Tagged: criminal defense counsel

What’s Wrong with America’s Criminal Justice System in 40+ Tweets

rantNorth Carolina criminal law attorney T. Greg Doucette’s twitter rant went viral. Although only tweeting, he does an excellent job in capturing what’s wrong with the American criminal justice system, particularly when race is involved.

Related Readings:

‘Making a Murderer’ – A Broader Debate

“Making a Murderer,” the Netflix series about Steven Avery, who may or may not have murdered Theresa Halbach in a rural Wisconsin town, has created a healthy controversy. Everybody is asking: “Did he do it? Or was he framed by the police?” Avery served eighteen years in jail for a crime he did not commit until he was exonerated by DNA evidence in 1999. His multi-million dollar lawsuit against the county, he alleges, is the motive for the police charging him with murder. Avery, along with his nephew Brendan Dassey, a mentally-challenged teenager, were convicted in separate trials.

The 10-part series is controversial. The documentarians are accused of biased reporting intended to prove the defendants are innocent. But that’s unfair;  ultimately, the series  demonstrates something true and more important: that despite the guilty verdicts we really do not know who killed Halbach, how, or why. The prosecution presented a strong circumstantial case, but this evidence is carefully dissected, and a viewer can readily believe that what little there was had been planted by the police. Moreover, Dassey’s “confession” in which he “guessed” at what the police wanted to hear, and later repeatedly recanted, is utterly uncorroborated by anything the police could find and appears to be the unreliable product of well-known unsavory police interrogation tactics.

We should broaden the debate beyond guilty or not guilty,  because “Making a Murderer” raises several fundamental questions about the criminal justice system.

First, what is the goal of our system? Is the goal to yield results that society is willing to accept? To be sure, we hope the adversary system and the use of juries lead to reliable results. But we know that, as the documentary shows, tragic mistajes are made, eyewitnesses are mistaken, and that the most we can ever hope for is uncertainty.  Is that enough?

Does the criminal adversary system really produce a fair fight? Avery’s retained lawyers worked incredibly hard, were unstintingly loyal, and were highly effective. Dassey was indigent and was assigned an attorney who, from the beginning, believed and announced that his client was guilty despite Dassey’s protests of innocence, and in fact,  handed the prosecution evidence to use against him. After this attorney was removed, new counsel was appointed and did the best he could. But once again we revisit the age-old maxim that the quality of justice depends on how much money you have.

Did the prosecutors perform their constitutional duty to be “ministers of justice”? Whether one buys the claim that Avery was framed, it’s clear that the prosecutor accepted whatever came from the police without any independent reflection. Even after the court ordered the local police to stay out of the investigation, they stayed deeply involved and produced the only “evidence” of guilt. The prosecutors believed Dassey’s fantastic tale of bloodthirsty sexual assault even though not a drop of blood or any other forensic evidence could be found to support it. Moreover, disregarding his ethical obligations, the prosecutor repeatedly made highly prejudicial statements to the media revealing extensive inflammatory details about the crime.

A few other thoughts. The absence of any racial issues – everyone involved is Whites – simplifies the legal and policy questions raised by the film. This is an excellent opportunity. But in their place we see issues of class and culture at play in a small rural community in middle America, a culture we really can’t penetrate. How do rumor, personal history, kinships, friendships, and resentments impact the quality of justice here?

In the final analysis, nobody really knows why or how Theresa Halbach died. Avery may be innocent, a degenerate, or a predator; Dassey may be no more than an immature, mentally-deficient teenager. They may have killed her, or maybe they did not. The title alone raises the provocative question: did the police “make” a murderer by framing a case against Avery? Or did society “make” a murderer by wrongly imprisoning a young man for eighteen years on the basis of a single mistaken identification? One can always fault the messengers, but the series raises important questions.

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John Oliver on the Public Defender System

public defenders JOJohn Oliver did it again! With more than 2.8 million views, John Oliver in his weekly “Last Week Tonight” analyzes the public defender system in the United States as only he can do it.  He begins by quoting the 1963 decision of Gideon v. Wainwright, in which the Court stated that “… any person … who is too poor to hire a lawyer, cannot be assured a fair trial unless counsel is provided for him.” Does this system works as intended?

