Category: Int’l and Comparative Criminal Law

Undercover Practices: A Comparison

POST WRITTEN BY: Lissa Griffin, Professor at Pace Law School & Rafael Wolff, Federal Judge in Brazil and SJD candidate at Pace Law School.

A recent editorial and recent articles in The New York Times address the growing use of undercover agents and their necessarily deceptive practices. The New York Times now reports that the use of undercover operations has expanded “with officers from at least 40 agencies posing as business people, welfare recipients, political protesters and even doctors or ministers to ferret out wrongdoing….” The justification is the efficiency and cost-savings over traditional investigation through tips, legwork, interviews, search warrants, and surveillance. No probable cause or search warrant is required.

Is such widespread deception part of our culture?

Maybe it’s just one of the choices we have to make given our Constitution. Our historic fear of centralized authority and the accompanying protection of the individual against government intrusion makes some other more overt investigatory techniques unavailable to us. Thus, for example, in the United Kingdom, recent terrorist legislation improved the Government’s ability to investigate and prevent terrorism by extending the permissible periods of pre-charge detention. Imminent terrorist events may now be averted by simply breaking up the terrorism groups, and enhanced questioning can be accomplished early on. Our bill of rights would prevent that. Thus, instead of investigating overtly, we investigate by deception.

Up until now, rules and guidelines have been inadequate. Now, apparently in response to the “Fast and Furious” undercover operation that allowed guns to travel to Mexico, the Department of Justice has  issued internal guidelines designed to “tighten oversight” of undercover operations. Before prosecutors approve of using undercover investigation, they must consider “whether an operation identifies a ‘clearly’ defined objective, whether it is truly necessary, whether it targets ‘significant criminal actors or entities,’ and other factors.” This is good.

So, does Brazil tolerate as much deception as the United States?  Our conclusion remains that Brazil’s statutory limits restrict deception and protect privacy to a much greater extent than do the US due process clause or recent agency guidelines.  Considering the efficiency of undercover operations, but considering the risks to third party privacy and even to the agent’s security, maybe Brazil needs to use more, and the United States less, of this particularly interesting investigative tool.

These articles raise questions about the scope of undercover investigations and about fair investigative tactics by government agents. An instructive comparison can be made between limits on undercover activity in the United States and in another country, for example, Brazil.

In Brazil, the use of undercover agents requires a judicial warrant authorizing the infiltration of a criminal organization. This is expressly stated by Law 11.343/06 (Article 53, I) and Law 12.850/13 (Article 10). A judge may only issue such a warrant if the government establishes: 1) evidence of organized criminal activities or narcotics offenses; and 2) it is impossible to produce the evidence by another less intrusive way (Law 12.850/13, Article 10). Those are both federal laws, as just the Federal Congress can legislate about criminal procedure. Organized criminal activity occurs when there is a criminal organization of four or more individuals that functions in a structured way and with a division of tasks, even informally, to obtain direct or indirect criminal advantage. To be considered a criminal organization, the activity should be punishable by a maximum prison sentence of more than four years. Law 12.850/12 also allows the use of undercover agents and other special investigative tools in case of transnational crime which Brazil is internationally obliged to eradicate (for sure, when the crime occurs in Brazilian soil) and transnational terrorist groups recognized by international organizations in which Brazil is a member.

The use of undercover agents is also legal in the investigation of crimes created by Law 11.343/06, that is, in investigations into narcotics crimes. This category was included by the legislature because of the considerable risk of danger in the organized narcotics business.

In addition, Law 12.850/13 requires that the conduct of the undercover agent be proportional to the goal  of the operation and provides that the agent will be criminally culpable for any excess (art. 13). The same article makes clear that the agent will not be liable if it was not reasonable to act differently in the case.  The legislation is very vague, however, leaving it to the court to fix the limits in the warrant.  For example, it will be the judge who, based on the values prescribed by the Constitution and statutes, will have to decide if it is reasonable to allow an agent to send child porn pictures during an investigation.  This is not an easy call, especially since there is no consistent case law about it.

