Tagged: mental disease

Can Gambling Disorder Be Used As a Criminal Defense?

WRITTEN BY: John A. Vitagliano (’17), J.D. Elisabeth Haub School of Law at Pace University & Prof. John Meringolo, Esq.

Introduction
While the defense of gambling addiction has been effectively used in criminal courts as an argument for reducing the severity of punishment, it has been unsuccessful as an insanity defense (aka mental disorder defense) in criminal trials. Recent empirical studies have shown the serious effects of gambling addiction, its similarities to drug addiction and changes in medical analysis when diagnosing a patient with this mental disorder. Advances in science and medicine may now make it possible to better understand and test for the impact of a gambling addiction on a person’s behavior, and may make it easier to establish a defense based on a gambling disorder.

Changes in the DSM
In 1994, the 4th Edition of the Diagnostic Statistical Manual (DSM) for Mental Disorders (DSM-IV) classified “Pathological Gambling” as an “Impulse Control Disorder Not Elsewhere Classified.” But in 2013, the 5th Edition of the DSM (DSM-V) renamed Pathological Gambling as “Gambling Disorder” and included it in the category of “Substance-Related and Addictive Disorders.” Recent medical developments have indicated that gambling disorder and drug or alcohol addiction have several common elements, both internal and external consequences as a result of the effects of this mental impairment. As NCRG stated,

According to Dr. Charles O’Brien, chair of the Substance-Related Disorders Work Group for DSM-5, brain imaging studies and neurochemical tests have made a ‘strong case that [gambling] activates the reward system in much the same way that a drug does.’

Although gambling disorder does not involve the physical ingestion of substances, it has been included as the only addictive disorder in the DSM-V that is a diagnosable condition. For more information, visit psychiatry.org.

To diagnose a gambling disorder, the DSM-V presents nine factors that may establish that a patient is significantly impaired as a result of his persistent gambling behavior (DSM-V) and whether this behavior severely impacts the individual’s day-to-day activities. Recognizing the commonalities with substance-related disorders, society may better understand the challenges of those living with gambling disorder face, leading to a greater chance that health insurance providers will cover medical services for treatment these patients need. See, Sarah A. Hinchliffe, Defining The “Defined” – Problem Gambling, Pathological Gambling, and Gambling Disorder: Impact on Policy and Legislation, 20 Barry L. Rev. 221 (2015).

Gambling Disorder and Sentencing
In light of the new developments, we must re-examine the existence of a gambling disorder and how it has been considered by courts during sentencing. Some courts have granted downward departures when an offender’s gambling addiction was a motivating factor for the crime committed. See, United States v. Sadolsky, 234 F.3d 938, (6th Cir. 2000) (defendant’s gambling problem qualified as significantly reduced mental capacity (SRMC) when committing computer fraud) and United States v. Checoura, 176 F. Supp. 2d 310, 315 (D. N.J. 2001) (it was not necessary to show connection between defendant’s gambling addiction and interstate transport of stolen property to grant downward departure). On the other hand, other courts require more of a causal connection between defendant’s mental condition and the criminal conduct committed to consider a downward departure. See, United States v. Ming, No. 00 CR 128-5, 2001 WL 1631874, at *7 (N.D.Ill.Dec.18, 2001) (downward departure could be warranted where inability to control behavior provides motive but insufficient connection where SRMC due to gambling was cause of defendant’s debt and motive to skim credit card numbers).

Recently, a federal judge granted a downward departure and accepted a gambling addict defense when he sentenced Andrew Caspersen. Mr. Caspersen pled guilty to wire fraud and securities fraud “for running a Ponzi-like scheme that bilked his friends and family out of $38.5 million”. At the sentencing, prosecutors recommended that Caspersen spend 15 ⅔ years in prison. After permitting an addiction expert to testify about Caspersen’s diagnosis of a severe case of gambling addiction and alcoholism, Judge Jed Rakoff “agree[d] that Caspersen’s gambling addiction ‘diminished’ his ability to make rational decisions.” Judge Rakoff granted a downward departure and sentenced Caspersen to four years in prison. Judge Rakoff recognized that Caspersen’s gambling addiction was a mental disorder that diminished his capacity when he committed the crimes he pled guilty to.

