Tagged: probative value

NY Court of Appeals Overturns a Murder Conviction Because of Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

POST WRITTEN BYProf. Peter Widulski, Assistant Director of the First Year Legal Skills Program and the Coach of International Criminal Moot Court Team at Pace Law School.

On July 1, 2015, the N.Y. Court of Appeals issued a 5-1 ruling regarding a prosecutor’s comments on summation that may overstate the probative value of DNA evidence presented at trial and defense counsel’s obligation to object to such comments. People v. Wright, No. 109, 2015 N.Y. Slip Op. 05621 (July 1, 2015).

The case involved the murder and alleged rape of a woman in Rochester, N.Y., who was found dead of strangulation by means of a ligature, shortly after she had sexual intercourse. A Monroe County prosecutor pursued charges of intentional murder, felony murder, and rape. Defense counsel admitted in opening statement that defendant had intercourse with the victim around the time in question, but argued that this intercourse was consensual. Counsel also vigorously opposed the murder charges.

In its case in chief, the prosecution called three expert witnesses who testified about the potential scientific value in general of the different methods of DNA testing they employed. The experts also carefully explained the limited probative value that could be deduced from their analysis of the ligature and items relating to the victim’s sexual intercourse.

The jury rejected the rape and felony murder charges, but convicted the defendant of intentional murder, pursuant to Penal Law § 125.25(1). The trial court imposed a sentence of 25 years to life. By a 3-2 vote, the Appellate Division affirmed. People v. Wright, 982 N.Y.S. 2d 219, 115  A.D. 3d 1257 (App. Div. 4th Dep’t 2014).

In the July 1 ruling, all six Court of Appeals judges who participated in the case (including especially dissenting Judge Eugene Pigott) credited defense counsel for effectively eliciting from the prosecution’s expert witnesses during cross-examination the limited probative value their testimony provided regarding identifying the defendant as the person possibly responsible for the murder. The appeal therefore focused decisively on statements made by the prosecution on summation and defense counsel’s response (or lack thereof) to such comments.

Upon review of the record, the Court’s majority held that during summation the prosecution prejudicially overstated the probative value of the DNA evidence its own witnesses provided relating to the circumstances of the case. The Court identified several instances in which the prosecutor told the jury that expert testimony conclusively showed that defendant’s DNA was a match for that found on the ligature. The Court noted that these comments contravened what the experts had in fact stated: that DNA analysis was only able to show that the defendant’s DNA could not be excluded from that found on the ligature.

The Court determined that the prosecutor’s “apparent intent was to persuade the jury that the DNA established that defendant had committed the rape and murder, when the evidence did not, and could not, dispositively establish his guilt.” The Court further held that defense counsel provided ineffective assistance because it could not identify any tactical reason to excuse counsel’s “multiple failures” to object to the prosecutor’s “numerous misrepresentations of the evidence.”

In support of its ruling, the majority noted the significant impact that DNA evidence may have on a jury’s deliberations. It further concluded that aside from the expert testimony, evidence produced at trial was insufficient to support defendant’s conviction for second degree murder. Accordingly, the Court reversed the Appellate Division and remanded the case for a new trial.

Judges Quarrel About Counsel’s Silence During Prosecutor’s PowerPoint Summation

Recently, the New York Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction of a defendant accused of killing her husband’s one-year-old daughter, although she had claimed that her counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the prosecution’s questionable PowerPoint presentation during summation. People v. Santiago, NY Slip Op 01261 (2014). At trial, the prosecution claimed that the defendant, Cheryl Santiago, had suffocated her husband’s child after becoming frustrated that the child would not fall asleep. Id. at *5. An expert witness for the prosecution testified that it would have taken the defendant approximately four to six minutes to suffocate the child by using her hand to cover the child’s mouth and nose. Id. at *6.