However, interestingly, Brazil defines “undercover operations” much more narrowly than does the United States so that these strict requirements only apply to certain undercover conduct.  Brazilian statutes (Laws 11.343/06 and 12.850/13) use the term “infiltrated agent” to define the regulated investigative activity, not “undercover agent.”  Thus, the definition only applies to those operations that involve agents assuming false identities to infiltrate criminal organizations. The use of plain clothes officers to buy drugs without the use of a false identification would not be regulated by the statute. In such cases, the need for a warrant is not even discussed in the case law. (STJ, AgRg no AREsp 1.956/SP, Rel. Ministra MARIA THEREZA DE ASSIS MOURA, SEXTA TURMA, julgado em 21/06/2011, DJe 01/07/2011). Thus, the kind of conduct reported in The Times, for example —  the presence of a police officer in the middle of a political protest —  would not be considered conduct by an “infiltrated agent,” as long as a false identity is not used to allow infiltration in a criminal organization. On the other hand, an officer who pretends to be a child to uncover a criminal organization involving pedophilia in the internet, for example, would indeed be subject to the warrant requirement.

From the defense perspective, there is protection against entrapment (article 17 of the Brazilian Criminal Code). For example, a defendant will not be liable for possessing a child porn photo sent by an undercover agent if the court finds the defendant was entrapped. However, this defense will not protect the Defendant if he possesses other photos, for example.

In the United States, of course, police and prosecutorial use of undercover agents is limited only by the broad and permissive boundaries of the due process clause. SeeUnited States v. Cuervelo, 949 F.2d 559 (2d Cir. 1991). Unlike Brazil, in the United States there is no requirement of a warrant or of judicial supervision of any kind regarding undercover agents. In fact, the Supreme Court has made clear that the use of undercover agents – even when the agent wears a wire – does not constitute a “search” under the Fourth Amendment. Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427 (1963); On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747 (1952); Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293 (1966); and United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745 (1971). As the Court has reasoned, betrayal by ones associates is always a risk, so there is  no  expectation of privacy in those interactions if they involve an undercover agent. Given that there is no “search,” there is no warrant requirement or a requirement even of probable cause or reasonable suspicion to use undercover agents to obtain evidence. Nor are there any statutory limits to the practice. The only limitation is whether an undercover officer’s behavior “shocks the conscience” of the court. Readers will remember the stomach-pumping case that actually did shock the conscience of the Supreme Court. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952).

The Sixth Amendment right to counsel, which attaches after arraignment, may limit the use of undercover agents – but only after charges have been brought and the defendant has been arraigned. That is because, under Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964), and its progeny, law enforcement may not contact a defendant without going through defense counsel.

In the United States, now, there is not likely to be a consensus for restricting the use of undercover agents, although the discussion of this issue in the press is interesting. New York Times reports that the use of undercover agents is widening and now extends anywhere from sending fake protesters to demonstrations in front of the Supreme Court to creating false identities for doctors and ministers to investigate welfare or other fraud. Until now, at least, we have balanced our interests in privacy, our separation-of-powers-based willingness to give our prosecutors and police tremendous discretion in law enforcement, and our desire for crime control in favor of discretion and crime control. Brazil’s restriction of undercover intrusions to cases involving organized crime, narcotics, terrorism and other transnational crimes that are the object of international treaties – to seriously dangerous organizational criminal behavior that is – should command our attention. Maybe we should tailor the intrusion to protect against serious criminal conduct while protecting the increasingly shrinking sphere of privacy for the rest of us. Certainly, Brazil’s requirement of a showing that there is no less intrusive means to secure the evidence sought should not be a seriously difficult evidential burden. Given the U.S. courts’ willingness to impose only the most nominal restrictions, the way to do this, of course, would be the way Brazil accomplished it – through legislation.

ICC Calls for Surrender of Two Suspects

POST WRITTEN BY: Prof. Peter Widulski, Assistant Director of the First Year Legal Skills Program and the Coach of International Criminal Moot Court Team at Pace Law School.

On December 10 and 11, 2014, Pre-Trial Chamber I of the International Criminal Court (ICC) issued decisions calling for delivery to the ICC of two persons under its arrest warrants.

The December 10 finding of non-compliance by Libya, under article 87(7), relates to Saif al-Islam Gaddafi, for whom the ICC issued an arrest warrant in May 2011, charging him with crimes against humanity allegedly committed by Libyan security forces under his command during anti-government protests. The December 11 decision on the admissibility relates to Simone Gbagbo, for whom the ICC issued an arrest warrant in February 2012, charging her with responsibility for crimes against humanity regarding violence committed by government forces against political opponents of her husband, former President Laurent Gbagbo, relating to the November 2010 Ivory Coast presidential election.

