Tagged: jury deliberations

Prof. Gershman on Racism in Jury Verdicts

In his most recent post titled How Racism Infects Jury Verdicts, Haub Law School Professor Bennett L. Gershman looks closely at two recent SCOTUS cases – Buck v. Davis and Pena-Rodriguez v. Colorado, both dealing with a blunt situation of racial bias in criminal trials.

In Buck v. Davis, an expert witness testified that the petitioner is more likely to be dangerous because he is Black and in Pena-Rodriguez v. Colorado, one of the jurors allegedly stated that he thought the defendant was guilty because he was Mexican. Both cases are currently before the United States Supreme Court.

Prof. Gershman concludes by saying that

It is almost impossible today to discuss any issue in criminal justice without at the same time discussing the role that race plays at every phase of the process. … given the increasing focus on protecting defendants against wrongful convictions, it is critical that a defendant’s constitutional right to a fair trial before an impartial jury not be corrupted by uniquely pernicious stereotypes promoted either by a purported “expert” witness or a bigoted juror. Both instances are so inflammatory as to destroy confidence in a jury’s verdict.

The Silver Verdict: Conviction Amidst Juror Struggles in High Profile Deliberation

WRITTEN BY: Anjelica Cappellino, Esq. & Prof. John Meringolo, Esq.

After a three-week highly publicized federal trial in the Southern District of New York, former New York Assembly Speaker, Sheldon Silver, was convicted on all seven counts against him. Silver received nearly $4 million in corrupt payments from two different law firms and earned over $700,000 in referral fees from real estate firm, Goldberg & Iryami, by inducing real estate developers to retain the firm. Silver also received over $3 million in case referrals sent to Weitz & Luxenberg. Silver secured the asbestos case referrals from a doctor, and in exchange, directed New York State funds to the doctor’s research center. Silver was automatically expelled from his assembly seat after his conviction.

The conviction of Silver signifies many turning points for New York and presents a broad array of subject matter. The end of a powerful politician’s decades-long run. A vacant seat in the assembly. A recently honed focus by the federal government to end rampant political corruption. But another less obvious topic of discussion amidst Silver’s trial is the role the jury played in his conviction. On several occasions during the deliberation process, jurors vocalized their concerns and requested to be relieved. Though Silver was ultimately convicted by a unanimous decision, it is worth noting the issues expressed by these jurors and what exactly they signify.

Shortly after the jury began deliberations, one juror sent a note to Judge Valerie E. Caproni requesting to be dismissed. “I have a different opinion/view so far in this case and it is making me feel very, very uncomfortable,” the juror wrote. “I am so stressed out right now that I can’t even write normally. I don’t feel like I can be myself right now! I need to leave!” The judge denied the juror’s request. Furthermore, the juror had also requested a private meeting with the judge. Judge Caproni denied such a meeting, stating that, “the secrecy of jury deliberations is a cornerstone of our jury system.” Shortly after the request, the judge received another note stating that one of the jurors was “having difficulty distinguishing whether or not exchanging New York State funds for something in return is illegal” – the ultimate trial issue – and requested information on a code of conduct. Another juror, a cab driver, later asked to be excused based on a conflict of interest – his medallion owner allegedly was friends with Silver. The juror was kept on the case. After three days of deliberation, a guilty verdict was rendered.

Jury deliberations are secretive by nature. It is very rare to catch a real-time glimpse of the inner workings of such a system. But in Silver’s case, perhaps one of the most highly publicized trials New York has seen in recent history, the mindsets of some jurors were exposed for all to see – and for all onlookers to analyze. So what does it mean when there is such discord in the juror room – enough to warrant letters to the judge and requests for dismissal?

In the case of the first reluctant juror, defense lawyer, John Meringolo, believed it could perhaps be due to the juror’s unwillingness to convict. “When there’s chaos in the jury room, it’s always good for the defendant. Statistically, the conviction rate is so high in the federal system, when you have someone who’s willing to take a stand, it means that maybe he has a shot.” Meringolo proved correct. After a deliberation was reached, the juror identified herself and stated she was the only juror who doubted Silver’s guilt. “There were people who did not want to listen to anything I had to say — not many, a few,” Arleen Phillips said. “It was tense and I just wanted to get out of there.”