Gambling Addiction Disorder as a Criminal Insanity Defense
While the gambling addiction insanity defense has been used to reduce the severity of an offender’s punishment, it has yet to excuse the commission of a crime. For this defense to be feasible, a defendant must demonstrate he is not responsible for his actions because his gambling disorder constitutes a form of insanity.

A majority of jurisdictions in the United States use one of two legal tests for insanity: 1) the M’Naghten Test, where an individual qualifies as insane if as a result of a mental disease or disorder, he does not know that his conduct was wrongful; or 2) The American Law Institute (ALI) Test, where a “person is not responsible for criminal conduct if at the time of such conduct as a result of mental disease or defect he lacks substantial capacity … to appreciate the criminality [wrongfulness] of his conduct.” See, Kate E. Bloch & Jeffrey Gould, Legal Indeterminacy in Insanity Cases: Clarifying Wrongfulness and Applying a Triadic Approach to Forensic Evaluations, 67 Hastings L. J. (2016). If a defendant commits a crime as a result of suffering from gambling disorder and does not know the crime he committed was wrong, or he lacks the capacity to understand why his conduct was wrong, a defendant may legally qualify as being insane.

While courts have been reluctant to allow defendants to rely on an insanity defense by reason of gambling addiction disorder, they have entertained the possibility that gambling addition disorder may qualify a defendant as legally insane. In United States v. Torniero, 735 F.2d 725 (2d. Cir. 1984), the court upheld the trial court’s exclusion of a criminal insanity defense based on the defendant’s assertion that his charges of interstate transportation of allegedly stolen jewelry were a result of his compulsive gambling behavior. However, the court stated “we do not foreclose admissibility of compulsive gambling in all circumstances, nor do we speculate on the desirability of the changes in the insanity law now being considered by Congress.” Here, the court reserved decision on whether a gambling disorder constitutes a “mental disease or defect” under the ALI Test.

In United States v. Lewellyn, 723 F.2d 615, (8th Cir. 1983), the central issue raised was the link between criminal activity and pathological gambling. The Court upheld the District court’s ruling that the defendant could not rely on a gambling addiction insanity defense for charges relating to embezzlement, but did not decide whether a limitation should be placed on the availability of this defense. The court noted that pathological gambling disorder (under the DSM-III) has only been recently recognized as a mental disorder and that there is a lack of clinical studies available and limited knowledge about this condition.

Conclusion
The courts have left open the opportunity for a defendant to put forward a successful gambling addiction disorder criminal insanity defense. With the reclassification of gambling disorder in the DSM-V, additional research on its effects on one’s mental capacity, and time clinicians have devoted to better understand and treat this disorder, there has been a shift in how this disease is perceived by professionals and society as a whole. Courts should reconsider the effects of this disorder on one’s mental state when crimes are committed. And perhaps, a person suffering from gambling addiction disorder may be found legally insane and not responsible for the crimes committed as a result of this disease.

REMINDER: Event – Prof. Gershman Stars as Clarence Darrow

Clarence Darrow performancePace Law School and the Pace Criminal Justice Society present Clarence Darrow starring Professor Bennett Gershman. Please join us for this once in a lifetime event and note that there will be only two performances! Suggested donation is $15 and all proceeds will benefit the Equal Justice Initiative. Don’t miss it and come and join us!

WHEN:
FRIDAY April 24, 2015 at 7:30 pm
SATURDAY April 25, 2015 at 2:00 pm

WHERE:
The Moot Court Room at Pace University School of Law, 78 North Broadway, White Plains, NY

Clarence Darrow (April 18, 1857 – March 13, 1938) was born in Ohio and attended the Allegheny College and University of Michigan Law School. He began his career as a corporate lawyer, moved on to labor law, and at the end of his legal career he was a criminal attorney defending, among others, Leopold and Loeb in Chicago presenting a defense that the two accused boys were mentally disabled and should not be sentenced to death, John T. Scopes in Tennessee who was accused of teaching evolution theory in violation of the Butler Act, Ossian Sweet in Michigan, articulating and highlighting racial prejudice throughout the trial of Mr. Ossian Sweet who was charged with murdering a white male while defending his home, or the Massie Trial in Hawaii presenting an honor killing defense in a case where two defendants were charged with murdering Joseph Kahahawai – a man who was accused of raping and beating Ms. Thalia Massie but who was believed to have escaped justice because of hung jury.

