Tagged: criminal justice system

N.Y. Court of Appeals Issues Ruling on Disclosure of Jury Notes in Criminal Cases

POST WRITTEN BY: Prof. Peter Widulski, Assistant Director of the First Year Legal Skills Program and the Coach of International Criminal Moot Court Team at Pace Law School.

On June 12, 2014, the New York Court of Appeals issued a memorandum decision on the responsibilities of a trial court when a jury sends a note asking for clarification of the court’s instructions on the elements of the crimes presented for the jury’s deliberations.

The appeal arose from a case in which the prosecution charged the defendant with second-degree murder, pursuant to N.Y. Penal Law § 125.25(1), which requires proof of intent to kill.  At the close of proof in the case, the trial court, in addition to instructing the jury on the elements of this charge, granted the defense counsel’s request to instruct the jury on the lesser included offense of first degree manslaughter, in the event that the jury, pursuant to Penal Law § 125.20(1), found that the defendant’s intent was not to kill the victim but only to cause serious physical injury that unintentionally resulted in the victim’s death.

During its deliberations, the jury sent the judge the following note: “Power Point – Judges directions on Manslaughter/Murder in the Second Degree -(Intent).” The judge did not present the jury’s note to the parties (apparently receiving no request to do so), but simply informed them that the jury was requesting “the Judge’s directions on manslaughter and murder in the second degree.” Of particular importance in this case is that the judge did not inform counsel of the note’s reference to intent. When the judge called the jury to the courtroom to hear his response to the note, the judge said that he understood them to be asking merely for a read-back of the instructions on the elements of charges at issue, and the judge repeated these instructions.

The jury acquitted defendant on the murder charge but found him guilty on the manslaughter charge. In rendering this verdict, the jury had to make a crucial decision about the defendant’s intent. Their verdict implied that they found that the defendant’s intent was not to kill but to cause serious physical injury.

The Defense appealed, arguing that the trial judge erred by not informing counsel of the jury note’s reference to intent. The Court of Appeals agreed. The Court noted that Criminal Procedure Law § 310.30 requires that when the trial court receives a request from the jury “for further instruction or information with respect to the law,” the court must give notice of the content of the request to the People and the defense. The Court stated that under its precedent in People v. O’Rama, 579 N.E.2d 189 (N.Y. 1991), this notice must be “meaningful,” so that the defense is able “to evaluate the inquiry and the proper responses in light of the defendant’s interests.” Id. at 192. The O’Rama court stated that

[a] court can neither serve the goal of maximizing counsel’s participation nor satisfy the CPL 310.30 requirement that meaningful notice be given when counsel is not afforded a verbatim account of a juror’s communication and is thereby deprived of an advance opportunity to suggest a response.

Id. at 193. Following this precedent, the Court held that the trial judge’s conduct with respect to the jury note, omitting specific reference to the intent issue, failed to satisfy this obligation. Moreover, because the Court deemed this a failure of the trial court’s “core responsibilities” relating to the court’s “mode of proceedings,” the Court held that under O’Rama an objection by defense counsel was not required to preserve the issue for appeal.

The Court vacated the defendant’s manslaughter conviction, with leave to the People to resubmit that charge to a grand jury.

Judge Robert Smith concurred in the result, while stating some misgivings that excusing the preservation requirement in such a case may provide defense counsel with a tactical opportunity to avoid seeking full disclosure to counsel of the contents of a juror note in hopes of a future reversal of the conviction. He suggested that a future case might raise and brief the issue of the scope and validity of the “mode of proceedings” doctrine and afford the Court with an opportunity to reconsider and revise of this doctrine.

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DOJ Adopts New Policy Requiring Electronic Recording of Statements

The Justice Department has announced a new policy that will require federal law enforcement agencies to electronically record interviews with suspects.  According to Attorney General Eric H. Holder Jr.,

Creating an electronic record will ensure that we have an objective account of key investigations and interactions with people who are held in federal custody. It will allow us to document that detained individuals are afforded their constitutionally protected rights.

The new policy will require federal law enforcement agencies to record interactions with a detained suspect during the time between the suspect’s arrest and initial appearance before a judge. Notably, the new policy also suggests that officials should consider using electronic recording devices during other investigative situations, including witness interviews.

