Tagged: DOJ

Federal Monitoring of State Prosecutors: Who Will Guard the Guardians?

juvenalPOST WRITTEN BYProf. Peter Widulski, Assistant Director of the First Year Legal Skills Program and the Coach of International Criminal Moot Court Team at Pace Law School.

The lead editorial in the New York Times of June 6, 2016 addresses an important issue: the all-too-frequent failure or resistance of prosecutors to comply with their constitutional obligation to produce to the defense evidence in their possession that is potentially exculpatory or mitigating for a defendant. To address this issue, the editorial suggests that the United States Department of Justice should monitor the practices of district attorneys’ offices in which such problems have arisen in the past.

This proposal may have merit, but it contains at least one troubling issue indicated in the editorial’s title: “To Stop Bad Prosecutors, Call the Feds.” This title and the editorial’s text suggest that the problem at issue is entirely or primarily the fault of local district attorneys’ offices and that such problems are absent or de minimis in the offices of federal prosecutors.

The editorial’s concern for fairness to individuals facing state criminal charges is to be applauded, but its proposal raises questions regarding federal prosecutors, who themselves are members of the Department of Justice, the department that would conduct the oversight. Will federal overseers, eager to advance their careers, monitor prosecutors in their own department as carefully as they review prosecutors in state offices? Will the Department’s oversight mandate be limited to local district attorneys’ offices? If so, will this foster an idea that federal prosecutors are exempt from scrutiny regarding their compliance with Brady v. Maryland?

In considering the editorial’s proposal, it is perhaps worth remembering an old question asked by the Roman poet Juvenal: Quis custodiet ipsos custodes? Who will guard the guardians?

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DOJ Policy Bans Waiver of Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claims as Condition of Guilty Plea

Last week, Deputy Attorney General James M. Cole issued a memorandum to federal prosecutors advising them that they should “no longer seek in plea agreements to have a defendant waive claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, whether those claims are made on collateral attack, or, when permitted by circuit law, made on direct appeal.” As to cases in which such waivers had already been entered, the memorandum advises that federal  prosecutors should “decline to enforce the waiver when defense counsel rendered ineffective assistance resulting in prejudice or when the defendant’s ineffective assistance claim raises a serious debatable issue that a court should resolve.”

The U.S. Supreme Court has not ruled on the validity of such waivers. The Court has clearly held, however, that the right to effective assistance of counsel applies to guilty pleas. Missouri v. Frye, 132 S.Ct. 1399 (2012); Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S.Ct. 1376 (2012); Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 (2010). Following these holdings, every circuit court to address the validity of a waiver of the right to effective assistance of counsel – ten of twelve circuits – has upheld the waiver. United States v. Djelevic, 161 F.3d 104 (2d Cir. 1998); United States v. Lemaster, 403 F.3d 216 (4th Cir. 2005); United States v. Wilkes, 20 F.3d 651 (5th Cir. 1994); Davila v. United States, 258 F.3d 448 (6th Cir. 2001); Jones v. United States, 167 F.3d 1142 (7th Cir. 1999); DeRoo v. United States, 223 F.3d 919 (8th Cir. 2000); Washington v. Lampert, 422 F.3d 864 (9th Cir. 2005); United States v. Cockerham, 237 F.3d 1179 (10th Cir. 2001). Interestingly, however, twelve state ethics opinions have held that insisting on such a waiver is unethical.  See, e.g., United States v. Kentucky Bar Ass’n, 2013-SC-000270-KB (Ky. Aug. 21, 2014), and cases cited in footnote 37 therein. In addition, in a 2013 113E Resolution, the American Bar Association declared its opposition to ineffective assistance of counsel (IAC) waivers, and in October 2012 the National Association Criminal Defense Lawyers (NACDL) has issued a formal opinion (12-02) finding it unethical for defense lawyers to participate in such waivers.