Related Readings:

Event: Professor Bennett Gershman Stars as Clarence Darrow

Clarence Darrow performancePace Law School and the Pace Criminal Justice Society present Clarence Darrow starring Professor Bennett Gershman. Please join us for this once in a lifetime event and note that there will be only two performances! Suggested donation is $15 and all proceeds will benefit the Equal Justice Initiative. Don’t miss it and come and join us!

WHEN:
FRIDAY April 24, 2015 at 7:30 pm
SATURDAY April 25, 2015 at 2:00 pm

WHERE:
The Moot Court Room at Pace University School of Law, 78 North Broadway, White Plains, NY

Clarence Darrow (April 18, 1857 – March 13, 1938) was born in Ohio and attended the Allegheny College and University of Michigan Law School. He began his career as a corporate lawyer, moved on to labor law, and at the end of his legal career he was a criminal attorney defending, among others, Leopold and Loeb in Chicago presenting a defense that the two accused boys were mentally disabled and should not be sentenced to death, John T. Scopes in Tennessee who was accused of teaching evolution theory in violation of the Butler Act, Ossian Sweet in Michigan, articulating and highlighting racial prejudice throughout the trial of Mr. Ossian Sweet who was charged with murdering a white male while defending his home, or the Massie Trial in Hawaii presenting an honor killing defense in a case where two defendants were charged with murdering Joseph Kahahawai – a man who was accused of raping and beating Ms. Thalia Massie but who was believed to have escaped justice because of hung jury.

Related Readings:

Recent SCOTUS Decision Restricting Fifth Amendment Protection

In Kansas v. Cheever, the Supreme Court recently held that when a defendant presents evidence of lack of mens rea through a psychological expert who has examined him the government may, consistent with the Fifth Amendment, rebut that evidence with testimony from a different expert who examined him in a pretrial, court-ordered examination.   In doing so, the Court clarified and arguably extended its holding in Buchanan v. Kentucky, 483 U.S. 402 (1987), where it allowed such proof to rebut a defense of extreme emotional disturbance, and where the court-ordered examination had been requested by both parties.  The Cheever Court held that the defendant’s assertion of voluntary intoxication that relied on an expert was sufficient to permit the prosecution to rebut because it is a “mental status” defense, even though voluntary intoxication is not a “mental disease or defect” under Kansas law.

Of course, in 1981 in Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454 (1981), the Supreme Court held that a court-ordered psychiatric examination violated the defendant’s fifth amendment rights where the defendant neither requested the examination nor put his mental capacity in dispute at trial.

The Cheever decision was unanimous.  Yet it is not clear why the content of a defendant’s discussion with a court-appointed expert should be revealed to a jury to rebut the testimony of another expert.  The Court indicated that this was essential to fair and effective impeachment, but, of course, the defendant’s expert is wholly subject to cross.  Certainly, in such a case, the defendant is being “compelled” to be a witness against himself, and, given the prosecution’s ability to cross examine that expert, fairness does not really justify that.  Moreover, although the court likened the situation to allowing a defendant to waive his privilege as to some subjects and not others, that is really not the case, since the defendant did not waive his privilege at the time when he spoke with the court-appointed expert, nor was the same psychiatric issue being investigated.   To the extent that it makes candor costly, the Cheever decision may well have a negative impact on the reliability of court-ordered pre-trial examinations that frequently are conducted for a variety of psychiatric reasons.

Cheever also claimed that if the rebuttal was properly permitted, the testimony exceeded proper limits in that it described broad subjects that had been discussed, i.e., the shooting from his perspective, intimated that he had  a personality disorder and discussing his alleged infatuation with criminals.  The Kansas Supreme Court had not addressed this issue, however, and the Supreme Court declined to address it in the first instance.