Tagged: newly discovered evidence

NY Court of Appeals Decides to Review 440.10 Summary Denials

In one of its last decisions of 2014, the Court of Appeals held that it will begin reviewing the Appellate Division’s summary denials of CPL 440.10(1)(g) motions.  The Court had held in People v. Crimmins38 N.Y.2d 407, 409 (1974) that

[t]he power to review a discretionary order denying a motion to vacate judgement upon the ground of newly discovered evidence ceases at the Appellate Division.

For nearly 40 years, the Crimmins decision kept the Court of Appeals from reviewing and determining whether such denials constituted “abuse of discretion.” People v. Jones, No. 14-219, ___ N.E.3d ___, 2014 N.Y. Slip Op. 08760, 2 (Dec. 16, 2014). In Jones, this Court overruled itself and explained that “the rule enunciated in Crimmins has needlessly restricted this Court’s power of review concerning CPL 440.10(1)(g) motions….”

In Jones, the Court held that the Appellate Division abused its discretion in summarily denying a defendant’s motion for an evidentiary hearing as part of his efforts to vacate his conviction on the ground of newly discovered evidence, pursuant to CPL 440.10(1)(g). Mr. Jones claimed that newly discovered DNA evidence would exclude him as the perpetrator of crimes of which he was convicted in 1981.  This decision signals a step in the right direction for the NY judiciary trying to grapple with evidence, like DNA, that may not have been available at the time of trial.

NY Appellate Court Upholds Vacatur of Conviction Based Upon DNA Evidence

On February 27, 2014, the NY Appellate Division, First Department, unanimously affirmed a prior judgment entered in Bronx County of New York (Clark, D.), vacating Tyrone Hicks’ conviction for Attempted Rape in the First Degree (PL § 110/130.35[1]) and Attempted Sodomy in the First Degree (PL § 110/130.50[1]), based upon his presentation of DNA evidence that had been unearthed by his lawyer, Professor Adele Bernhard of New York Law School. At trial, the only evidence linking Hicks to the crime was the uncorroborated eyewitness identification by the victim. The jury rejected Hicks’ alibi defense, which consisted of testimony from his son-in-law, who claimed that Hicks was home when the attack occurred.

In 2009, Professor Bernhard, who directs the NYLS Post-Conviction Innocence Clinic, successfully obtained testing of genetic material found under the victim’s fingernails that had been collected shortly after the crime. The results of such testing concluded that there was male genetic material recovered from the victim’s fingernail scrapings that did not match the defendant’s DNA. Professor Bernhard petitioned the court to vacate Hick’s conviction based upon both the DNA results, and the likelihood that Hicks had been misidentified as the assailant.

In vacating Hicks’ conviction, the Bronx County Court concluded that a new trial was warranted under CPL § 440.10 (1) (g), since the results of the DNA testing “could not have been discovered prior to [Hicks’] trial,” and were “unquestionably material to the issues of identity” – undermining the “sole evidence connecting [Hicks] to the crime.” The court observed that “the DNA test results ruling out the defendant’s genetic profile [had] pronounced forensic value where there [was] multiple differing descriptions of the perpetrator by the sole identifying witness and no physical evidence linking the defendant to the crime.” Id. at 4.  The court explained that the jury may have seen it to be “a particularly powerful piece of evidence, especially where the identity of [the] attacker was the primary issue at trial.”

The Appellate Court upheld the lower court’s decision to vacate the conviction based upon the defendant’s showing that the DNA results created a “reasonable probability that he would have obtained a more favorable verdict.” The Court also concluded that “the DNA evidence [was] material and exculpatory because it support[ed] identifying someone other than defendant as the attacker.” Notably, the Court rejected the government’s claim that the DNA results were cumulative, and not newly discovered under CPL 440.10 (g). Specifically, the Court noted that given the recent amendments to CPL 440.10, namely CPL 440.10 (1) (g-1), the defendant “no longer ha[d] to show that the results of [DNA] testing is newly discovered evidence in order to seek vacatur of a judgment of conviction.”

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Actual Innocence: Landmark Decision Changes Post-Conviction Landscape in New York

A landmark decision by the Appellate Division, Second Department has given new hope to individuals wrongfully convicted of a crime in the state of New York, and unable to obtain post-conviction relief due to the procedural restraints statutorily imposed under New York Criminal Procedure Law. On January 15, 2014,  the Appellate Court Second Department handed down its epic decision, becoming the first New York Appellate Court to recognize a freestanding claim of actual innocence, reaffirming that the incarceration of an innocent person is inherently unconstitutional.