He shares quite a few shocking facts and statistics:

  • “… anywhere from 60-90 percent of criminal defendants need publicly-funded attorneys, depending on the jurisdiction.” (Brennan Center for Justice, Apr. 9, 2013). 
  • “… 40% of all county-based public defender offices had no investigators on staff.” (Bureau of Justice Statistics).
  • “… about 95 percent of criminal cases never make it to trial.”

He explains that

[t]he Miranda warning includes the right to a public defender. It doesn’t include the fact that public defenders are highly overworked and grossly underpaid.

Related Readings:

  • Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963). 
  • William Lawrence, The Public Defender Crisis in America: Gideon, the War on Drugs and the Fight for Equality, 5 U. Miami Race & Soc. Just. L. Rev. 167 (2015).
  • Indigent Defense Systems (Bureau of Justice Statistics) offers statistical data on the right to counsel and methods for providing indigent criminal defense.
  • John Oliver, Public DefendersLast Week Tonight (Sept. 13, 2015).

Student Perspective: The Etan Patz Case – Confession, Lack of Physical Evidence and Reasonable Doubt

POST WRITTEN BY: Alexander Zugaro (’15), Pace Law School

The story of the 6-year-old boy, Etan Patz, who had gone missing in SOHO Manhattan in 1979, is one that stretches over several decades. Now, after a ruling on November 24, 2014 by Judge Maxwell Wiley and almost a three month long trial, the story is reaching a conclusion. In 2012, after police re-opened the investigation, Pedro Hernandez confessed to law enforcement that he was responsible for the disappearance and murder of Etan Patz. He told law enforcement that he strangled Etan and disposed of his body. Mr. Hernandez was an 18-year-old man working in a neighborhood convenience store at the time of Patz’s disappearance.

However, this past fall a hearing was held regarding the admissibility of Mr. Hernandez’s confession. Hernandez’s defense attorney, Harvey Fishbein, argued that Hernandez was schizophrenic and bipolar at the time he made his confession. As such, Mr. Hernandez did not understand he could reassert his right against self-incrimination even after he waived his Miranda warnings. Yet, Judge Maxwell Wiley ruled on November 24, 2014 that the confession was admissible, stating that Hernandez waived his Miranda rights and that such waiver was done knowingly and intelligently.

To date the prosecution has not been able to find any evidence corroborating Hernandez’s confession, except a statement made by Hernandez’s brother who told police that Hernandez had confessed to him two years prior to his arrest and a statement made to members of his prayer group in the summer of 1979, none of whom came forward to testify until after Mr. Hernandez was arrested. The body of Etan Patz was never found, and prosecutors have not presented any physical evidence tying Mr. Hernandez to the boy’s disappearance.

The significance of Judge Wiley’s ruling is that the jury was able to hear Hernandez’s confession and will decide on whether they believe his confession is reliable. Defense attorney Frishbein stated that “Mr. Hernandez is extremely suggestible because of his low I.Q. and other mental handicaps. Anyone who sees these confessions will understand that when the police were finished with him, Mr. Hernandez believed he killed Etan Patz, but that doesn’t mean that he did.” On the other hand, however, the lead prosecutor stated that Mr. Hernandez’s statements contain little-known details about the crime that would be hard for someone to invent. Because Judge Wiley ruled that Hernandez’ confession is admissible, the prosecution was able to present this confession as evidence to the jury, leading to the inevitable back and forth between Mr. Fishbein and the prosecutors about the reliability and weight of the confession.

Generally, if a defendant makes a videotaped confession coupled with voluntary admission to at least one other person, such evidence would be nearly impossible for the defense attorney to overcome. However, since in this case there is no tangible evidence corroborating the confession, will the jury doubt the accuracy of Mr. Hernandez’ confession? Time will soon tell.

Since the beginning of the trial on January 30, 2015, the defense has continued to undermine the reliability of Hernandez’s confession. Not only has the defense argued that the confession was a fantasy invented under police pressure by a man with a weak and malleable mind, plagued by a personality disorder, Mr. Fishbein has presented evidence of an alternative suspect who might have been responsible of Etan Patz’ disappearance. Witnesses place Jose A. Ramos, a man convicted of child molestation in an unrelated case, near Etan Patz’s home around the time of the murder. Ramos was dating Ms. Susan Harrington, who was hired to walk Etan Patz to and from school. The defense witnesses further testified that Ramos met Etan Patz and that he had been in the Patz’s apartment. Although Etan Patz’s mother denied Ramos was ever in their apartment, by presenting this evidence, the defense further undermined Hernandez’s confession.

