Category: Int’l and Comparative Criminal Law

UN Mechanism for International Criminal Tribunals

As mentioned in our earlier posts the ad hoc international criminal tribunals have been preparing to transition their responsibilities to the Mechanism after completing their mandate and marking 20 years of existence in 2014. The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) closed on Dec. 31, 2015 and the Mechanism assumed it work as part of its mission to preserve and promote the legacy of the tribunal.

The Mechanism for International Criminal Tribunals (the MICT) 

was established by the United Nations Security Council on 22 December 2010 (S/RES/1966 (2010)) [acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter] to carry out a number of essential functions of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) and the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), after the completion of their respective mandates.

The SC Res. 1966 in its Annex I includes the Statute of the Residual Mechanism articulating the Machanism’s competence, functions, structure, and organization, the election of judges, rules of procedure and evidence, the role of the Prosecutor and Registry, investigation, trial, right of the accused, protection of victims and witnesses, judgments and penalties, appellate procedures, enforcement of sentencing, pardons, and management of the archives. The Mechanism has two branches; one covering the remaining functions of the ICTR and the other of the ICTY. According to the Mechanism’s website, it is tasked with “continuing the jurisdiction, rights and obligations and essential functions of the ICTR” and “maintaining the legacy of both institutions.”

The President of the ICTY, Theodor Meron in its address to the UN Security Council on June 7, 2012 stated:

By establishing the Mechanism, the Council has helped to guarantee that the closure of the two pioneering ad hoc tribunals does not open the way for impunity to reign once more.

The Mechanism commenced action on July 1, 2013 temporarily overlapping with the ICTR and ICTY as both tribunals complete their outstanding mandates. The Security Council expects the Mechanism to function until it is decided otherwise with periodic reviews of its progress every 2 years. The first progress report (S/2015/883) was compiled and submitted in November 2015 for the Security Council review in 2016. In paragraphs 52-59 of the status report, President Meron describes the purpose and function of the Archives and Records stating that the Mechanism has the responsibility to manage, maintain, preserve and provide access to archives of the Mechanism and the two tribunals, as required under art. 27 of the Mechanism’s statute.

It is the Mechanism’s website ensuring access to information and documents related to the tribunals as well as the documents related to the Mechanism’s work, including basic documents (statute, rules of procedure and evidence, regulations and policies, reports and publication and budget), as well as links to the ICTR and ICTY archives (including basic documents, cases, news, reports, etc.), and links to review reports submitted to the Security Council on the progress of the Mechanism, news, and documents related to cases handled by the Mechanism.

The ICC’s Principle of Complementarity and Domestic Prosecutions

POST WRITTEN BY: Prof. Peter Widulski, Assistant Director of the First Year Legal Skills Program and the Coach of International Criminal Moot Court Team at Pace Law School.

Before a matter can be fully pursued by the International Criminal Court, the ICC Prosecutor must first in the course of a preliminary examination determine, among other jurisdictional requirements, whether national authorities are actively pursuing a case of potential concern to the ICC. This is because the principle of complementarity, set forth in the Preamble of the Rome Statute and given specificity in Article 17 of the Rome Statute, debars the ICC from pursuing possible crimes within its subject matter jurisdiction if a State that can assert jurisdiction over the matter is doing so.

Article 19 of the Rome Statute provides additional force to the complementarity principle. It states that “[t]he Court shall satisfy itself that it has jurisdiction in any case brought before it” and that “[t]he Court may, on its own motion, determine the admissibility of a case in accordance with Article 17.” Article 19 also allows certain individuals and States to challenge the admissibility of a case.

In one of its first cases, the ICC prosecuted Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, the leader of a group pursuing violent opposition to the government of the Congo – despite the fact that the Congo was pursuing charges against him for genocide and crimes against humanity. Because these charges did not specifically include the crime of enlisting children under age 15 to participate in hostilities (a crime within ICC’s subject matter jurisdiction), the ICC determined that it could pursue that charge against Lubanga, without violating the principle of complementarity. ICC prosecution of Lubanga on this charge resulted in 2012 in the first conviction achieved by the ICC.

In an October 2015 report, ICC Prosecutor Fatou Bensouda needed to address the complementarity issue when requesting authority from a Pre-Trial Chamber to open an investigation into 2008 conflict in the South Ossetia region of Georgia. As written earlier, this conflict includes possible crimes committed by South Ossetian forces rebelling against Georgia and by Georgian forces in response, and – potentially – by Russian forces that intervened in support of the rebels.

In August 2008, Prosecutor Bensouda’s predecessor opened a preliminary examination of this matter. ICC Protocol regarding preliminary examinations requires the Prosecutor to first determine whether there is a reasonable basis to believe that crimes within ICC jurisdiction have been committed. The OTP recently made an affirmative determination regarding the Georgian situation prior to 2015. In her October 2015 Request for Authorization, Prosecutor Bensouda mentions that the seven-year delay in presenting her request was caused by the need, pursuant to Article 17’s complementarity requirement, to monitor efforts by national authorities in Georgia and Russia undertaking investigations of crimes of concern to the ICC.