This is a stark change from the Department’s prior policy, which expressively prohibited the use of recording equipment by law enforcement agencies when conducting interviews with suspects. The Justice Department was previously concerned that the use of recording devices would undermine investigative techniques of federal agencies, and would discourage suspects from talking. The Department also once expressed that jurors may frown upon FBI interviewing techniques, and have “unfavorable impressions of agents” had they heard verbatim accounts of such interrogations.

Mr. Holder discounted these concerns, explaining that federal officials should be more committed to a process that exemplifies evenhanded enforcement of the law, and the new policy would “provide verifiable evidence that our words are matched by our deeds.” He noted that it is of great importance for federal agencies to ensure that the statements of suspects are accurately recorded, and that suspects are afforded their constitutional rights during interrogations with federal agents.

National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers President Jerry J. Cox was pleased to hear about the Justice Department’s policy change, noting that the use of electronic recording during interviews

protects the accused against police misconduct, protects law enforcement against false allegations, and protects public safety by ensuring a verbatim record of the interrogation process and any statements.

Mr. Holder has already begun the implementation of the new policy, and has instructed United States attorneys and agency field offices to begin training sessions. As of July, the new policy will apply to the FBI, DEA, ATF and U.S. Marshals Service.

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Does this Government Conduct “Shock the Conscience of the Ninth Circuit?”

The Ninth Circuit recently upheld a due process challenge to an ATF sting that targeted the poorest minority neighborhoods in Phoenix to court individuals – with a promise of riches – to break into and rob local fictitious, non-existent stash houses.  Many of these individuals had no criminal records; almost all were out of work and poor.

Pace Professor Bennett L. Gershman analyzes the ATF’s penchant for creating fictitious crimes (see e.g., Operation Fast and Furious) in a recent Huffington Post column.  Click here to read the entire post.

Oh My Brady! Who Art Thou?

Although the New York State Court of Appeals decision in People v. McCray, will likely not be a hot topic of conversation in many legal circles, it will definitely have a palpable impact on prosecutorial practices regarding the handling of Brady disclosures in New York.

In McCray, the defendant was accused of raping an 18-year-old female acquaintance. At trial, the prosecution alleged that the defendant and the complainant had gone on a date and that the defendant physically forced the complainant to engage in sexual intercourse while inside an abandoned building. The defense claimed that the sexual encounter was consensual, and an altercation arose when the complainant demanded money in exchange for having sex with the defendant. The defense also contended that a physical struggle occurred when the defendant attempted to stop the complainant from running off with his “pants.”

Unquestionably, the case presented a “classic he-said she-said credibility determination.” And “[t]he outcome of the case obviously depended on which witness the jury believed.”

Prior to trial, the prosecution requested that the court conduct an in-camera review of the complainant’s mental health records. The prosecution didn’t believe that all of the reports were discoverable, and sought the court’s guidance as to which documents were Brady-Giglio material. The trial court found that only 28 pages out of the thousand records it reviewed should be disclosed to the defense –although the undisclosed records referenced, among other things, the complainant’s tendency (1) to confuse dates of events or misunderstand events, (2) to have hallucinations or distorted perceptions, (3) to misrepresent the truth in an effort to please her mother, (4) to engage in wishful thinking about relationships with males with whom she is recently acquainted, and (5) to fabricate occurrences of sexual assault and attempted rape by her father –allegations which were ultimately deemed “unfounded.”

The Court of Appeals observed that “[t]his case differs from the typical Brady case in that it involves confidential mental health records, and the decision to deny disclosure was made not by a prosecutor, but by a judge after an in camera review of the records sought.”  Nevertheless, it concluded that the key inquiry remained whether there was a “reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different.”

The Court held that the undisclosed records were “either cumulative or of little if any relevance to the case.” The Court explained that they “contain other examples of what could be called hallucinations or distorted perceptions, but the other examples were no clearer or more dramatic than the ones the defense already had….” The Court also found that any prior fabrications would be immaterial because the “accusation [against] her father was far removed in time and quite different from the[se] accusation[s]…” The Court concluded that “[i]t is hard to imagine, however, a juror who could attribute the complainant’s testimony here — a claim of rape, made immediately after what defendant testified was consensual sex followed by a dispute over payment — to a failure of recollection or a misunderstanding, however susceptible to those failings the complainant may have been.”