A juror’s pressure to ‘get out’ of deliberations (and oftentimes, jury duty itself) is a problem that has long plagued the justice system. As is one of the many ways in which a juror’s fairness is unable to be gauged, lawyers and judges alike cannot predict which jurors vote due to factually and legally cognizable reasoning and which vote simply to “get out of there.” But in Silver’s case, it was vocalized on three separate occasions that there were issues amongst the jurors that influenced their decisions in perhaps an inappropriate way. As evident in Phillips’ statement, unanimity was not reached due to her actual beliefs and interpretations of the facts and law, but rather, it seems that she was broken down by others.

It is no surprise that a juror majority will always try to influence the lone wolf in an effort to reach a verdict. But what happens if debate and discussion turns into pressure and coercion? At what point is a jury considered no longer able to render a truly unanimous verdict? Silver’s case is a prime example of such an issue, and just as it brings forth many questions as to the propriety of New York’s politicians, it is also an excellent vehicle in which to examine the practical difficulties of juror unanimity.

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Improper Use of Technology in Courtroom Leads to Prosecutorial Misconduct

We all think and say it: images are worth a thousand words. The same is true when prosecuting a case. Prof. Bennett L. Gershman of Pace Law School, in his latest HuffPost piece titled Prosecutorial Misconduct Using Courtroom Technology challenges the way some prosecutors put on their cases when using technology. He suggests that many increasingly cross the line when they use technology to suggest that “‘beyond reasonable doubt’ is really not that demanding” of a standard, when they use “visual trickery” to awaken an angry and emotional reaction out of jury, or when they sway juries by showing “misleading and prejudicial images” during their closing arguments.

Prof. Gershman states that

[a]lthough there’s nothing inherently wrong with using technology in the courtroom, more and more prosecutors cross the line by exploiting the power of technology to skew the way juries analyze the evidence, and thereby prejudice a defendant’s right to a fair trial.

Check it out and share your thoughts.

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NY Court of Appeals Overturns a Murder Conviction Because of Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

POST WRITTEN BYProf. Peter Widulski, Assistant Director of the First Year Legal Skills Program and the Coach of International Criminal Moot Court Team at Pace Law School.

On July 1, 2015, the N.Y. Court of Appeals issued a 5-1 ruling regarding a prosecutor’s comments on summation that may overstate the probative value of DNA evidence presented at trial and defense counsel’s obligation to object to such comments. People v. Wright, No. 109, 2015 N.Y. Slip Op. 05621 (July 1, 2015).

The case involved the murder and alleged rape of a woman in Rochester, N.Y., who was found dead of strangulation by means of a ligature, shortly after she had sexual intercourse. A Monroe County prosecutor pursued charges of intentional murder, felony murder, and rape. Defense counsel admitted in opening statement that defendant had intercourse with the victim around the time in question, but argued that this intercourse was consensual. Counsel also vigorously opposed the murder charges.

In its case in chief, the prosecution called three expert witnesses who testified about the potential scientific value in general of the different methods of DNA testing they employed. The experts also carefully explained the limited probative value that could be deduced from their analysis of the ligature and items relating to the victim’s sexual intercourse.

The jury rejected the rape and felony murder charges, but convicted the defendant of intentional murder, pursuant to Penal Law § 125.25(1). The trial court imposed a sentence of 25 years to life. By a 3-2 vote, the Appellate Division affirmed. People v. Wright, 982 N.Y.S. 2d 219, 115  A.D. 3d 1257 (App. Div. 4th Dep’t 2014).

In the July 1 ruling, all six Court of Appeals judges who participated in the case (including especially dissenting Judge Eugene Pigott) credited defense counsel for effectively eliciting from the prosecution’s expert witnesses during cross-examination the limited probative value their testimony provided regarding identifying the defendant as the person possibly responsible for the murder. The appeal therefore focused decisively on statements made by the prosecution on summation and defense counsel’s response (or lack thereof) to such comments.

Upon review of the record, the Court’s majority held that during summation the prosecution prejudicially overstated the probative value of the DNA evidence its own witnesses provided relating to the circumstances of the case. The Court identified several instances in which the prosecutor told the jury that expert testimony conclusively showed that defendant’s DNA was a match for that found on the ligature. The Court noted that these comments contravened what the experts had in fact stated: that DNA analysis was only able to show that the defendant’s DNA could not be excluded from that found on the ligature.

The Court determined that the prosecutor’s “apparent intent was to persuade the jury that the DNA established that defendant had committed the rape and murder, when the evidence did not, and could not, dispositively establish his guilt.” The Court further held that defense counsel provided ineffective assistance because it could not identify any tactical reason to excuse counsel’s “multiple failures” to object to the prosecutor’s “numerous misrepresentations of the evidence.”