The Prosecutor further states that Russia’s investigations appear to be proceeding. However, although Georgia had been engaging in investigations since 2008, Georgian officials notified her Office in March of this year that, because of several difficulties, Georgia was discontinuing its investigations. Because of this discontinuance, the Prosecutor concludes that there is at this time no complementarity objection that would defeat her request to open an investigation into the Georgian situation.

An ICC Pre-Trial Chamber must now decide whether to authorize the Prosecutor to open an investigation. The Trial Chamber will determine, among other jurisdictional issues, whether an investigation comports with the principle of complementarity. As noted above, even should the Chamber grant the Prosecutor’s request, challenges to admissibility may be raised at later stages.

ICC Prosecutor Requests Authorization to Investigate a Conflict in Georgia Involving Russia

POST WRITTEN BY: Prof. Peter Widulski, Assistant Director of the First Year Legal Skills Program and the Coach of International Criminal Moot Court Team at Pace Law School.

The ICC Prosecutor Fatou Bensouda is seeking authorization to investigate possible war crimes and crimes against humanity committed seven years ago in the context of a clash between Russia and Georgia. The conflict involves the effort by the former Soviet Union Republic Georgia to retain control of its region of South Ossetia.

In an October 13, 2015 Request for Authorization, the Prosecutor asks an ICC Pre-Trial Chamber I to authorize investigation of possible crimes within ICC jurisdiction committed between July 1 and October 10, 2008 in South Ossetia. In 2008, South Ossetian rebel forces took military action to gain independence, and Georgia responded with force to retain control. The Russian Federation sent military forces into South Ossetia to support the rebels. These forces then occupied South Ossetia during the time at issue.

After hundreds of people were killed and thousands of ethnic Georgians were forcibly displaced from their homes in South Ossetia, both Georgia and Russia maintained in the area troops designated as peacekeeping forces.

The Prosecutor’s Request for Authorization finds, pursuant to Rome Statute Article 15, a reasonable basis to believe that South Ossetian forces committed war crimes and crimes against humanity relating to forcible displacement of ethnic Georgians, and that war crimes were committed by South Ossetian forces against Georgian peacekeepers and by Georgian forces against Russian peacekeepers.

The submission suggests that further investigation, if authorized, might implicate Russian nationals in criminal activity. It notes substantial military, financial, and other assistance provided by Russia to South Ossetia and states that available information indicates that South Ossetian forces could not have continued with forcible displacement of ethnic Georgians “but for the occupation of Georgian territory by Russian armed forces and the military advances that preceded the occupation.” Pointedly, “information available indicates that at least some members of the Russian armed forces participated” in war crimes relating to displacement. Related charges of crimes against humanity would require evidence that Russian military or governmental authorities pursued a policy of displacing ethnic Georgians. The report states that such evidence is lacking “at this stage.”

Authorization to investigate would represent the first time the ICC has addressed a conflict on the European continent as all other nine currently open situations before the ICC involve countries on the African continent.

ICC entry would also be bold because the ICC would be intervening on its own initiative into a conflict involving a major world power and in a situation where there is an “ongoing tense relationship between Georgia and the Russian Federation” noted in the report. As a State Party to Rome Statute, Georgia could have referred the matter to the ICC, but it did not. The Prosecutor is pursuing this matter on her own initiative, following up on her predecessor’s initiative to open a preliminary examination of the situation in Georgia in August 2008.

As a State Party, Georgia has accepted obligations set out in Part 9 of the Rome Statute to cooperate with ICC investigations. Russia did not ratify the treaty establishing the Rome Statute, but it did sign it, and Russia also acceded to the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. Article 18(a) of the VCLT requires a State that has signed a treaty “to refrain from acts which would defeat the object and purpose of a treaty.” Given the nature of the conflict at issue, however, the cooperation of the parties involved may be tailored to accord with partisan interests. The Prosecutor reports that she has engaged with, and received information from, authorities in Georgia and Russia. She cautions, however, that “[w]hen assessing the information in [her] possession, the Prosecutor has…taken into account the possible bias and interests from parties to the conflict, and has therefore primarily focused…examination on allegations corroborated by third parties.”

In support of her request for authorization, the Prosecutor notes receipt of requests from several possible victims of the conflict and from seven Georgian and international human rights organizations seeking justice for victims and punishment of the perpetrators.

An ICC Pre-Trial Chamber I must now decide whether to grant the request for investigation. If the Chamber does so, the ICC will enter a new and challenging phase in its work.

Related Readings:

The Humanitarian Crisis in Syria

POST WRITTEN BY: Prof. Peter Widulski, Assistant Director of the First Year Legal Skills Program and the Coach of International Criminal Moot Court Team at Pace Law School.

