Category: Wrongful Conviction

Developments in Compensation for Exonerees

Two developments in New York State took place last week that may reveal a less strict approach to compensating exonerees. First, David Ranta, a man who was framed by Brooklyn detective Louis Scarcella and served 23 years in prison for a murder he did not commit  reached an agreement with the office of the City Comptroller, Scott Stringer, to receive $6.4 million in compensation. Ranta’s $150 million claim was settled by the city comptroller, Scott Stringer, without a law suit ever being filed and thus without involving the City’s legal department.  This was the first case to be disposed of by the new Conviction Integrity Unit in the Brooklyn District Attorney’s office, and that office joined in the application to vacate the conviction. While Stringer took some heat for this decision, he made clear that spending millions of dollars and many years in litigation would not do anyone justice in a case where the district attorney joined in the motion to vacate the conviction.

Second, New York State Attorney General Eric Schneiderman announced legislation that would allow people who have confessed or pleaded guilty to a crime they did not commit to sue the state for damages.  This change seemingly would go hand in hand with the amendment to N.Y. CPL § 440 that allowed convicted defendants who had plead guilty to bring a post-conviction motion for DNA testing.  As Schneiderman noted in his announcement, 10 of the 27 people in New York who have had their convictions vacated based on DNA had falsely confessed or pleaded guilty.  Such people will be able to sue for compensation even if they cannot prove that their confession or guilty plea was coerced. The proposed bill would also extend the statute of limitations for wrongful conviction compensation claims from two to three years.

These developments make sense.  NYC Comptroller Stringer’s decision to settle a claim without years of expensive litigation is a welcome breath of fresh air in our overly contentious adversary system and will allow the millions that would have been spent on defending the indefensible to be used to pay other wrongfully convicted individuals or for other important criminal justice purposes.  Similarly, given what we now know about the causes of wrongful conviction, we should welcome the end of our pretending that false confessions do not exist.

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Actual Innocence: Landmark Decision Changes Post-Conviction Landscape in New York

A landmark decision by the Appellate Division, Second Department has given new hope to individuals wrongfully convicted of a crime in the state of New York, and unable to obtain post-conviction relief due to the procedural restraints statutorily imposed under New York Criminal Procedure Law. On January 15, 2014,  the Appellate Court Second Department handed down its epic decision, becoming the first New York Appellate Court to recognize a freestanding claim of actual innocence, reaffirming that the incarceration of an innocent person is inherently unconstitutional.

In People v. Hamilton, the Court ruled that a defendant’s claim of actual innocence may now be recognized as a “freestanding” ground to vacate a judgment of conviction pursuant to NY CPL 440.10. (1)(h), which provides that  a court may vacate a judgement if obtained in violation of a defendant’s constitutional rights. Notably, the Court directed  that a defendant’s claim of “actual innocence”  may be pursued  independently of the other grounds for relief prescribed by New York’s post-judgement statute, and can even be supported by evidence that may fail to survive the “newly discovered” criteria imposed under NY CPL 440.10(1)(g). The Court explained that the defendant may present a claim of actual innocence based upon  new evidence, whether or not it satisfies the Salemi factors or is barred by other legal hurdles, such as prior adverse court determinations.

The Court  directed  that relief based upon an actual innocence claim should only be granted when the court is presented with clear and convincing evidence that the defendant is innocent. The court reasoned that

Mere doubt as to the defendant’s guilt, or a preponderance of conflicting evidence as to the defendant’s guilt, is insufficient, since a convicted defendant no longer enjoys the presumption of innocence, and in fact is presumed to be guilty.

The Court also explained that an exploration into the merits of a case may be necessary when a prima facie showing of actual innocence has been made by a defendant. In this case, the court found that Hamilton had made such a showing to require a hearing.

In response to the court’s decision, Derrick Hamilton, who spent 20 years in prison for murder, stated that “it is a crime that it has taken this long for me to receive a shot at justice.” Since his conviction, Hamilton had spent the last twenty two years  battling the criminal justice system in an effort  to clear his name. All prior attempts to vacate his conviction were denied, although making a credible presentation of alibi evidence, witness recantation, and possible manipulation of witnesses by police. The Hamilton case has also been vetted for  review by the Brooklyn District Attorney’s Office, which is currently reviewing cases handled by retired detective Louis Scarcella. The Office has undertaken a review of about 50 homicide cases to determine whether the defendants were wrongfully convicted as a result of possible police misconduct.