In support of its ruling, the majority noted the significant impact that DNA evidence may have on a jury’s deliberations. It further concluded that aside from the expert testimony, evidence produced at trial was insufficient to support defendant’s conviction for second degree murder. Accordingly, the Court reversed the Appellate Division and remanded the case for a new trial.

Student Perspective: The Etan Patz Case – Confession, Lack of Physical Evidence and Reasonable Doubt

POST WRITTEN BY: Alexander Zugaro (’15), Pace Law School

The story of the 6-year-old boy, Etan Patz, who had gone missing in SOHO Manhattan in 1979, is one that stretches over several decades. Now, after a ruling on November 24, 2014 by Judge Maxwell Wiley and almost a three month long trial, the story is reaching a conclusion. In 2012, after police re-opened the investigation, Pedro Hernandez confessed to law enforcement that he was responsible for the disappearance and murder of Etan Patz. He told law enforcement that he strangled Etan and disposed of his body. Mr. Hernandez was an 18-year-old man working in a neighborhood convenience store at the time of Patz’s disappearance.

However, this past fall a hearing was held regarding the admissibility of Mr. Hernandez’s confession. Hernandez’s defense attorney, Harvey Fishbein, argued that Hernandez was schizophrenic and bipolar at the time he made his confession. As such, Mr. Hernandez did not understand he could reassert his right against self-incrimination even after he waived his Miranda warnings. Yet, Judge Maxwell Wiley ruled on November 24, 2014 that the confession was admissible, stating that Hernandez waived his Miranda rights and that such waiver was done knowingly and intelligently.

To date the prosecution has not been able to find any evidence corroborating Hernandez’s confession, except a statement made by Hernandez’s brother who told police that Hernandez had confessed to him two years prior to his arrest and a statement made to members of his prayer group in the summer of 1979, none of whom came forward to testify until after Mr. Hernandez was arrested. The body of Etan Patz was never found, and prosecutors have not presented any physical evidence tying Mr. Hernandez to the boy’s disappearance.

The significance of Judge Wiley’s ruling is that the jury was able to hear Hernandez’s confession and will decide on whether they believe his confession is reliable. Defense attorney Frishbein stated that “Mr. Hernandez is extremely suggestible because of his low I.Q. and other mental handicaps. Anyone who sees these confessions will understand that when the police were finished with him, Mr. Hernandez believed he killed Etan Patz, but that doesn’t mean that he did.” On the other hand, however, the lead prosecutor stated that Mr. Hernandez’s statements contain little-known details about the crime that would be hard for someone to invent. Because Judge Wiley ruled that Hernandez’ confession is admissible, the prosecution was able to present this confession as evidence to the jury, leading to the inevitable back and forth between Mr. Fishbein and the prosecutors about the reliability and weight of the confession.

Generally, if a defendant makes a videotaped confession coupled with voluntary admission to at least one other person, such evidence would be nearly impossible for the defense attorney to overcome. However, since in this case there is no tangible evidence corroborating the confession, will the jury doubt the accuracy of Mr. Hernandez’ confession? Time will soon tell.

Since the beginning of the trial on January 30, 2015, the defense has continued to undermine the reliability of Hernandez’s confession. Not only has the defense argued that the confession was a fantasy invented under police pressure by a man with a weak and malleable mind, plagued by a personality disorder, Mr. Fishbein has presented evidence of an alternative suspect who might have been responsible of Etan Patz’ disappearance. Witnesses place Jose A. Ramos, a man convicted of child molestation in an unrelated case, near Etan Patz’s home around the time of the murder. Ramos was dating Ms. Susan Harrington, who was hired to walk Etan Patz to and from school. The defense witnesses further testified that Ramos met Etan Patz and that he had been in the Patz’s apartment. Although Etan Patz’s mother denied Ramos was ever in their apartment, by presenting this evidence, the defense further undermined Hernandez’s confession.

The confession of Mr. Hernandez has become the focal point of the entire trial. As the attorneys are delivering their closing arguments, many people following the case and trial, I’m sure, have developed their opinions. For me, it was important to realize and understand that an innocent defendant and a defendant being not guilty are two very different things. The defense attorney has to create a reasonable doubt in the jurors’ minds that Hernandez has possibly not committed the alleged crime in order to succeed. Mr. Fishbein’s efforts to cast this doubt by introducing an alternative suspect theory, by undermining the reliability of the original confession, and by pointing to the lack of physical evidence have been clear. However, it is difficult to tell what the outcome of this case will be. As the jury is about to retire to deliberate, the long anticipated verdict will soon be revealed bringing this case to a close after decades of waiting.

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