Dissenters were critical of the Court’s failure to protect the defendant’s right to consider and explore all legitimate avenues of information relevant to his defense and to the victim’s testimony and potential cross-examination. (Dissenting Judges: Jenny Rivera, Jonathan Lippman, Eugene Pigott).  They explained that “[w]ithout access to documents concerning reliability of the witness, the defendant cannot properly develop and pursue questioning favorable to the defense or address facts and related issues important to the truth finding process.”

Unfortunately, the long-standing importance of the Brady-Giglio rule has not been fully appreciated by all members of the Court and decisions like McCray reaffirm the need for legislative reform in order to address the stark imbalance in discovery practices.  Likewise, the result-affecting test conducted by the Courts to determine Brady violations is simply a farfetched and imperfect process -as “[w]hat influences juries, courts seldom know.” (Chief Judge Jerome Frank). The imperfection of this process is further illustrated by the illogical fact that the majority in McCray found it “hard to imagine” that a juror might reach a different outcome–while members of its own bench implicitly found that they would have reached a different outcome in this case had they know of the undisclosed reports.

The McCray decision simply fails to recognize that the right to disclosure of exculpatory and impeachment evidence under the Brady-Giglio rule is the cornerstone to ensuring a defendant the right to a fair trial, and ensuring that the “goals of seeking the truth through the trial process” is legitimate.  Without access to favorable evidence, a defendant is unable to either effectively prepare for trial, or present facts important to the “truth finding process.”

All the parties in McCray, except the defense, were permitted to decide how the complainant’s mental health records may be useful to the accused. In my opinion, such a vetting process is unsound, and should not be representative of how future Brady-Giglio materials should be handled by prosecuting offices. As an alternative,  these Brady-Giglio materials, even if  referencing “private matters” of the complainant, should have been turned over to the defense under a protective order, or subject to preclusion after the court heard arguments from both sides. Of course, such an alternative process would at least respect the fundamental principle that the right to favorable evidence is one of constitutional dimension -and the “privacy concern” of a witness is not.

To decide what may be favorable to a defendant, while keeping him blindfolded in his prison cell, does not comport to the notions of fairness and justice for all.

References

Many Wrongful Convictions: Not So Many Answers

Recent studies have estimated that between 2.3% and 5% of all prisoners in the United States are factually innocent. According to the Innocence Project, if just 1% of all prisoners were innocent, that would mean that more than 20,000 innocent people are currently in prison. Of course, one would assume that such staggering numbers would prompt some type of national examination to determine why the criminal justice system is continually breaking down.  At the very least, the continued unveiling of wrongful convictions nationwide must lead to some type of reform that would prevent future injustices from occurring. Unfortunately, the Criminal Justice system has failed miserably in its attempts to deal with these issues, despite its realization that wrongful convictions continue to occur. As Professor Bennett L. Gershman of Pace Law School recently noted

there is hardly ever a postmortem of a derailment in the criminal justice system, as there typically is when a train derails, or a plane crashes.

Professor Gershman’s editorial, Don’t Let the Prosecutor Off the Hook, discusses how the justice system has simply forgotten to undertake its duty to determine the causes behind this tragic epidemic that has continually plagued our justice system. Citing the recent exoneration of Jonathan Fleming, who had spent 24 years in prison for a murder that he did not commit, Professor Gershman explained

Nobody, certainly nobody in the media, has attempted to examine this case more closely and to ask probing questions about how this human tragedy could have happened? We don’t investigate how criminal cases miscarried. We don’t investigate how the system malfunctioned. And we don’t investigate those officials who caused the malfunction.

Evidently, there are probably thousands of cases in which an innocent person has been convicted. Yet, the process of finding answers or solutions to the systemic flaws causing wrongful convictions has been a snail’s race.  As Professor Gershman implicitly points out, however, the prospect of finding a solution is undermined by society’s passive approach to the problem. Moreover, the likelihood of successfully confronting this important issue can never be truly realized until the wrongdoers are actually held accountable for their actions and no longer allowed “off the hook.” Of course, as Prof. Gershman notes, the first step will be to simply “ask probing questions about how this human tragedy could have happened?”

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