Tagged: Pre-Trial Chamber

ICC Confirms War Crimes Charges for Intentional Destruction of Cultural and Religious Buildings

In a recent decision by the ICC’s Pre-Trial Chamber I on March 24, 2016, the Court confirmed charges for war crimes for intentionally directing attacks against religious and cultural buildings under Art. 8(2)(e)(iv) in the case of the Prosecutor v. Ahmad Al Faqi Al Mahdi. The defendant is alleged to have committed war crimes in Timbuktu, Mali, between around June 30, 2012 through around July 11, 2012. Already in a press release dated September 26, 2015, the ICC Prosecutor Fatou Bensouda stated that that

Intentional attacks against historic monuments and buildings dedicated to religion are grave crimes. […] No longer should such reprehensible conduct go unpunished. […] Such attacks affect humanity as a whole. We must stand up to the destruction and defacing of our common heritage.

The ICC’s Rome Statute Article 8(2)(e)(iv) defines war crimes as

(e) Other serious violations of the laws and customs applicable in armed conflicts not of an international character, within the established framework of international law, namely any of the following acts: (iv) Intentionally directing attacks against building dedicated to religion, education, art, science or charitable purposes, historic monuments, hospitals and places where the sick and wounded are collected, provided they are not military objectives; […].

The Pre-Trial Chamber I found sufficient evidence to establish substantial grounds to believe that Ahmad Al Faqi Al Mahdi committed the crimes with which he is charged and reasoned, in paragraphs 40-44 of its decision on confirmation of charges, that it is not disputed that the targeted buildings/structures were “dedicated to religion and constituted historic monuments because of their origins and significance, and that none of them constituted a military objective” and that these buildings were “specifically identified, chosen, and targeted by the perpetrators as objects of their attack, precisely in light and because of their religious and historical character.” The Court further reasoned that the article’s prohibition “attaches to the attack per se” regardless of whether the building/structure was or was not destroyed and concluded that the “attacks” within the meaning of the statute also include acts “which did not bring about a complete destruction” of the targeted building or structure.

This reasoning is a step in the right direction when a Court of international stature recognizes the importance of cultural, historical, religious, and national heritage as embodied in buildings and structures and articulates that even a partial destruction will not go unpunished. The Court appears to focus on the reasons that the objects were targeted for their religious and historical importance within the surrounding society, the fact that they did not constitute military objectives, and that their destruction (even partial) was considered very serious by the local populations rather than the level or the intended level of destruction. As such, it would reason that even vandalizing, defacing, or otherwise damaging a building or structure might fall within the statute according to the Court’s interpretation of Art. 8(2)(e)(iv).

Related Readings:

The ICC’s Principle of Complementarity and Domestic Prosecutions

POST WRITTEN BY: Prof. Peter Widulski, Assistant Director of the First Year Legal Skills Program and the Coach of International Criminal Moot Court Team at Pace Law School.

Before a matter can be fully pursued by the International Criminal Court, the ICC Prosecutor must first in the course of a preliminary examination determine, among other jurisdictional requirements, whether national authorities are actively pursuing a case of potential concern to the ICC. This is because the principle of complementarity, set forth in the Preamble of the Rome Statute and given specificity in Article 17 of the Rome Statute, debars the ICC from pursuing possible crimes within its subject matter jurisdiction if a State that can assert jurisdiction over the matter is doing so.

Article 19 of the Rome Statute provides additional force to the complementarity principle. It states that “[t]he Court shall satisfy itself that it has jurisdiction in any case brought before it” and that “[t]he Court may, on its own motion, determine the admissibility of a case in accordance with Article 17.” Article 19 also allows certain individuals and States to challenge the admissibility of a case.

In one of its first cases, the ICC prosecuted Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, the leader of a group pursuing violent opposition to the government of the Congo – despite the fact that the Congo was pursuing charges against him for genocide and crimes against humanity. Because these charges did not specifically include the crime of enlisting children under age 15 to participate in hostilities (a crime within ICC’s subject matter jurisdiction), the ICC determined that it could pursue that charge against Lubanga, without violating the principle of complementarity. ICC prosecution of Lubanga on this charge resulted in 2012 in the first conviction achieved by the ICC.

