also failed to comply with requests to return to the Defense privileged documents that Libyan authorities had seized from Gaddafi’s defense counsel. Determining that Libya was depriving the defendant of his rights and preventing the Court from fulfilling its mandate, the Court, under article 87(7), referred the matter to the Security Council, so that the Council may consider measures to secure Libya’s compliance.

ICC had previously utilized article 87(7) to inform the Security Council of the failure of authorities in Chad, Malawi, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo to arrest and surrender Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir, for whom ICC issued arrest warrants charging him with responsibility for war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide, committed during the conflict in Darfur. Al-Bashir remains at large.

In the week preceding the Gaddafi finding, the Trial Chamber V(B) rendered Decision on Prosecution’s application for a finding of non-compliance under article 87(7) stating that the Government of Kenya, a State Party to the Rome Statute, had breached its treaty obligation by failing to provide the Prosecutor with access to information necessary for the case against Kenyan President Kenyatta on charges of crimes against humanity committed during the 2007-2008 post-election violence in Kenya. As a result of Kenya’s breach, ICC Prosecutor Bensouda withdrew the charges against Kenyatta without prejudice. In a December 5, 2014 press release, Bensouda stated that this was “a painful moment for the men, women and children who have suffered tremendously from the horrors of the post-election violence, and who have waited, patiently, for almost seven years to see justice done.”

The Kenyatta, al-Bashir, Gaddafi, and Simone Gbagbo cases illustrate the difficulties the ICC confronts in carrying out its responsibilities to prosecute grave international crimes.

The International Criminal Court’s Jurisdiction over Charles Blé Goudé

POST WRITTEN BY: Prof. Peter Widulski, Assistant Director of the First Year Legal Skills Program and the Coach of International Criminal Moot Court Team at Pace Law School

On March 22, 2014, Ivory Coast authorities delivered Charles Blé Goudé to the International Criminal Court pursuant to an arrest warrant for Blé Goudé issued by the ICC. This raises an issue as to whether the ICC is the appropriate forum for the prosecution of Blé Goudé. See Ivory Coast Delivers Suspect to the International Criminal Court for additional background information.

As a result of an investigation by the ICC Prosecutor into the Ivory Coast Situation authorized in October 2011, three ICC arrest warrants have thus far been made public: for former President Gbagbo (Nov. 23, 2011), for Blé Goudé (Dec. 21, 2011), and for Simone Gbagbo (Feb. 29, 2012). All are Ivory Coast nationals potentially subject to prosecution in the Ivory Coast. The warrants for all three are based on the same four counts of crimes against humanity alleged to have been committed during the same period (from Dec. 16, 2010 to April 12, 2011). The Ivory Coast has delivered Laurent Gbagbo and Charles Blé Goudé to the ICC. However, according to news reports the Ivory Coast has stated its intention not to deliver Simone Gbagbo to the ICC but to prosecute her in its domestic courts, despite the fact that when the Pre-Trial Chamber issued the arrest warrant for her, it directed the ICC Registry to transmit a request to the Ivory Coast government to surrender her to the ICC.

This presents an interesting issue about complementarity. The Preamble of the Rome Statute “[r]ecall[s] that it is the duty of every State to exercise its criminal jurisdiction over those responsible for international crimes,” and “[e]mphasiz[es] that the International Criminal Court … shall be complementary to national criminal jurisdictions.” Article 17 of the Statute requires the ICC to defer to domestic jurisdiction unless the State with jurisdiction “is unwilling or unable genuinely to carry out the investigation or prosecution.”

The ICC Prosecutor addressed the Article 17 issue in January of last year reporting that the Prosecutor’s Office would open an investigation into the Situation in Mali, the most recent of the eight Situations currently before the ICC, which was referred to ICC for investigation in July 2012. The Prosecutor, finding support in ICC Pre-Trial Chamber opinion interpreting Article 17, stated in paragraph 136 that “[t]he absence of national proceedings is sufficient to render a case admissible.” By this logic, it would be appropriate for the ICC to prosecute Laurent Gbagbo and Charles Blé Goudé (because the Ivory Coast has chosen not to prosecute them) but not to prosecute Simone Gbagbo (because the Ivory Coast intends to prosecute her) – even though all three individuals are charged with responsibility for the same crimes on the territory of the Ivory Coast during the same time period.

Unless extenuating circumstances in the Ivory Coast suggest otherwise, this presents a possibility that State Parties – or non-State Parties who accept ICC jurisdiction pursuant to Article 12(3) – may choose selectively to prosecute some high authorities but not others, based on reasons of the State’s own choosing.