An article in the New York Times on October 6, 2015 on the conflict in Syria states that the conflict “has left 250,000 people dead and displaced half the country’s population since it started in 2011.”

This horrifying statement is contained in a dependent clause in a sentence in the sixth paragraph of an article on Russia’s intervention in the Syrian conflict. This placement unfortunately may reflect that the massive human suffering in Syria is becoming an afterthought to the quarrels among world powers regarding Syria.

What is happening to the people of Syria is difficult for most people to imagine. Americans will remember that thousands of their fellow citizens were displaced from their homes when Hurricane Katrina struck New Orleans in 2005. Most of these have returned home, but many have been unable to do so because what were their homes no longer exists.

The forced evacuation of a city like New Orleans is a frightening event. The present writer was one of those who experienced it. On the morning before the hurricane struck, I learned from radio reports that Katrina was not veering off, would hit the city in about 24 hours with great destruction, and all should evacuate. Not having a car, I stuffed some things in a kit bag, left my apartment in the Uptown District, and started walking toward downtown – not knowing where in particular I was going or what was going to happen to me. I managed to make my way to the Superdome, where about 25,000 others and I took shelter in harsh conditions for five days, before being evacuated.

The difficulties that my fellow refugees and I experienced at that time were as nothing compared to the terror and extreme hardships now being experienced by the people of Syria. We were evacuating our city, not our country. And our displacement was caused by a natural disaster, whose effects, for the most part, were temporary. It is a very different thing to be forced to flee not only your home, but also your country, because vicious people are more than willing to kill you and your family because of your political sympathies or because of your religious beliefs or because you just happen to be in the way.

The horrendous numbers of dead and displaced in Syria strongly support a conclusion that such massive suffering could not have happened without the commission of war crimes and crimes against humanity by participants in the conflict. Whether there will ever be investigation or prosecution of such crimes by the International Criminal Court is far from clear. The U.N. Security Council has authority under the ICC’s Statute and Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter to refer the Syrian situation to the ICC, but such referral is unlikely because of the veto power of one or more of the Council’s permanent members.

The Preamble of the ICC’s Statute articulates its ratifiers’ “[d]etermin[ation] to put an end to impunity for the perpetrators” of “grave crimes [that] threaten the peace, security and well being of the world.” It seems that regarding what is happening in Syria, this goal will remain for the moment a mere aspiration, and, as the quarrel among world powers intensifies, the suffering of the Syrian people will remain an afterthought.

Related Readings:

Ukraine Expands Its Acceptance of ICC Jurisdiction

POST WRITTEN BY: Prof. Peter Widulski, Assistant Director of the First Year Legal Skills Program and the Coach of International Criminal Moot Court Team at Pace Law School.

Violence in Ukraine has troubled that nation and the world community for about two years. Recently, Ukraine has renewed and expanded its efforts to afford the International Criminal Court jurisdiction to investigate and prosecute those responsible for mass crimes committed on its territory. Ukraine is now alleging that Russia is responsible, in part, for such crimes.

Ukraine is not a State Party to the ICC’s Rome Statute. However, as written about in April 2014 post, Ukraine lodged an Article 12(3) declaration, which allows a non-Party State to accept the Court’s jurisdiction over crimes within its subject matter jurisdiction that are committed on the State’s territory. Ukraine’s 2014 declaration alleged that crimes against humanity were committed during internal strife in Ukraine between November 2013 and February 2014, responsibility for which it alleged was attributable to Ukraine’s former President and possibly other senior officials in his government. The ICC Prosecutor has been conducting a preliminary investigation regarding this matter but has not yet decided whether to seek authorization to open a formal investigation that would expand her investigative powers and allow for filing of charges against individuals.

Ukraine has now gone further. In a September 8, 2015 press release the ICC reported that the ICC Registrar acknowledged receipt of a second Article 12(3) declaration by Ukraine, in which Ukraine expands its acceptance of ICC temporal jurisdiction from beyond February 2014 to the indefinite future. Importantly, the declaration attributes responsibility for post-February 2014 war crimes and crimes against humanity to “senior officials of the Russian Federation and leaders of terrorist organizations.” Thus, Ukraine’s second declaration opens a politically potent issue, asking the ICC Prosecutor to conduct at least a preliminary investigation into Russia’s alleged involvement in the violence in Ukraine.

In its September 8 press release, the ICC noted that “[t]he provisions of Part 9 of the Statute relating to international cooperation and judicial assistance apply.” Part 9 of the Rome Statute imposes on State Parties the responsibility “to cooperate fully with the Court in its investigation and prosecution of crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court.” The Russian Federation, however, is not a State Party to the Rome Statute, and thus has no such responsibility to the ICC.

It will be interesting to see how this matter will develop.