In an October 2015 report, ICC Prosecutor Fatou Bensouda needed to address the complementarity issue when requesting authority from a Pre-Trial Chamber to open an investigation into 2008 conflict in the South Ossetia region of Georgia. As written earlier, this conflict includes possible crimes committed by South Ossetian forces rebelling against Georgia and by Georgian forces in response, and – potentially – by Russian forces that intervened in support of the rebels.

In August 2008, Prosecutor Bensouda’s predecessor opened a preliminary examination of this matter. ICC Protocol regarding preliminary examinations requires the Prosecutor to first determine whether there is a reasonable basis to believe that crimes within ICC jurisdiction have been committed. The OTP recently made an affirmative determination regarding the Georgian situation prior to 2015. In her October 2015 Request for Authorization, Prosecutor Bensouda mentions that the seven-year delay in presenting her request was caused by the need, pursuant to Article 17’s complementarity requirement, to monitor efforts by national authorities in Georgia and Russia undertaking investigations of crimes of concern to the ICC.

The Prosecutor further states that Russia’s investigations appear to be proceeding. However, although Georgia had been engaging in investigations since 2008, Georgian officials notified her Office in March of this year that, because of several difficulties, Georgia was discontinuing its investigations. Because of this discontinuance, the Prosecutor concludes that there is at this time no complementarity objection that would defeat her request to open an investigation into the Georgian situation.

An ICC Pre-Trial Chamber must now decide whether to authorize the Prosecutor to open an investigation. The Trial Chamber will determine, among other jurisdictional issues, whether an investigation comports with the principle of complementarity. As noted above, even should the Chamber grant the Prosecutor’s request, challenges to admissibility may be raised at later stages.

The ICC Asks the UN Security Council for Additional Support of Its Work

POST WRITTEN BY: Prof. Peter Widulski, Assistant Director of the First Year Legal Skills Program and the Coach of International Criminal Moot Court Team at Pace Law School.

As reported in the October 24, 2014 press release, the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, Mrs. Fatou Bensouda, on October 23, 2014, addressed the United Nations Security Council on ways the Council can provide more effective support to the International Criminal Court (ICC).

The relationship between the ICC and the Security Council, which the Prosecutor addressed, has important implications for the ICC’s goal to end impunity for grave international crimes. Unlike the International Court of Justice, which was established in 1945 by the U.N. Charter as the U.N.’s principal judicial organ, the International Criminal Court is a judicial body independent of the U.N. The ICC was established through a separate treaty – the Rome Statute that entered into force in 2002 – with different jurisdictional predicates focusing on prosecution of individuals alleged to have committed grave crimes of an internationally recognized nature that are within the ICC’s subject matter jurisdiction.

Despite the ICC’s independent status, the Preamble of the Rome Statute “reaffirm[s] the Purposes and Principles of the Charter of the United Nations [which require] that all States shall refrain [from acting with force] in any … manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.” In addition, Article 13(b) of the Statute accords the Council the capability to refer to the Court for criminal investigation matters the Council deems appropriate pursuant to its responsibility under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter “to maintain or restore international peace and security.”

Article 13(b) provides the Council with the opportunity for the first time to invoke its Chapter VII authority to initiate criminal investigations before a standing international criminal court. Before the ICC’s establishment, the Council, when confronted with situations in which severe crimes threatening international peace occurred, had to provide for both investigation and prosecution through special resolutions and particularly crafted statutes that created ad hoc tribunals, such as those for the former Yugoslavia and for Rwanda.

The authority accorded to the Council by Article 13(b) is powerful and important because it authorizes the Council to refer to the ICC Prosecutor investigation of crimes within the ICC’s subject matter jurisdiction where the ICC’s other jurisdictional predicates would otherwise be lacking. The Council can refer to the ICC Prosecutor investigation of crimes in situations even when the alleged crimes do not occur on the territory of a State Party to the Rome Statute or were not committed by a national of a State Party.

The Security Council has utilized its Article 13(b) authority thus far to refer two situations to the ICC: Darfur, Sudan (2005) and Libya (2011). The ICC Prosecutor has been actively pursuing cases in both of these situations.

