Tagged: Second Circuit

Second Circuit: Admittance of Co-Defendant’s Redacted Confession Violated Confrontation Clause

A recent decision by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals may provide guidance to criminal defense practitioners seeking to (1) suppress the involuntary confession of a client, and (2) limit the impact of a co-defendants’ redacted confession being admitted at trial. The Second Circuit, sitting en banc, affirmed a panel’s decision to vacate the convictions of three defendants found guilty of conspiring to commit a Hobbs Act robbery, among other things, and brandishing a firearm in furtherance of a crime of violence. The Court had been asked by the government to review a panel decision that had formerly held that the “confession” of one of the defendant’s was involuntary and should not have been admitted against the declarant at trial. The government also sought review of the panel’s determination that the admission of the “confession” was also prejudicial to the declarant’s co-defendants, requiring a new trial. United States v. Taylor, 736 F.3d 661 (2d Cir. 2013).

A panel of the Court had held that the defendant’s Miranda waiver was not knowing and voluntary, given that the defendant was clearly mentally incapacitated during his interview with federal agents. Id. at 669. The panel noted that the defendant had ingested a quantity of Xanax pills immediately before his arrest, and not long before the interrogation by the FBI had begun. The panel pointed out that the defendant was “in and out of consciousness while giving his statement, and in a trance or a stupor most of the time when not actually asleep.” Id. at 670. As such, the panel determined that “the officers’ persistent questioning took undue advantage of [the] [defendants’] diminished mental state, and ultimately overbore his will.” Id. The panel concluded that the admission of the defendant’s involuntary confessions was a critical part of the prosecution’s case, and could not be deemed “harmless error beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. at 672.

Notably, the Second Circuit (en banc) withdrew the panel’s prior decision, and issued a superseding opinion. States v. Taylor, 2014 WL 814861, (2d Cir. 2014). It not only reaffirmed the panel’s prior decision in all respects, but further held that the admission of the defendant’s “confession” at trial violated the Confrontation Clause rights of the other co-defendants. The Court ruled that the redacted confession simply did not comply with Bruton, and made it obvious to jurors that the declarant had implicated his co-defendants in the crime. The Court explained that the redacted version of the defendant’s statement suggested that the original statements contained actual names.

The Court took observance of the fact that the redacted statement had contained both the declarant’s name and the name of the government’s cooperating witness (“Luana Miller”), while referencing the other co-defendants by “two other individuals” or “driver.”  Id. The Court reasoned that the redacted confession allowed jurors to notice that “Miller is the one person involved who was cooperating, and [] infer that the obvious purpose of the meticulously crafted partial redaction was to corroborate Miller’s testimony against the rest of the group, not to shield confederates.” Id. at *11. The Court noted that “[i]f the defendant had been trying to avoid naming his confederates, he would not have identified one of them-Miller-in the very phrase in which the names of the other confederates are omitted.” Id.

The Court explained that “[o]nce it becomes obvious that names have been pruned from the text, the choice of implied identity is narrow. The unnamed persons correspond by number (two) and by role to the pair of co-defendants.” Id. at *12. The Court noted that the “obviously redacted confession … points directly to the defendant[s], and it accuses the defendant[s] in a manner similar to … a testifying codefendant’s accusatory finger.” Id. (quoting Gray, 523 U.S. at 194).  The Court concluded that the “awkward circumlocution used to reference other participants, coupled with the overt naming of Luana Miller (only), is so unnatural, suggestive, and conspicuous as to offend Bruton, Gray, and Jass.” Id.

While the Second Circuit’s decision is applaudable, it may leave many criminal defense practitioners pondering over the slew of similar cases that have come before the Circuit in the past without any success on this  issue. Both the language and form (identifying by name the declarant & cooperator(s), while others as “person/individual”) that the Court identified in Taylor appears to have been customarily approved by the Courts. Indeed, Federal prosecutors have routinely been able to utilize such redacted confessions, although the defense has routinely objected to its admission based upon the obvious nature of the redaction and the likelihood that the jury will infer that their client had been implicated by their cohort.  Nevertheless, the Second Circuit has finally spoken against this once unfettered practice, and provided some much needed guidance on the issue.

Related Readings

Second Circuit Upholds Right to Sue for Brady Violation after Guilty Plea

On January 16, 2014, in Poventud v. City of New York, No. 12-1011-cv, 2014 WL 182313 (2d Cir. 2014), the Second Circuit, sitting en banc, upheld the original panel’s ruling that the defendant, who served nine years in jail for a crime he probably didn’t commit, could sue the City despite the fact that he had originally pleaded guilty.  The dissenter on the original panel would have held that his Brady claim – that the police withheld information that impeached the victim’s identification – was waived by his plea, which essentially admitted he was at the scene.

In short, the Second Circuit took a very practical approach to the pressures – particularly on someone who is innocent – to plead guilty.

Scheindlin Moves to Fight Removal but Her Motion Is Denied

Last Thursday, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit denied Judge Shira Scheindlin’s motion to vacate the order of the panel, which removed Judge Scheindlin from presiding on any further proceedings in Floyd v. City of New York, 12 Civ. 2274 (SAS).  

This Court of Appeals decision is the latest twist in the legal drama that ensued following the Floyd decision.

In its decision on Thursday, “the panel clarified that it had not ruled that Scheindlin violated the code of conduct, only that the ‘appearance of partiality required reassignment.”

As this issue gains widespread attention – drawing in the likes of lawyers, law professors, former Mayor Rudolph Giuliani, and police unions – it remains to be seen how the Second Circuit will proceed.  But one thing is certain:  the institutional reputation of this previously unusually well respected court has suffered.

 

Second Circuit Releases Decision Raising Interesting Terry Stop Issue

BY: David Restrepo

The Second Circuit recently decided United States v. Freeman, which was on appeal from a conviction for gun possession.  On appeal, the defendant argued that the police lacked reasonable suspicion to conduct the Terry stop that produced a gun in the defendant’s possession.  The Second Circuit reversed the defendant’s conviction, mainly on the ground that the police lacked reasonable suspicion to stop and frisk so that the evidence should have been suppressed.

The interesting part about the case is the court’s in-depth discussion on what constitutes reasonable suspicion.  Initially, police responded to a pair of anonymous 911 calls from the same caller.  The caller offered a description and location of the defendant, claiming that the defendant had a gun on his person.  What makes the court’s decision newsworthy is its analysis of the phone calls and their sufficiency as a basis for reasonable suspicion given that, although they were anonymous, the 911 center recorded the phone number and the caller called twice.

The Second Circuit held that the phone calls were an insufficient basis for reasonable suspicion because the information in the calls could not be corroborated.  However, the majority and dissent both discussed an issue raised by Justice Kennedy in his concurrence in Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266 (2000) – whether 911 calls are really anonymous given current police technology.  In J.L., the majority held that a mere description in 911 call is not sufficient to establish reasonable suspicion.  In his dissent in Freeman, however,  Judge Wesley disagreed, suggesting that the Supreme Court should offer “further guidance in this troubling and exceptionally important area of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.”  Whether or not the holding in Freeman is correct, Judge Wesley poses an interesting issue.  Given the speed of advancement in technology available to law enforcement, it is an issue that deserves further clarification by the Supreme Court.

Related Readings

David Restrepo, United States v. Freeman – Second Circuit, ABA Media Alerts (Nov. 7, 2013).
United States v. Freeman, No. 12-2233-cr (2d Cir. Nov. 7, 2013).