Tagged: SCOTUS

Supreme Court “Consents” To Expanding Warrantless Search Exception

For the past forty years, the United States Supreme Court has continually tinkered with the exceptions to the Fourth Amendment’s general prohibition on warrantless searches, including the allowance of warrantless searches that are conducted after the police have obtained voluntary consent from the individual whose property is being searched. In 1974, the United States Supreme Court ruled that the Fourth Amendment recognizes a warrantless search of a premises when the police obtain the consent of an occupant who shares common authority over the property. United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 170 (1974). Thereafter, the Court expanded its decision in Matlock to include situations where a warrantless search of a premises was conducted based upon the “consent of a third party whom the police, at the time of the entry, reasonably believe to possess common authority over the premises, but who in fact does not.”  Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 186 (1990).  In 2006, the Court again modified its prior decisions on this issue, ruling that the consent of one co-occupant was insufficient to authorize police to conduct a warrantless search of a premises if another objecting occupant was “physically present” at the time. Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103 (2006).

On Tuesday, the Court decided to rework its decision in Randolph, and severely limit its future application. In Fernandez v. California, the Court held that the rule set forth in Randolf was “extremely narrow,” and does not apply to situations when the police have received consent from one co-occupant after the objecting occupant had been removed from the premises. The Court explained that the co-occupant’s initial objection to the police’s entry is not everlasting, and can be overridden by the consent of a co-occupant after the objecting party is no longer present. Notably, the Court held that the consent of a co-occupant will authorize a search even when the objecting party has been removed from the premises involuntarily, including when removal occurs as a result of police conduct. The Court explained that searches occurring after the police have removed the objector will be permissible so long as the reason for removing the occupant was “objectively reasonable.” In Fernandez, the police had removed the objecting co-occupant after he was suspected of being involved in a robbery and believed to have battered his girlfriend moments before the police had arrived. Several hours later, the police returned to the residence and conducted a warrantless search of the premises based upon the girlfriend’s consent.

Three members of the Court (Justices Ginsburg, Sotomayor, & Kagan) disagreed with the majority’s decision, noting that “[i]n its zeal to diminish Randolph, today’s decision overlooks the warrant requirement’s venerable role as the “bulwark of Fourth Amendment protection.” They explained that “[r]educing Randolph to a “narrow exception,” the Court declares the main rule to be that “consent by one resident of jointly occupied premises is generally sufficient to justify a warrantless search. Such a declaration “has it backwards, for consent searches themselves are a “`jealously and carefully drawn’ exception” to “the Fourth Amendment rule ordinarily prohibiting the warrantless entry of a person’s house as unreasonable per se.” (citations omitted).

Related readings

SCOTUS Agrees to Hear and Resolve Search of Cell Phones Incident to Arrest

The U.S. Supreme Court recently granted certiorari in two cases involving searches of cell phones incident to arrest. Riley v. California, No. 13-132, review granted 1/17/14; United States v. Wurie, No. 13-212, review granted 1/17/14.

There is a split of authority on this issue:  some courts have held that existing Supreme Court precedent involving search incident to arrest is applicable, i.e., that a phone is no different than any other hand-held container and may be searched incident to arrest without a warrant, probable cause, or even reasonable suspicion.  Other courts have refused to apply that precedent, treating cell phones as sui generis because of the tremendous amount of personal information contained in a typical smart phone.

In Wurie, the First Circuit held that mobile phones are different from the containers other courts have allowed to be searched incident to arrest. It held unconstitutional a police search of the defendant’s numbers in the call log on his mobile phone incident to his arrest.  United States v. Wurie, 728 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2013).  In Riley, the California state court upheld a warrantless search of the defendant’s mobile phone address book, photographs and videos incident to his arrest for a firearms offense that then linked him to a drive-by shooting. People v. Riley, No. SCD226240, 2013 WL 475242 (Cal. Ct. App. 2013) (not certified for publication in official reports and not to be cited pursuant to California Rules of Court, Rule 8.1115(a) except as provided in Rule 8.1115(b)).

Denial of Cert by Supreme Court: Racial Comments by Prosecutors

The U.S. Supreme Court recently denied certiorari in a case involving racial comments by a prosecutor in summation.   Defense counsel had not objected to the comments.  Justice Sotomayor, joined by Justice Breyer,  wrote to make clear that such comments are intolerable.

Pace Professor Bennett Gershman discusses the issue.

U.S. Supreme Court Enlarges Scope of Plain Error Doctrine

This week, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the plain error doctrine applies to unpreserved errors on issues of law that at the time of trial were unresolved, as long as the error was plain at the time of appeal.  Pace Professor Lissa Griffin comments on the decision in: Hugh B. Kaplan, Plain Error – Supreme Court Resolves Circuit Split Over Interpretation of Plain-Error Rule, 92 CrL 637 (Feb. 27, 2013).

Read the full text of Henderson v. United States