Tagged: UN Security Council

The International Criminal Court Issues a Ruling in the Situation in Libya

POST WRITTEN BY: Prof. Peter Widulski, Assistant Director of the First Year Legal Skills Program and the Coach of International Criminal Moot Court Team at Pace Law School

On May 21, 2014, the ICC Appeals Chamber, in a divided vote, rejected Libya’s appeal of an ICC Pre-Trial Chamber’s May 31, 2013, ruling that Libya’s criminal investigation of Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi was not sufficient to bar the ICC from conducting its own criminal proceedings against him. On February 26, 2011, the U.N. Security Council, pursuant to Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter and Article 13(b) of the Rome Statute, adopted Resolution 1970 referring the situation in Libya to the ICC for investigation of the violence occurring since 15 February 2011 between the Libyan government, then headed by Muammar Gaddafi, and anti-government protesters. In UN S.C. Res. 1970, the Security Council

[d]eplor[ed] the [Libyan government’s] gross and systematic violation of human rights, including the repression of peaceful demonstrators, [expressed] deep concern at the deaths of civilians, [and] reject[ed] unequivocally the incitement to hostility and violence against the civilian population made from the highest level of the Libyan government.

Following an investigation by the Prosecutor’s Office, on June 27, 2011, an ICC Pre-Trial Chamber issued arrest warrants for Muammar Gaddafi, his son Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi, and Gaddafi’s brother-in-law Abdullah Al-Senussi, on charges of crimes against humanity for murder and persecution. On November 22, 2011, the ICC terminated its case against Muammar Gaddafi following his death.

On May 13, 2014 (a week before the Appeals Chamber announced its ruling), the ICC Prosecutor reported to the Security Council on the situation in Libya and asserted that

Libya continues to be under a pending obligation to surrender [Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi] to the Court [and that] [t]he Government of Libya should immediately surrender Saif Al- Islam Gaddafi to the Court or give reasons for its inability to do so.

An issue on appeal was the proper interpretation of Article 17(1)(a) of the Rome Statute, which requires the ICC to find that a case is not admissible to the ICC when “[t]he case is being investigated or prosecuted by a State which has jurisdiction over it.” Article 19(2)(b) provides that such a State may raise an admissibility challenge in order to retain exclusive jurisdiction of the case. It was undisputed in the appeal that Libya was proceeding with an investigation of Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi that included some incidents referred to in the ICC’s arrest warrant for him. A significant issue on appeal was: How much similarity and overlap between the matters investigated by a domestic jurisdiction and an ICC investigation was required in deciding whether the scope and contours of a domestic investigation would render a ‘case’ inadmissible to the ICC under Article 17?

Libya argued that when interpreting Article 17, the principle of complementarity creates a strong presumption favoring domestic prosecution. By a 4-1 decision, the Appeals Chamber rejected Libya’s argument and held that the evidence provided by Libya regarding its investigation was insufficient to demonstrate that the actions for which Libya was investigating Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi included all matters for which the ICC sought to prosecute him.

In her dissenting opinion, Judge Ušacka explained that the majority’s interpretation of Article 17 did not give sufficient consideration to the importance of the complementarity principle. After reviewing the ICC’s previous admissibility decisions, she asserted in paragraph 39 of her dissent that Libya’s appeal

is the first admissibility case before the Court in which a State has submitted a wealth of information about its ongoing proceedings and has clearly expressed the will to investigate and prosecute the same suspects as well as conduct that is arguably even broader than that contained in the warrants of arrests.

Judge Ušacka added in paragraph 65 “as a concluding remark on the subject of complementarity,” that “the overall goal of the [Rome] Statute to combat impunity can … be achieved by the Court through means of active cooperation with the domestic authorities.” Judge Ušacka would have remanded the case to the Pre-Trial Chamber for consideration of the admissibility issue under a standard that she thought gave more adequate consideration to the Article 17 principle.

ICC Pursues the Arrest of Al Bashir

POST WRITTEN BY: Prof. Peter Widulski, Assistant Director of the First Year Legal Skills Program and the Coach of International Criminal Moot Court Team at Pace Law School

On April 9, 2014, the Pre-Trial Chamber II of the International Criminal Court (ICC) issued a decision chastising the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) for failing to comply with ICC requests for the arrest and surrender of Omar Al Bashir, the President of Sudan.

In March 2005, the U.N. Security Council adopted a resolution referring the Situation in Darfur, Sudan, to the ICC for investigation. This was the first time the Security Council referred a situation to the ICC pursuant to Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter and Article 13(b) of the ICC’s Rome Statute. Following an investigation by the ICC Prosecutor, the ICC issued two arrest warrants for Al Bashir, first in March 2009 and second in July 2010, charging him with responsibility for war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide, committed during the bloody conflict in Darfur.

