Tagged: grave crimes

ICC Confirms War Crimes Charges for Intentional Destruction of Cultural and Religious Buildings

In a recent decision by the ICC’s Pre-Trial Chamber I on March 24, 2016, the Court confirmed charges for war crimes for intentionally directing attacks against religious and cultural buildings under Art. 8(2)(e)(iv) in the case of the Prosecutor v. Ahmad Al Faqi Al Mahdi. The defendant is alleged to have committed war crimes in Timbuktu, Mali, between around June 30, 2012 through around July 11, 2012. Already in a press release dated September 26, 2015, the ICC Prosecutor Fatou Bensouda stated that that

Intentional attacks against historic monuments and buildings dedicated to religion are grave crimes. […] No longer should such reprehensible conduct go unpunished. […] Such attacks affect humanity as a whole. We must stand up to the destruction and defacing of our common heritage.

The ICC’s Rome Statute Article 8(2)(e)(iv) defines war crimes as

(e) Other serious violations of the laws and customs applicable in armed conflicts not of an international character, within the established framework of international law, namely any of the following acts: (iv) Intentionally directing attacks against building dedicated to religion, education, art, science or charitable purposes, historic monuments, hospitals and places where the sick and wounded are collected, provided they are not military objectives; […].

The Pre-Trial Chamber I found sufficient evidence to establish substantial grounds to believe that Ahmad Al Faqi Al Mahdi committed the crimes with which he is charged and reasoned, in paragraphs 40-44 of its decision on confirmation of charges, that it is not disputed that the targeted buildings/structures were “dedicated to religion and constituted historic monuments because of their origins and significance, and that none of them constituted a military objective” and that these buildings were “specifically identified, chosen, and targeted by the perpetrators as objects of their attack, precisely in light and because of their religious and historical character.” The Court further reasoned that the article’s prohibition “attaches to the attack per se” regardless of whether the building/structure was or was not destroyed and concluded that the “attacks” within the meaning of the statute also include acts “which did not bring about a complete destruction” of the targeted building or structure.

This reasoning is a step in the right direction when a Court of international stature recognizes the importance of cultural, historical, religious, and national heritage as embodied in buildings and structures and articulates that even a partial destruction will not go unpunished. The Court appears to focus on the reasons that the objects were targeted for their religious and historical importance within the surrounding society, the fact that they did not constitute military objectives, and that their destruction (even partial) was considered very serious by the local populations rather than the level or the intended level of destruction. As such, it would reason that even vandalizing, defacing, or otherwise damaging a building or structure might fall within the statute according to the Court’s interpretation of Art. 8(2)(e)(iv).

Related Readings:

N.Y. Court of Appeals Judge Robert Smith Hears His Last Oral Arguments

POST WRITTEN BY: Prof. Peter Widulski, Assistant Director of the First Year Legal Skills Program and the Coach of International Criminal Moot Court Team at Pace Law School.

On November 19, 2014, the Court of Appeals heard oral arguments in four cases, two of which presented criminal procedure issues relating to whether a defendant can employ a post-verdict, pre-sentence CPL § 330.30 motion to raise issues based on facts not discovered until after the verdict was rendered and have such facts considered as part of the record for purposes of direct appeal. In response to probing questions from the Court, all attorneys involved made forceful and well-informed arguments.

The November 19 arguments were the last that Judge Robert Smith will hear prior to his retirement from the Court. In accord with Court of Appeals tradition, at the conclusion of the arguments the other members of the Court rose and applauded Judge Smith. Chief Judge Lippman expressed his thanks and admiration to Judge Smith for his dedicated service to the Court before an audience that included the Judge’s family and virtually all members of the Court staff.

One of the most important legacies of Judge Smith’s tenure regarding criminal justice issues is the strong and thoughtful stance he took in many cases to curb prosecutors’ unfounded employment of a depraved indifference murder charge pursuant to N.Y. Penal Law § 125.25(2).  Section 125.25(2) provides for a second degree murder charge in cases where a defendant, without intent, causes the death of another person “[u]nder circumstances evincing a depraved indifference to human life [when the defendant] engages in conduct which creates a grave risk of death ….”

Dissenting in a case in which the Court majority upheld three depraved indifference murder convictions, Judge Smith stated that

experience shows that juries, especially in cases with inflammatory facts, will often find depraved indifference where the evidence does not support it, and as a result we have reversed many convictions in recent years because the proof of this mens rea was insufficient.

In the cases in question, Judge Smith found that the facts showed at most a basis for conviction on a lesser charge of second degree manslaughter. He cautioned the majority that its affirmance of the murder convictions “departs from the rigor we have previously shown [in depraved indifference murder appeals] and makes it more difficult to attain our long-sought goal of reserving convictions of this crime for the very few cases that warrant them.”

This writer was one of the clerks employed by Judge Smith when he took the bench in January 2004. After oral arguments one day during the winter of 2004, my co-clerks and I met with the Judge to discuss that day’s oral arguments. In a criminal appeal argued that day, when the Court pressed the defense attorney on a secondary argument he made for his client, the attorney responded in a sheepish way and declined to pursue that argument. Judge Smith asked us what we thought about this: he wanted to convey that the attorney’s response was unacceptable. He told us that the attorney had a basis to support this argument and that he should have presented it, prefacing his argument by saying: “It is my responsibility to fight for my client’s liberty with everything I have.”

Cases:

  • People v. Heidgen, 3 N.E.3d 657 (N.Y. 2013) (Smith, J., dissenting)