Following the Council’s Sudan referral, an ICC court issued arrest warrants for Sudanese president Omar Hassan Ahmad al Bashir in March 2009 and again in July 2010, charging him with co-perpetrator responsibility on multiple counts alleging crimes against humanity, war crimes, and genocide relating to the bloody conflict in Sudan.

Several African States have declined to execute these warrants when Al Bashir traveled to these States for diplomatic purposes. As reported previously on this blog, in April of this year an ICC Pre-Trial Chamber chastised the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) for failing to comply with ICC requests for Al Bashir’s arrest when in February 2014, he visited the DRC to participate in a summit conference of African leaders.

In her October 23 address to the Council and during the discussion that followed, Prosecutor Bensouda gave prominent attention to issues relating to the Darfur situation. She called on the Council, when issuing its Article 13(b) referrals, to advise States of their cooperation responsibilities in the stronger terms that it used in its resolutions creating the ad hoc tribunals. She urged the Council to call on U.N. Member States to cooperate in the arrest of suspects under ICC arrest warrants, and she urged the Council to consider ways to address the failure of States to comply with such obligations.

The International Criminal Court Issues a Ruling in the Situation in Libya

POST WRITTEN BY: Prof. Peter Widulski, Assistant Director of the First Year Legal Skills Program and the Coach of International Criminal Moot Court Team at Pace Law School

On May 21, 2014, the ICC Appeals Chamber, in a divided vote, rejected Libya’s appeal of an ICC Pre-Trial Chamber’s May 31, 2013, ruling that Libya’s criminal investigation of Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi was not sufficient to bar the ICC from conducting its own criminal proceedings against him. On February 26, 2011, the U.N. Security Council, pursuant to Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter and Article 13(b) of the Rome Statute, adopted Resolution 1970 referring the situation in Libya to the ICC for investigation of the violence occurring since 15 February 2011 between the Libyan government, then headed by Muammar Gaddafi, and anti-government protesters. In UN S.C. Res. 1970, the Security Council

[d]eplor[ed] the [Libyan government’s] gross and systematic violation of human rights, including the repression of peaceful demonstrators, [expressed] deep concern at the deaths of civilians, [and] reject[ed] unequivocally the incitement to hostility and violence against the civilian population made from the highest level of the Libyan government.

Following an investigation by the Prosecutor’s Office, on June 27, 2011, an ICC Pre-Trial Chamber issued arrest warrants for Muammar Gaddafi, his son Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi, and Gaddafi’s brother-in-law Abdullah Al-Senussi, on charges of crimes against humanity for murder and persecution. On November 22, 2011, the ICC terminated its case against Muammar Gaddafi following his death.

On May 13, 2014 (a week before the Appeals Chamber announced its ruling), the ICC Prosecutor reported to the Security Council on the situation in Libya and asserted that

Libya continues to be under a pending obligation to surrender [Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi] to the Court [and that] [t]he Government of Libya should immediately surrender Saif Al- Islam Gaddafi to the Court or give reasons for its inability to do so.

An issue on appeal was the proper interpretation of Article 17(1)(a) of the Rome Statute, which requires the ICC to find that a case is not admissible to the ICC when “[t]he case is being investigated or prosecuted by a State which has jurisdiction over it.” Article 19(2)(b) provides that such a State may raise an admissibility challenge in order to retain exclusive jurisdiction of the case. It was undisputed in the appeal that Libya was proceeding with an investigation of Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi that included some incidents referred to in the ICC’s arrest warrant for him. A significant issue on appeal was: How much similarity and overlap between the matters investigated by a domestic jurisdiction and an ICC investigation was required in deciding whether the scope and contours of a domestic investigation would render a ‘case’ inadmissible to the ICC under Article 17?

Libya argued that when interpreting Article 17, the principle of complementarity creates a strong presumption favoring domestic prosecution. By a 4-1 decision, the Appeals Chamber rejected Libya’s argument and held that the evidence provided by Libya regarding its investigation was insufficient to demonstrate that the actions for which Libya was investigating Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi included all matters for which the ICC sought to prosecute him.

