Tagged: new trial

May Decisions from the NY Court of Appeals

Several interesting criminal procedure decisions were handed down in May by the New York Court of Appeals:

People v. Stone2017 N.Y. Slip Op. 03559, 29 N.Y.3d 166 (May 4, 2017) (Court’s PDF) – Conviction affirmed where the defendant argued his right to confrontation was violated where a detective was permitted to testify that an unavailable witness had identified the defendant. The Court held that the trial court “eliminated any prejudice to defendant by striking the offending testimony from the record and instructing the jury to disregard the statements.”

People v. Bushey29 N.Y.3d 158, 53 N.Y.S.3d 604 (May 4, 2017) (Court’s PDF) – In this case, the Court held that a police officer may run a car’s license plate number through the government database without any suspicion of wrongdoing; that this does not constitute a search, and that any information obtained as result of such inquire may form probable cause for the police officer to stop the vehicle.

People v. Smalling, 29 N.Y.3d 981, 75 N.E.3d 665, 53 N.Y.S.3d 248 (May 2, 2017) (Court’s PDF) – In this case, the Court reversed a conviction and ordered a new trial where the trial court had agreed not to give a jury instruction on constructive possession but then ultimately did give such an instruction.

A Warning to Itinerent Defense Counsel: Beware of Conflicts of Interest

The Supreme Court, Kings County, has granted a post-conviction motion to vacate a conviction (CPL 440.10) where the defendant’s attorney accepted employment with the Kings County District Attorney’s Office after having been substantially involved in the preparation of the case for trial.  The attorney was assigned to the homicide bureau, became Chief of the Trial Division, and then an Executive in the office and there were no mechanisms put in place to avoid a breach of confidence or the appearance of a conflict of interest.

People v. Dennis, Indictment No.: 12843/1989 (N.Y. Kings Cnty, Mar. 16, 2015).

Scrutinizing Verdicts

Two recent events overlap to raise a question about rendering of verdicts after trial. In Warger v. Schauers, the US Supreme Court recently heard oral argument about whether a civil plaintiff can move for a new trial based on information about something that occurred during jury deliberations that ended in a defendant’s verdict. The case raises the seemingly settled question about whether  the courts and the public and the parties can have access to information about what happens in a jury room during deliberations. The current answer is a resounding no, and, based on press and opinion, the Supreme Court does not seem likely to change that.

In Warger, the plaintiff sought to rely on information that the forewoman had stated during deliberations that her daughter had been at fault in an auto accident and that her life would have been ruined if she had been sued. Apparently, the forewoman had made no mention of this during voir dire. The plaintiff relied on this information to seek a new trial, arguing that the forewoman had been dishonest and should not have been seated on the jury. The lower courts have refused to rely on this information because it violates the total privacy given to jury deliberations in the United States (absent a third-party influence into the jury room).

In contrast  to this total prohibition against scrutiny of deliberations we have the reading, on worldwide television, of the verdict in the Oscar Pistorius trial. Not only was the verdict rendered in public; according to South African law the judge who rendered it (with the help of two appointed assessors) gave all of her reasons for the verdict, including resolution of credibility questions, the drawing or rejection of inferences, and the like.

So these two cases are a study in contrasts. Is it necessary to close our eyes to improprieties in the jury room – if indeed they occur – in order to secure the right to a traditional lay jury? Do we have to give up the judgment of lay jurors to learn the reasons why a jury resolves a case the way it does? Food for thought.

Caveat Chatter: Digital Communication and Mens Rea in United States v. Valle

POST WRITTEN BY: Jake B. Sher (’16), Pace Law School

JSher_valle imageIn a recent post, we discussed issues of mens rea as they related to internet search history. Digital communications, however, have also recently come under scrutiny. In the hands of an adroit prosecutor, they are equally as revealing and equally powerful evidence as an individual’s internet search history.  Yet, when the prosecution relies exclusively on online communications to prove a defendant’s mens rea beyond a reasonable doubt, a skilled defense team may be able to raise issues surrounding the actual context of the communications that may preclude a conviction.

In an opinion and order issued on June 30, 2014 Judge Paul Gardephe of the Southern District of New York conditionally granted former NYPD Officer Gilberto Valle’s motion for a new trial on his conviction for conspiracy to commit kidnapping. The prosecution relied heavily on a mountain’s worth of digital communications between Valle and his alleged co-conspirators. Unfortunately, none of the evidence against Valle had any corroboration outside of the electronic world, and Valle never finalized any of his alleged “plans.” As a result, Valle’s defense counsel contended that his online activities constituted morbid fantasy role-playing, not conspiracy. The government conceded that some of Valle’s communications were fantastical, but argued that some were manifestations of Valle’s specific intent to commit the alleged crime of kidnapping.

Judge Gardephe observed that “Valle’s depraved, misogynistic … fantasies about his wife, former college classmates, and acquaintances undoubtedly reflect a mind diseased.” United States v. Valle, No. 12 Cr. 847 (PGG), 2014 WL 2980256, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 89650 (S.D.N.Y. June 30, 2014). His observation notwithstanding, however, the judge granted Valle’s motion for a new trial. He did so based on the theory that the government neither demonstrated proof beyond a reasonable doubt that Valle’s chats reflected true criminal intent as opposed to fantasy role-play, and that the government’s evidence was insufficient to distinguish the real communications from the conceded fantasy communications. (emphasis added). In Valle, the Court wrote:

Valle’s visits to Internet sites devoted to death, violence, and kidnapping; his possession of images depicting acts of sexual violence against women; his computer searches regarding kidnapping methods; and his 89 computer folders containing Facebook images of women he knew, all graphically illustrate his depraved interests.  The Government did not, however, meet its burden … the Government offered no evidence that would have permitted a reasonable juror to determine whether someone who is truly interested in kidnapping a woman would be more likely to engage in these activities than someone who is merely interested in fantasizing about kidnapping and committing acts of sexual violence against women.

Even digital communications that may appear damningly unassailable require corroboration or further investigation. As Learned Hand once ruminated, “it does not follow, because a jury might have found [the defendant] guilty of the substantive offence, that they were justified in finding him guilty of a conspiracy to commit it.” United States v. Crimmins, 123 F.2d 271, 273 (2d Cir. 1941).

Proof of mens rea may require something more than digital evidence alone, even if a jury is convinced of a defendant’s guilt. As a result, the prosecution in Valle fell short of building their case for a conviction as a matter of law, a fact that Valle’s attorneys managed to exploit in floating an argument sufficient to warrant a re-trial.

Cases and Related Readings:

Skakel Denied Bail

Michael Skakel, who was convicted 10 years ago of murdering his Greenwich, Connecticut  neighbor, 15-year-old  Martha Moxley, was recently released from prison after a judge found he was denied the effective assistance of counsel.  The case has achieved notoriety because Mr. Skakel is a Kennedy relative.  Yesterday (Nov. 6, 2013), however, he was refused bail and ordered to return to prison to await a new trial, or an appeal.  On November 6, 2014, the judge who ordered the new trial granted the prosecutor’s motion to deny bail pending appeal or a new trial. The Judge stated that any bail decision should be handled by the new judge who will preside over all subsequent proceedings.

Related Readings

Judge’s Decision
Alison Leigh Cowan, Judge Who Overturned Skakel Murder Conviction Declines Bail Request, N.Y. Times, Nov. 6, 2013.