In People v. Hamilton, the Court ruled that a defendant’s claim of actual innocence may now be recognized as a “freestanding” ground to vacate a judgment of conviction pursuant to NY CPL 440.10. (1)(h), which provides that  a court may vacate a judgement if obtained in violation of a defendant’s constitutional rights. Notably, the Court directed  that a defendant’s claim of “actual innocence”  may be pursued  independently of the other grounds for relief prescribed by New York’s post-judgement statute, and can even be supported by evidence that may fail to survive the “newly discovered” criteria imposed under NY CPL 440.10(1)(g). The Court explained that the defendant may present a claim of actual innocence based upon  new evidence, whether or not it satisfies the Salemi factors or is barred by other legal hurdles, such as prior adverse court determinations.

The Court  directed  that relief based upon an actual innocence claim should only be granted when the court is presented with clear and convincing evidence that the defendant is innocent. The court reasoned that

Mere doubt as to the defendant’s guilt, or a preponderance of conflicting evidence as to the defendant’s guilt, is insufficient, since a convicted defendant no longer enjoys the presumption of innocence, and in fact is presumed to be guilty.

The Court also explained that an exploration into the merits of a case may be necessary when a prima facie showing of actual innocence has been made by a defendant. In this case, the court found that Hamilton had made such a showing to require a hearing.

In response to the court’s decision, Derrick Hamilton, who spent 20 years in prison for murder, stated that “it is a crime that it has taken this long for me to receive a shot at justice.” Since his conviction, Hamilton had spent the last twenty two years  battling the criminal justice system in an effort  to clear his name. All prior attempts to vacate his conviction were denied, although making a credible presentation of alibi evidence, witness recantation, and possible manipulation of witnesses by police. The Hamilton case has also been vetted for  review by the Brooklyn District Attorney’s Office, which is currently reviewing cases handled by retired detective Louis Scarcella. The Office has undertaken a review of about 50 homicide cases to determine whether the defendants were wrongfully convicted as a result of possible police misconduct.

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Battle of Experts: Controversy in Shaken Baby Case Set for NY Court

A New York court is set to hear testimony that will decide whether a shift in the medical community over the prognosis of shaken baby syndrome (“SBS”) constitutes newly discovered evidence under Article 440 of the New York Criminal Procedure Law. Supreme Court Justice James Piampiano has ordered a hearing in People v. Rene Bailey after being presented with strong evidence that the medical community’s standard for diagnosing shaken baby syndrome has significantly shifted over the years since Bailey’s conviction.

 Rene Bailey, once a daycare provider, was convicted of violently shaking a two year old child and causing severe brain injuries that resulted in the child’s death. At trial, the proof against Bailey rested primarily upon the testimony of a state medical examiner, who had claimed that the child’s internal brain injuries could only be caused by a violent shaking of the  body (SBS), and could not be attributed to any other cause known within the medical community at the time.

Contrary to the state’s medical examiner, medical experts for Bailey have now opined that a diagnosis of shaken baby syndrome should not have rested exclusively on the presentation of the child’s internal brain injuries, consisting of subdural hematoma, retinal hemorrhaging, and cerebral edema (“triad of injuries”). As of today, many members within the medical community no longer promote an exclusive diagnosis of SBS based solely upon the presentation of internal brain injuries, realizing that causes unassociated with shaking may be the root of the issue. Since Bailey’s conviction, medical studies have also shown that a child may suffer the “triad of injuries” as a result of impact to the brain caused by common short distance falls. Notably, as opined in an article by NY Times writer Emily Bazelon, some biomechanical engineers have raised doubts, [in the absence of external injuries], about whether it’s even possible to shake a baby to death.

Aside from new medical testimony, the Court will also entertain evidence that has been discovered by her attorney, Professor Adele Bernhard of New York Law School, which shows that her client may be factually innocent. The evidence presented by a new witness appears to support Bailey’s continuous declaration that she had not shaken the alleged victim, and further corroborates the observation of another child, who was present at the time of the occurrence and had initially stated to the police that the alleged victim had jumped off a chair and hit her head on the ground.  Justice Piampiano has also reserved judgment upon whether further discovery will be ordered in the matter, including whether Bailey’s request for the State to produce notes from an interview of a third child eyewitness will be granted. According to court papers, a third child may have also been present at the time of the alleged occurrence, and the child may have made exculpatory declarations to police consistent with Bailey’s version of the event  that were never disclosed to trial counsel.

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