Ivory Coast was asserting its right under Rome Statute articles 17 and 19 to challenge the admissibility of Simone Gbagbo’s case on the ground that it was prosecuting her for the same crimes charged in the ICC arrest warrant. In the Gaddafi case, ICC courts had previously rejected Libya’s challenge to the admissibility of the ICC case against him and reminded Libya of its obligation to surrender him to the Court. Libya is not a State Party to the Rome Statute, but in February 2011 the U.N. Security Council acting under its Chapter VII powers issued a Resolution 1970 referring the Libyan situation to the Court and requiring Libyan authorities to fully cooperate with the ICC. The issue before the Court was whether Libya failed to comply with this obligation.

In the Ivory Coast situation, as blogged about earlier, the ICC issued arrest warrants against Ivory Coast nationals Laurent Gbagbo, Simone Gbagbo, and Charles Blé Goudé – all on the same charges relating to the same events. The Ivory Coast government chose to surrender Laurent Gbagbo and Charles Blé Goudé to the ICC, but not Simone Gbagbo. The government’s reasons for this selection are not fully apparent from court documents. Nevertheless, the Ivory Coast decided to challenge the admissibility of Simone Gbagbo’s case. The Court rejected this challenge, finding that the Ivory Coast government failed to show that it was investigating and prosecuting Gbagbo for the same criminal conduct alleged by the ICC Prosecutor. The Court concluded that Ivory Coast must “surrender Simone Gbagbo to the Court without delay.”

With respect to the Gaddafi case, the Court found that Libya failed to comply with repeated requests to deliver Gaddafi to the Court and also failed to comply with requests to return to the Defense privileged documents that Libyan authorities had seized from Gaddafi’s defense counsel. Determining that Libya was depriving the defendant of his rights and preventing the Court from fulfilling its mandate, the Court, under article 87(7), referred the matter to the Security Council, so that the Council may consider measures to secure Libya’s compliance.

ICC had previously utilized article 87(7) to inform the Security Council of the failure of authorities in Chad, Malawi, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo to arrest and surrender Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir, for whom ICC issued arrest warrants charging him with responsibility for war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide, committed during the conflict in Darfur. Al-Bashir remains at large.

In the week preceding the Gaddafi finding, the Trial Chamber V(B) rendered Decision on Prosecution’s application for a finding of non-compliance under article 87(7) stating that the Government of Kenya, a State Party to the Rome Statute, had breached its treaty obligation by failing to provide the Prosecutor with access to information necessary for the case against Kenyan President Kenyatta on charges of crimes against humanity committed during the 2007-2008 post-election violence in Kenya. As a result of Kenya’s breach, ICC Prosecutor Bensouda withdrew the charges against Kenyatta without prejudice. In a December 5, 2014 press release, Bensouda stated that this was “a painful moment for the men, women and children who have suffered tremendously from the horrors of the post-election violence, and who have waited, patiently, for almost seven years to see justice done.”

The Kenyatta, al-Bashir, Gaddafi, and Simone Gbagbo cases illustrate the difficulties the ICC confronts in carrying out its responsibilities to prosecute grave international crimes.

The ICC Reports on Situation in Libya

POST WRITTEN BY: Prof. Peter Widulski, Assistant Director of the First Year Legal Skills Program and the Coach of International Criminal Moot Court Team at Pace Law School.

On November 12, 2014, ICC Prosecutor Fatou Bensouda presented the U.N. Security Council with a report on “the deteriorating situation” in Libya, calling the Council’s attention to several disturbing matters that the OTP is confronting in its work in Libya.

The Security Council referred the situation in Libya to the ICC in 2011, pursuant to the authority accorded to it by Article 13(b) of the Rome Statute and by Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter. This was the second time the Council referred a situation of violent internal conflict to the ICC; the first time was in 2005, with respect to the violence in Darfur, Sudan. The ICC Prosecutor has been pursuing cases against several suspects in both of these situations.

In both, the ICC has encountered severe difficulties in carrying out its responsibilities. With respect to the Darfur situation, four of the suspects subject to ICC arrest warrants remain at large. As noted here, earlier this year the Prosecutor asked the Council for further assistance in dealing with the failure of several countries to execute the ICC arrest warrant for Sudan President Omar al-Bashir. As noted here, in April 2014 the ICC Pre-Trial Chamber issued a rebuke to the Democratic Republic of the Congo for failing to arrest al-Bashir when the Chamber, having advance notice of al-Bashir’s visit to the DRC, issued a request to the DRC for his arrest. The DRC is a State Party to the Rome Statute; Article 86 of the Statute requires that “State Parties shall … cooperate fully with the Court in its investigation and prosecution of crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court.”