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Battle of Experts: Controversy in Shaken Baby Case Set for NY Court

A New York court is set to hear testimony that will decide whether a shift in the medical community over the prognosis of shaken baby syndrome (“SBS”) constitutes newly discovered evidence under Article 440 of the New York Criminal Procedure Law. Supreme Court Justice James Piampiano has ordered a hearing in People v. Rene Bailey after being presented with strong evidence that the medical community’s standard for diagnosing shaken baby syndrome has significantly shifted over the years since Bailey’s conviction.

 Rene Bailey, once a daycare provider, was convicted of violently shaking a two year old child and causing severe brain injuries that resulted in the child’s death. At trial, the proof against Bailey rested primarily upon the testimony of a state medical examiner, who had claimed that the child’s internal brain injuries could only be caused by a violent shaking of the  body (SBS), and could not be attributed to any other cause known within the medical community at the time.

Contrary to the state’s medical examiner, medical experts for Bailey have now opined that a diagnosis of shaken baby syndrome should not have rested exclusively on the presentation of the child’s internal brain injuries, consisting of subdural hematoma, retinal hemorrhaging, and cerebral edema (“triad of injuries”). As of today, many members within the medical community no longer promote an exclusive diagnosis of SBS based solely upon the presentation of internal brain injuries, realizing that causes unassociated with shaking may be the root of the issue. Since Bailey’s conviction, medical studies have also shown that a child may suffer the “triad of injuries” as a result of impact to the brain caused by common short distance falls. Notably, as opined in an article by NY Times writer Emily Bazelon, some biomechanical engineers have raised doubts, [in the absence of external injuries], about whether it’s even possible to shake a baby to death.

Aside from new medical testimony, the Court will also entertain evidence that has been discovered by her attorney, Professor Adele Bernhard of New York Law School, which shows that her client may be factually innocent. The evidence presented by a new witness appears to support Bailey’s continuous declaration that she had not shaken the alleged victim, and further corroborates the observation of another child, who was present at the time of the occurrence and had initially stated to the police that the alleged victim had jumped off a chair and hit her head on the ground.  Justice Piampiano has also reserved judgment upon whether further discovery will be ordered in the matter, including whether Bailey’s request for the State to produce notes from an interview of a third child eyewitness will be granted. According to court papers, a third child may have also been present at the time of the alleged occurrence, and the child may have made exculpatory declarations to police consistent with Bailey’s version of the event  that were never disclosed to trial counsel.

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Following Review, First Two Hynes Convictions Vacated

The murder convictions of two men, Sharrif Wilson and Antonio Yarbough, were vacated by N.Y.S. Supreme Court Justice Raymond Guzman last week.  The two men were 15 and 18 at the time of the murders and each had served 21 years in prison.  District Attorney Ken Thompson consented to the vacatur and promptly dismissed the cases against them.

The two teenagers had been out together when Antonio Yarbrough returned home to find the grisly murder scene:  his mother, young sister, and another young girl had been brutally murdered.  The men consistently maintained their innocence and no physical evidence connected them to the crime.  Last year, testing of material under Yarbrough’s mother’s fingernails revealed DNA that matched a subsequent rape and murder that occurred while the two were in prison.  The killer remains unidentified.

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Second Circuit Upholds Right to Sue for Brady Violation after Guilty Plea

On January 16, 2014, in Poventud v. City of New York, No. 12-1011-cv, 2014 WL 182313 (2d Cir. 2014), the Second Circuit, sitting en banc, upheld the original panel’s ruling that the defendant, who served nine years in jail for a crime he probably didn’t commit, could sue the City despite the fact that he had originally pleaded guilty.  The dissenter on the original panel would have held that his Brady claim – that the police withheld information that impeached the victim’s identification – was waived by his plea, which essentially admitted he was at the scene.

In short, the Second Circuit took a very practical approach to the pressures – particularly on someone who is innocent – to plead guilty.