The Pre-Trial Chamber’s rebuke of the DRC was occasioned by the DRC’s failure to arrest Al Bashir when in late February 2014, he visited the DRC to participate in a summit conference of African leaders to discuss matters of common economic concern in Eastern and Southern Africa. Having advance notice of this visit, the Pre-Trial Chamber issued a request to the DRC to arrest and surrender Al Bashir, pursuant to the previously issued warrants. The DRC is a State Party to the Rome Statute, and Part IX of the Statute requires State Parties to cooperate with the ICC with regard, among other matters, to the arrest and surrender of persons for whom the ICC has issued an arrest warrant.

Among its reasons for not arresting Al Bashir during his February visit, the DRC asserted that it was obligated to respect Al Bashir’s immunity as a head of state, despite the fact that Article 27 of the Rome Statute does not recognize head of state immunity as a bar to ICC prosecution. The DRC, not implausibly, found authority for its position in Rome Statute Article 98(1), which states that the ICC “may not proceed with a request for surrender or assistance which would require the requested State to act inconsistently with its obligations under international law with respect to the State or diplomatic immunity of a person or property of a third State, unless the Court can first obtain the cooperation of that third State for the waiver of the immunity.” Sudan is such a “third State,” not being a State Party.

The Pre-Trial Chamber found the DRC’s claim unavailing because of the Security Council’s referral of the Sudan Situation to the ICC. The Chamber stated in paragraph 31 of its Decision that the Security Council, when referring the Darfur Situation by way of a Resolution pursuant to its Chapter VII authority, “implicitly lifted the immunities of Omar Al Bashir ….” (Both the DRC and Sudan are U.N. members, subject to Security Council authority.)

The Chamber forcefully stated in paragraph 33 of its decision that compliance with a Security Council referral to the ICC was of paramount importance; otherwise such a referral “would never achieve its ultimate goal … to put an end to impunity.”

The Chamber found that the DRC’s failure to arrest Al Bashir constituted a failure of the DRC to comply with its obligations to cooperate with the ICC. Accordingly, the Chamber stated that it was referring its decision to the Security Council and to the Assembly of State Parties.

The Chamber has made a strong statement in support of the ICC’s mandate. But its decision will continue some of the political controversies in which the ICC has been involved, especially given the fact that the DRC and Sudan are member States of the African Union, which has criticized the ICC for allegedly giving excessive and inappropriate attention to affairs in Africa.

The International Criminal Court Convicts Katanga for War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity

POST WRITTEN BY: Prof. Peter Widulski, Assistant Director of the First Year Legal Skills Program and the Coach of International Criminal Moot Court Team at Pace Law School

On March 7, 2014, a Trial Chamber of the International Criminal Court (ICC) rendered a guilty verdict against Germain Katanga, relating to an investigation commenced in June 2004 by the ICC Prosecutor into the Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). This is the second conviction achieved by an ICC Prosecutor since the entry into force of the ICC’s Rome Statute on July 1, 2002.

The ICC’s first conviction was rendered in 2012 against Thomas Lubanga Dyilo. The Lubanga Case also arose out of the Prosecutors’ investigation of the DRC situation. Lubanga, the leader of an armed group opposed to the DRC government, was convicted pursuant to Article 8 of the Rome Statute of the war crime of conscripting children into his military forces.

Germain Katanga, who also led an armed force opposed to the DRC, was also convicted of Article 8 war crimes. Notably, however, he was also found guilty on one count of a crime against humanity, pursuant to Article 7(1)(a) of the Rome Statute. This represents the first conviction the ICC Prosecutor has obtained on a charge of crimes against humanity.

Pursuing a charge of crimes against humanity requires the ICC Prosecutor, under Article 7(1) of the Rome Statute, to prove that the underlying criminal acts were committed “as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian population ….”

During the 1990s prior to the entry into force of the Rome Statute, the United Nations Security Council, pursuant to its authority under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter, enacted the Statutes of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia and the International Tribunal for Rwanda. These statutes contain similar requirements for prosecution of crimes against humanity.

In accordance with these statutory requirements, the ICTY and the ICTR have obtained convictions against many defendants on charges of crimes against humanity. While these cases are not binding on ICC Court, when in September 2008 the ICC Pre-Trial Chamber confirmed the crimes against humanity charge against Katanga, it explicitly referenced and found guidance from the ICTY and ICTR cases regarding their interpretation of the elements required to sustain a crimes against humanity charge.

The Trial Chamber found Katanga not guilty of some of the war crimes charged and one of the crimes against humanity charged. Both the Defense and the Prosecutor have 30 days within which to appeal the judgment. The Trial Chamber will soon conduct proceedings with respect to the sentence and reparations for the victims.