In summation, the prosecutor presented to the jury  a six minute PowerPoint presentation that consisted of a series of slides using a postmortem photograph of the child. Alluding to the expert’s opinion regarding the amount of time it took for the child to suffocate, the prosecutor suggested to the jury that “if there’s any question in your mind how long six minutes take, take a look at this.” Id. at *7. Without objection from defense counsel, the prosecutor proceeded to play the PowerPoint slides, “with each successive slide progressively fading, until the final slide was entirely white, thus eliminating the image of the [child].” Id.  Notably, some of the slides also contained captions that described the child’s deteriorating medical condition –stating that at one and a half to two minutes- “struggle ends;” four minutes- “brain death occurs;” and four and a half to six minutes –“cardiac death.” Id.

The Court rejected the defendant’s claim that trial counsel was infective for failing to object to the PowerPoint presentation, noting that counsel’s lapse was not a “clear-cut” or “dispositive” omission. Id. at *13. The Court observed that a postmortem photograph itself was properly admitted at trial, and that “[t]he slides depicting an already admitted photograph, with captions accurately tracking prior medical testimony, might reasonably be regarded as relevant and fair, albeit dramatic, commentary on the medical evidence, and not simply an appeal to the jury’s emotions.”Id.

The Court did note that it did not know how the PowerPoint presentation aided the jury in its fact-finding function, or how it was relevant to the cause of the child’s death. Id. Furthermore, the Court also observed that the defendant’s failure to make a timely objection to the PowerPoint’s admission –which would have required the trial court to rule on its admissibility- precluded the Court to extend its inquiry further as to whether the trial court abused its discretion and that such error required a reversal of the judgment of conviction. Id. at *14.  In noting this observation, however, the Court implicitly suggested that its inquiry of the matter was cut short due to counsel’s failure (i.e. ineffective assistance of counsel) –and, by its own admission, an objection would have placed the trial court in an unlikely situation of finding that the PowerPoint evidence had any probative value, and even if so, that its value outweighed its prejudicial impact. Id. at *15 (conceding that the Powerpoint failed to “aid[] the jury in its fact-finding function”).

In dissent, Judge Rivera observed that the PowerPoint presentation had manipulated the evidence and was “designed to inflame the passion of the jury in order to engender prejudice against the defendant.” Id. at 1 (dissent, j. Rivera). She concluded that the Court had erred in not finding that counsel’s failure to object to the PowerPoint presentation had amounted to ineffective assistance of counsel. She noted that counsel’s lapse permitted the prosecution to taint the jury’s deliberative process –which denied the defendant a fair trial. Id. at (“The prosecutor’s use of this Powerpoint imagery was an impermissible attempt to secure a verdict based on emotion and repulsion for the defendant, rather than facts.”).

Judge Rivera was also extremely troubled by the inflammatory nature of the Powerpoint, noting that “[a]ny doubts as to the emotional responses engendered by the presentation are easily dispelled by viewing the slide show, wherein the picture of a 21 month old child, in her pink pajamas, with white froth on her lips, her body prone and lifeless, is projected over and over, fading slightly with each slide, until all that remains is a white background and the memory of her tiny body. One simply cannot be but moved by this depiction.” Id. at 3.

Notably, the ever-changing dynamics of courtroom advocacy due to the technological advances in “trial presentation” software may continue to cause issues for criminal defendants when utilized in an improper fashion by prosecutors. Although such technology can provide each party a better, faster and clearer way of presenting information than conventional trial form, it can also lead the jury away from “the four corners of the evidence” and hinder the truth seeking process. Hopefully, the courts will use caution when allowing evidence to be presented in an unconventional format, and take consideration of the fact that a juror may become more occupied with the entertainment value of the presentation rather than the relevance of the information being conveyed.

Related Readings

  • People v. Caldavado, 78 AD 3d 962 (2nd Dept. 2010) (permitting a “PowerPoint presentation as to the injuries associated with shaken baby syndrome and in allowing an expert witness to shake a doll in order to demonstrate the force necessary to inflict shaken baby syndrome.”).
  • People v. Yates, 290 AD 2d 888 (3rd Dept. 2002) (finding no error in the presentation of  a computer-generated video demonstrating the mechanics of “shaken baby syndrome.”).