With respect to the Libya situation, Prosecutor Bensouda advised that despite elections in Libya in June 2014, political instability is increasing as two governments vie for legitimacy. She also noted that there have been several assassinations and numerous threats made against human rights workers, judges, prosecutors, and others. She reported that the deteriorating security situation in the country is making it very difficult for her Office to pursue its work, including, among other matters, the Office’s ability to investigate “new instances of mass crimes allegedly committed by the rebel forces.”

The Prosecutor expressed her Office’s “great concern” regarding “the continued failure of the Government of Libya to surrender Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi to the custody of the International Criminal Court.” On June 27, 2011, the ICC issued an arrest warrant for Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi on two counts of crimes against humanity but he remains at large. Regarding Abdullah Al-Senussi, whom the ICC previously sought for prosecution, the Prosecutor stated that because of the on-going violence in Libya that may endanger the possibility of a fair trial for Al-Senussi, she may apply for review of decisions by ICC courts deferring to Libya’s prosecution of him.

Prosecutor Bensouda called upon Libya for cooperation, and she stated that “the international community could be more proactive in exploring solutions in order to tangibly help restore stability and strengthen accountability for Rome Statute crimes in Libya.”

The Prosecutor’s October 23 and November 12 statements to the Security Council suggest that ICC prosecutions of cases following a Security Council referral are encountering difficulties that go beyond those encountered by prosecutors authorized to prosecute cases in the ad hoc tribunals established through Security Council resolutions prior to the Rome Statute’s entry into force in 2002. If the ICC is to be able to carry out its responsibilities – especially with regard to Security Council referrals – the Prosecutor seems to be correct that additional support for the ICC will be needed from the Security Council, from States affected, and from the international community in general.

The ICC Asks the UN Security Council for Additional Support of Its Work

POST WRITTEN BY: Prof. Peter Widulski, Assistant Director of the First Year Legal Skills Program and the Coach of International Criminal Moot Court Team at Pace Law School.

As reported in the October 24, 2014 press release, the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, Mrs. Fatou Bensouda, on October 23, 2014, addressed the United Nations Security Council on ways the Council can provide more effective support to the International Criminal Court (ICC).

The relationship between the ICC and the Security Council, which the Prosecutor addressed, has important implications for the ICC’s goal to end impunity for grave international crimes. Unlike the International Court of Justice, which was established in 1945 by the U.N. Charter as the U.N.’s principal judicial organ, the International Criminal Court is a judicial body independent of the U.N. The ICC was established through a separate treaty – the Rome Statute that entered into force in 2002 – with different jurisdictional predicates focusing on prosecution of individuals alleged to have committed grave crimes of an internationally recognized nature that are within the ICC’s subject matter jurisdiction.

Despite the ICC’s independent status, the Preamble of the Rome Statute “reaffirm[s] the Purposes and Principles of the Charter of the United Nations [which require] that all States shall refrain [from acting with force] in any … manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.” In addition, Article 13(b) of the Statute accords the Council the capability to refer to the Court for criminal investigation matters the Council deems appropriate pursuant to its responsibility under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter “to maintain or restore international peace and security.”

Article 13(b) provides the Council with the opportunity for the first time to invoke its Chapter VII authority to initiate criminal investigations before a standing international criminal court. Before the ICC’s establishment, the Council, when confronted with situations in which severe crimes threatening international peace occurred, had to provide for both investigation and prosecution through special resolutions and particularly crafted statutes that created ad hoc tribunals, such as those for the former Yugoslavia and for Rwanda.

The authority accorded to the Council by Article 13(b) is powerful and important because it authorizes the Council to refer to the ICC Prosecutor investigation of crimes within the ICC’s subject matter jurisdiction where the ICC’s other jurisdictional predicates would otherwise be lacking. The Council can refer to the ICC Prosecutor investigation of crimes in situations even when the alleged crimes do not occur on the territory of a State Party to the Rome Statute or were not committed by a national of a State Party.

The Security Council has utilized its Article 13(b) authority thus far to refer two situations to the ICC: Darfur, Sudan (2005) and Libya (2011). The ICC Prosecutor has been actively pursuing cases in both of these situations.