In her dissenting opinion, Judge Ušacka explained that the majority’s interpretation of Article 17 did not give sufficient consideration to the importance of the complementarity principle. After reviewing the ICC’s previous admissibility decisions, she asserted in paragraph 39 of her dissent that Libya’s appeal

is the first admissibility case before the Court in which a State has submitted a wealth of information about its ongoing proceedings and has clearly expressed the will to investigate and prosecute the same suspects as well as conduct that is arguably even broader than that contained in the warrants of arrests.

Judge Ušacka added in paragraph 65 “as a concluding remark on the subject of complementarity,” that “the overall goal of the [Rome] Statute to combat impunity can … be achieved by the Court through means of active cooperation with the domestic authorities.” Judge Ušacka would have remanded the case to the Pre-Trial Chamber for consideration of the admissibility issue under a standard that she thought gave more adequate consideration to the Article 17 principle.

Ivory Coast Delivers Suspect to the International Criminal Court

POST WRITTEN BY: Prof. Peter Widulski, Assistant Director of the First Year Legal Skills Program and the Coach of International Criminal Moot Court Team at Pace Law School

On March 22, 2014, Ivory Coast (Côte d´Ivoire) authorities delivered Charles Blé Goudé to the International Criminal Court (ICC) in The Hague, pursuant to an arrest warrant issued by an ICC Pre-Trial Chamber on December 21, 2011. The warrant was based on information that Blé Goudé bears responsibility for crimes committed by militia forces under his command in the aftermath of the Ivory Coast presidential election in November 2010. After the election, a civil war broke out between forces of former President Laurent Gbagbo (who lost his bid for re-election) and supporters of the newly elected President Alassane Ouattara. More than 3,000 people were killed during this civil war. Blé Goudé, a supporter of Gbagbo, is accused of being responsible as an “indirect co-perpetrator” on four counts of crimes against humanity: murder, rape and other forms of sexual violence, other inhumane acts, and persecution. All of these acts are listed in Article 7 of the ICC’s Rome Statute as the basis for a charge of crimes against humanity “when committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian population ….”

The Ivory Coast was not a Party to the ICC’s Rome Statute at the time the crimes charged were committed. The Ivory Coast deposited its instrument of ratification of the Rome Statute on February 15, 2013.  However, many years earlier, in April 2003, the Ivory Coast Government under then-President Gbagbo accepted ICC jurisdiction over crimes committed on its territory during a previous period of violence. This was done pursuant to Rome Statute Article 12(3), which provides that a non-State Party may lodge a declaration with the ICC accepting jurisdiction over acts committed on its territory that constitute crimes within the ICC’s subject matter jurisdiction. By letters to the ICC in December 2010 and May 2011, newly elected President Ouattara reaffirmed the validity of the April 2003 Declaration (original) and his government’s willingness to cooperate with the ICC.

Following these letters, the ICC Prosecutor requested authorization from the Pre-Trial Chamber to initiate an investigation of the Ivory Coast Situation, which the Chamber provided in October 2011. The Chamber found that information submitted by the Prosecutor provided reasonable grounds to believe that pro-Gbagbo forces committed crimes against civilians that are within the ICC’s subject matter jurisdiction. Among the materials submitted by the Prosecutor were several public reports authored by Human Rights Watch and by the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, informing of murders and rapes committed by pro-Gbagbo forces against civilians who were, or were suspected to be, loyal to Alassane Ouattara.

When two months later, in December 2011, the Pre-Trial Chamber issued the arrest warrant for Blé Goudé, it noted that the Prosecutor’s submission that Blé Goudé is liable as an “indirect co-perpetrator” under Rome Statute Article 25(3)(a) “may well need to be revisited in due course with the parties and participants.” Article 61 of the Rome Statute requires that within a reasonable time after an accused person has been surrendered to the Court, the Pre-Trial Chamber must hold a hearing to confirm the charges. This hearing will provide Blé Goudé an opportunity to challenge the charges against him. It will be the Pre-Trial Chamber’s duty to determine, on the basis of the hearing, whether, pursuant to Article 61(7), “there is sufficient evidence to establish substantial grounds to believe that the person committed each of the crimes charged.” If one or more of the charges are confirmed and the case goes to trial, the Trial Chamber must be convinced, pursuant to Article 66(3), of the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.