The confession of Mr. Hernandez has become the focal point of the entire trial. As the attorneys are delivering their closing arguments, many people following the case and trial, I’m sure, have developed their opinions. For me, it was important to realize and understand that an innocent defendant and a defendant being not guilty are two very different things. The defense attorney has to create a reasonable doubt in the jurors’ minds that Hernandez has possibly not committed the alleged crime in order to succeed. Mr. Fishbein’s efforts to cast this doubt by introducing an alternative suspect theory, by undermining the reliability of the original confession, and by pointing to the lack of physical evidence have been clear. However, it is difficult to tell what the outcome of this case will be. As the jury is about to retire to deliberate, the long anticipated verdict will soon be revealed bringing this case to a close after decades of waiting.

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DOJ Policy Bans Waiver of Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claims as Condition of Guilty Plea

Last week, Deputy Attorney General James M. Cole issued a memorandum to federal prosecutors advising them that they should “no longer seek in plea agreements to have a defendant waive claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, whether those claims are made on collateral attack, or, when permitted by circuit law, made on direct appeal.” As to cases in which such waivers had already been entered, the memorandum advises that federal  prosecutors should “decline to enforce the waiver when defense counsel rendered ineffective assistance resulting in prejudice or when the defendant’s ineffective assistance claim raises a serious debatable issue that a court should resolve.”

The U.S. Supreme Court has not ruled on the validity of such waivers. The Court has clearly held, however, that the right to effective assistance of counsel applies to guilty pleas. Missouri v. Frye, 132 S.Ct. 1399 (2012); Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S.Ct. 1376 (2012); Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 (2010). Following these holdings, every circuit court to address the validity of a waiver of the right to effective assistance of counsel – ten of twelve circuits – has upheld the waiver. United States v. Djelevic, 161 F.3d 104 (2d Cir. 1998); United States v. Lemaster, 403 F.3d 216 (4th Cir. 2005); United States v. Wilkes, 20 F.3d 651 (5th Cir. 1994); Davila v. United States, 258 F.3d 448 (6th Cir. 2001); Jones v. United States, 167 F.3d 1142 (7th Cir. 1999); DeRoo v. United States, 223 F.3d 919 (8th Cir. 2000); Washington v. Lampert, 422 F.3d 864 (9th Cir. 2005); United States v. Cockerham, 237 F.3d 1179 (10th Cir. 2001). Interestingly, however, twelve state ethics opinions have held that insisting on such a waiver is unethical.  See, e.g., United States v. Kentucky Bar Ass’n, 2013-SC-000270-KB (Ky. Aug. 21, 2014), and cases cited in footnote 37 therein. In addition, in a 2013 113E Resolution, the American Bar Association declared its opposition to ineffective assistance of counsel (IAC) waivers, and in October 2012 the National Association Criminal Defense Lawyers (NACDL) has issued a formal opinion (12-02) finding it unethical for defense lawyers to participate in such waivers.

The DOJ policy is important because it is a break with the growing momentum of waiver by guilty plea:  it seems that over the years defendants have been asked to waive more and more rights as part of a plea bargain.  Ultimately, although problematic, many defendants are now required to waive the right to appeal or to appeal and collateral attack as part of a guilty plea.   The DOJ directive mark an important exception to these practices.

The DOJ policy memorandum is significant for another reason. In other jurisdictions, like the United Kingdom, internal prosecutorial procedures and policies are publicly available and provide some limitations on what would otherwise be unlimited prosecutorial discretion. This is an excellent way to create at least a presumption that the prosecution is behaving fairly.

Finally, there are those who wonder whether the prosecution (or the courts) can or should do more when confronted by deficient performance of defense counsel. See, e.g., Vanessa Merton, What Do You Do When You Meet a “Walking Violation of the Sixth Amendment” If You’re Trying to Put That Lawyer’s Client in Jail?69 Fordham L. Rev. 997 (2000). They are on the front lines, if you will; aside from the ethical obligation to report unethical conduct by other lawyers, prosecutors generally have no duty to protect a defendant from the ineffectiveness of his or her counsel. Thankfully, by virtue of the DOJ memorandum, federal prosecutors have accepted the duty not to participate in hiding these claims from review.