Such a possibility seems inconsistent with the Preamble of the Rome Statute and with policy statements issued by organs of the ICC. The Office of the Prosecutor and the Bureau of Assembly of States Parties have endorsed a “positive complementarity” policy to encourage and assist States to prosecute in their national courts crimes that may fall within the ICC’s subject matter jurisdiction.

William Schabas, a respected scholar on ICC issues, has addressed the complementarity issue as posed by Mali’s referral. Prof. Schabas stated that “[t]he profound flaw in the ‘self-referral’ model is that it flies in the face of ‘positive complementarity’. If Mali wants to ensure that its rebels are prosecuted, the Court should encourage it to do so by itself.”

An ICC Pre-Trial Chamber has scheduled a hearing for August 2014 to confirm the charges against Blé Goudé. At the hearing, Blé Goudé will have the opportunity to challenge the Court’s jurisdiction and the charges against him. Whether or not Blé Goudé, exercises his right under Article 19(2)(a), to challenge the admissibility of his case, Article 19(1) states that “[t]he Court may, on its own motion, determine the admissibility of a case in accordance with article 17.”

How the Pre-Trial Chamber deals with this matter will be important for the ICC’s complementarity jurisprudence.

Ivory Coast Delivers Suspect to the International Criminal Court

POST WRITTEN BY: Prof. Peter Widulski, Assistant Director of the First Year Legal Skills Program and the Coach of International Criminal Moot Court Team at Pace Law School

On March 22, 2014, Ivory Coast (Côte d´Ivoire) authorities delivered Charles Blé Goudé to the International Criminal Court (ICC) in The Hague, pursuant to an arrest warrant issued by an ICC Pre-Trial Chamber on December 21, 2011. The warrant was based on information that Blé Goudé bears responsibility for crimes committed by militia forces under his command in the aftermath of the Ivory Coast presidential election in November 2010. After the election, a civil war broke out between forces of former President Laurent Gbagbo (who lost his bid for re-election) and supporters of the newly elected President Alassane Ouattara. More than 3,000 people were killed during this civil war. Blé Goudé, a supporter of Gbagbo, is accused of being responsible as an “indirect co-perpetrator” on four counts of crimes against humanity: murder, rape and other forms of sexual violence, other inhumane acts, and persecution. All of these acts are listed in Article 7 of the ICC’s Rome Statute as the basis for a charge of crimes against humanity “when committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian population ….”

The Ivory Coast was not a Party to the ICC’s Rome Statute at the time the crimes charged were committed. The Ivory Coast deposited its instrument of ratification of the Rome Statute on February 15, 2013.  However, many years earlier, in April 2003, the Ivory Coast Government under then-President Gbagbo accepted ICC jurisdiction over crimes committed on its territory during a previous period of violence. This was done pursuant to Rome Statute Article 12(3), which provides that a non-State Party may lodge a declaration with the ICC accepting jurisdiction over acts committed on its territory that constitute crimes within the ICC’s subject matter jurisdiction. By letters to the ICC in December 2010 and May 2011, newly elected President Ouattara reaffirmed the validity of the April 2003 Declaration (original) and his government’s willingness to cooperate with the ICC.

Following these letters, the ICC Prosecutor requested authorization from the Pre-Trial Chamber to initiate an investigation of the Ivory Coast Situation, which the Chamber provided in October 2011. The Chamber found that information submitted by the Prosecutor provided reasonable grounds to believe that pro-Gbagbo forces committed crimes against civilians that are within the ICC’s subject matter jurisdiction. Among the materials submitted by the Prosecutor were several public reports authored by Human Rights Watch and by the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, informing of murders and rapes committed by pro-Gbagbo forces against civilians who were, or were suspected to be, loyal to Alassane Ouattara.

When two months later, in December 2011, the Pre-Trial Chamber issued the arrest warrant for Blé Goudé, it noted that the Prosecutor’s submission that Blé Goudé is liable as an “indirect co-perpetrator” under Rome Statute Article 25(3)(a) “may well need to be revisited in due course with the parties and participants.” Article 61 of the Rome Statute requires that within a reasonable time after an accused person has been surrendered to the Court, the Pre-Trial Chamber must hold a hearing to confirm the charges. This hearing will provide Blé Goudé an opportunity to challenge the charges against him. It will be the Pre-Trial Chamber’s duty to determine, on the basis of the hearing, whether, pursuant to Article 61(7), “there is sufficient evidence to establish substantial grounds to believe that the person committed each of the crimes charged.” If one or more of the charges are confirmed and the case goes to trial, the Trial Chamber must be convinced, pursuant to Article 66(3), of the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.