The DOJ policy is important because it is a break with the growing momentum of waiver by guilty plea:  it seems that over the years defendants have been asked to waive more and more rights as part of a plea bargain.  Ultimately, although problematic, many defendants are now required to waive the right to appeal or to appeal and collateral attack as part of a guilty plea.   The DOJ directive mark an important exception to these practices.

The DOJ policy memorandum is significant for another reason. In other jurisdictions, like the United Kingdom, internal prosecutorial procedures and policies are publicly available and provide some limitations on what would otherwise be unlimited prosecutorial discretion. This is an excellent way to create at least a presumption that the prosecution is behaving fairly.

Finally, there are those who wonder whether the prosecution (or the courts) can or should do more when confronted by deficient performance of defense counsel. See, e.g., Vanessa Merton, What Do You Do When You Meet a “Walking Violation of the Sixth Amendment” If You’re Trying to Put That Lawyer’s Client in Jail?69 Fordham L. Rev. 997 (2000). They are on the front lines, if you will; aside from the ethical obligation to report unethical conduct by other lawyers, prosecutors generally have no duty to protect a defendant from the ineffectiveness of his or her counsel. Thankfully, by virtue of the DOJ memorandum, federal prosecutors have accepted the duty not to participate in hiding these claims from review.

Second Circuit Targets “DOJ White Paper” in Sanctioned-Killings

A three-judge panel for Second Circuit Court of Appeals has recently ordered the United States Government to release portions of a Justice Department memorandum (“DOJ White Paper”) that purportedly contains classified information regarding the targeted killing of Anwar al-Awlaki. In 2011, Anwar al-Awlaki, a United States citizen alleged to have joined Al Qaeda forces, was killed during a targeted drone strike in Yemen. His killing, along with some other alleged terror suspects, were sanctioned by the United States targeted-killing program in the “War on Terror.”

In New York Times Co. v. Dep’t of Justice, the Court ruled that partial disclosure of the “DOJ White Paper,” sections setting forth the government’s reasoning as to lawfulness of its targeted killings of United States citizens carried out by drone aircraft, was justified given the government’s public statements discussing Awlaki’s death. The court observed that senior Government officials had undertaken

an extensive public relations campaign to convince the public that [the Administration’s] conclusions [about the lawfulness of the killing of al-Awlaki] are correct.

The court further concluded that such limited disclosure would not impinge upon any attorney-client privilege matters between the government and the DOJ’s Office of Legal Counsel, nor would disclosure risk “any aspect of military plans, intelligence activities, sources and methods or foreign relations.”

In a prior editorial, the New York Times noted that the “DOJ White Paper” was of monumental importance to help settle the significant legal debate that has transpired since the targeted-killing program was made public. Many legal scholars have long awaited the release of the “legal reasoning” that has been drummed up by government officials to justify the targeted-killing program. Many scholars have remained skeptical of the government’s analysis, and have wondered whether it is ever lawful for the government to conduct targeted killings of American citizens, observing that the targeted-killing of any United States citizen may inherently contravene

executive orders banning assassinations, a federal law against murder, protections in the Bill of Rights and various strictures of the international laws of war.

Last year, U.S. District Court Judge Colleen McMahon denied the request of the New York Times and the American Civil Liberties Union to obtain an unredacted version of the Justice Department’s memorandum pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act. In response to the District Court’s ruling, the ACLU expressed that

[t]his ruling denies the public access to crucial information about the government’s extrajudicial killing of U.S. citizens and also effectively green-lights its practice of making selective and self-serving disclosures.

At the time, ACLU deputy legal director Jameel Jaffer also suggested that the “targeted killing program raises profound questions about the appropriate limits on government power in our constitutional democracy.” Jaffer advocated that the memorandum should be unsealed, because “[t]he public has a right to know more about the circumstances in which the government believes it can lawfully kill people, including U.S. citizens, who are far from any battlefield and have never been charged with a crime.”

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