Following the Council’s Sudan referral, an ICC court issued arrest warrants for Sudanese president Omar Hassan Ahmad al Bashir in March 2009 and again in July 2010, charging him with co-perpetrator responsibility on multiple counts alleging crimes against humanity, war crimes, and genocide relating to the bloody conflict in Sudan.

Several African States have declined to execute these warrants when Al Bashir traveled to these States for diplomatic purposes. As reported previously on this blog, in April of this year an ICC Pre-Trial Chamber chastised the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) for failing to comply with ICC requests for Al Bashir’s arrest when in February 2014, he visited the DRC to participate in a summit conference of African leaders.

In her October 23 address to the Council and during the discussion that followed, Prosecutor Bensouda gave prominent attention to issues relating to the Darfur situation. She called on the Council, when issuing its Article 13(b) referrals, to advise States of their cooperation responsibilities in the stronger terms that it used in its resolutions creating the ad hoc tribunals. She urged the Council to call on U.N. Member States to cooperate in the arrest of suspects under ICC arrest warrants, and she urged the Council to consider ways to address the failure of States to comply with such obligations.

DOJ Policy Bans Waiver of Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claims as Condition of Guilty Plea

Last week, Deputy Attorney General James M. Cole issued a memorandum to federal prosecutors advising them that they should “no longer seek in plea agreements to have a defendant waive claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, whether those claims are made on collateral attack, or, when permitted by circuit law, made on direct appeal.” As to cases in which such waivers had already been entered, the memorandum advises that federal  prosecutors should “decline to enforce the waiver when defense counsel rendered ineffective assistance resulting in prejudice or when the defendant’s ineffective assistance claim raises a serious debatable issue that a court should resolve.”

The U.S. Supreme Court has not ruled on the validity of such waivers. The Court has clearly held, however, that the right to effective assistance of counsel applies to guilty pleas. Missouri v. Frye, 132 S.Ct. 1399 (2012); Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S.Ct. 1376 (2012); Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 (2010). Following these holdings, every circuit court to address the validity of a waiver of the right to effective assistance of counsel – ten of twelve circuits – has upheld the waiver. United States v. Djelevic, 161 F.3d 104 (2d Cir. 1998); United States v. Lemaster, 403 F.3d 216 (4th Cir. 2005); United States v. Wilkes, 20 F.3d 651 (5th Cir. 1994); Davila v. United States, 258 F.3d 448 (6th Cir. 2001); Jones v. United States, 167 F.3d 1142 (7th Cir. 1999); DeRoo v. United States, 223 F.3d 919 (8th Cir. 2000); Washington v. Lampert, 422 F.3d 864 (9th Cir. 2005); United States v. Cockerham, 237 F.3d 1179 (10th Cir. 2001). Interestingly, however, twelve state ethics opinions have held that insisting on such a waiver is unethical.  See, e.g., United States v. Kentucky Bar Ass’n, 2013-SC-000270-KB (Ky. Aug. 21, 2014), and cases cited in footnote 37 therein. In addition, in a 2013 113E Resolution, the American Bar Association declared its opposition to ineffective assistance of counsel (IAC) waivers, and in October 2012 the National Association Criminal Defense Lawyers (NACDL) has issued a formal opinion (12-02) finding it unethical for defense lawyers to participate in such waivers.

The DOJ policy is important because it is a break with the growing momentum of waiver by guilty plea:  it seems that over the years defendants have been asked to waive more and more rights as part of a plea bargain.  Ultimately, although problematic, many defendants are now required to waive the right to appeal or to appeal and collateral attack as part of a guilty plea.   The DOJ directive mark an important exception to these practices.

The DOJ policy memorandum is significant for another reason. In other jurisdictions, like the United Kingdom, internal prosecutorial procedures and policies are publicly available and provide some limitations on what would otherwise be unlimited prosecutorial discretion. This is an excellent way to create at least a presumption that the prosecution is behaving fairly.

Finally, there are those who wonder whether the prosecution (or the courts) can or should do more when confronted by deficient performance of defense counsel. See, e.g., Vanessa Merton, What Do You Do When You Meet a “Walking Violation of the Sixth Amendment” If You’re Trying to Put That Lawyer’s Client in Jail?69 Fordham L. Rev. 997 (2000). They are on the front lines, if you will; aside from the ethical obligation to report unethical conduct by other lawyers, prosecutors generally have no duty to protect a defendant from the ineffectiveness of his or her counsel. Thankfully, by virtue of the DOJ memorandum, federal prosecutors have accepted the duty not to participate in hiding these claims from review.