Tagged: wrongful convictions

Many Wrongful Convictions: Not So Many Answers

Recent studies have estimated that between 2.3% and 5% of all prisoners in the United States are factually innocent. According to the Innocence Project, if just 1% of all prisoners were innocent, that would mean that more than 20,000 innocent people are currently in prison. Of course, one would assume that such staggering numbers would prompt some type of national examination to determine why the criminal justice system is continually breaking down.  At the very least, the continued unveiling of wrongful convictions nationwide must lead to some type of reform that would prevent future injustices from occurring. Unfortunately, the Criminal Justice system has failed miserably in its attempts to deal with these issues, despite its realization that wrongful convictions continue to occur. As Professor Bennett L. Gershman of Pace Law School recently noted

there is hardly ever a postmortem of a derailment in the criminal justice system, as there typically is when a train derails, or a plane crashes.

Professor Gershman’s editorial, Don’t Let the Prosecutor Off the Hook, discusses how the justice system has simply forgotten to undertake its duty to determine the causes behind this tragic epidemic that has continually plagued our justice system. Citing the recent exoneration of Jonathan Fleming, who had spent 24 years in prison for a murder that he did not commit, Professor Gershman explained

Nobody, certainly nobody in the media, has attempted to examine this case more closely and to ask probing questions about how this human tragedy could have happened? We don’t investigate how criminal cases miscarried. We don’t investigate how the system malfunctioned. And we don’t investigate those officials who caused the malfunction.

Evidently, there are probably thousands of cases in which an innocent person has been convicted. Yet, the process of finding answers or solutions to the systemic flaws causing wrongful convictions has been a snail’s race.  As Professor Gershman implicitly points out, however, the prospect of finding a solution is undermined by society’s passive approach to the problem. Moreover, the likelihood of successfully confronting this important issue can never be truly realized until the wrongdoers are actually held accountable for their actions and no longer allowed “off the hook.” Of course, as Prof. Gershman notes, the first step will be to simply “ask probing questions about how this human tragedy could have happened?”

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NY Court of Appeals Upends Police Tricks Behind Interrogation Doors

False confessions have long been recognized as one of the leading causes of wrongful convictions. Case studies have proven that an individual’s confession to a crime is not always indicative of the confessor’s actual guilt. In fact, a number of external factors may lead an individual to falsely confess to committing a crime. According to studies conducted by the Innocence Project, many false confessions have been prompted by conditions in which the confessor was placed under  duress during police interrogations, or was prodded to give false information as a result of police coercion or subterfuge tactics. Laurie Shanks, clinical professor of law at Albany Law School in Albany, recently explained that “[t]here’s a perception that people don’t confess to crimes they didn’t commit, [b]ut the science is that absolutely they do.”

Yet, the rule of law determining the voluntariness of a confessor’s statement, when such statements are adduced by police subterfuge, has remained a vital and perplexing issue within our criminal justice system. The admissibility of such confessions has been a hotly debated topic among criminal defense practitioners and prosecutors, irrespective of recent case studies proving the fallibility of such confessions. In spite of recent findings, prosecutors have continued to hold the upper hand when arguing that such confessions are voluntary and admissible at trial, relying on the proposition that certain police ruses are essential to conducting meaningful interrogations of suspects, and vital to the police’s ability to expeditiously solve certain crimes.  Under this guise, the Courts have heeded to the government’s “demands” and have consequently become more laxed in uprooting such questionable police tactics –noting that confessions are “essential to society’s compelling interest in finding, convicting, and punishing those who violate the law.” McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 181 (1991). As such, courts around the nation have routinely accepted that “deceit and subterfuge are within the ‘bag of tricks’ that police may use in interrogating suspects.” State v. Schumacher, 37 P.3d 6, 13-14 (Idaho Ct. App. 2001); See also United States v. Bell, 367 F.3d 452, 461 (5th Cir. 2004) (observing that deception is “not alone sufficient to render a confession inadmissible”).  

In New York, however, it appears that the courts are becoming less reluctant to address this significant legal issue , and more inclined than many of their sister state courts to fully determine on a case by case determination whether a confession could be deemed involuntary when police misrepresentations work to overcome a confessor’s will. See N.Y. Criminal Procedure Law § 60.45 [2][b][i]  (treating as “involuntarily made” a statement of a defendant that was  elicited “by means of any promise or statement of fact, which promise or statement creates a substantial risk that the defendant might falsely incriminate himself”).

Notably, the New York Court of Appeals has recently made clear that not all police subterfuge is acceptable during the interrogations of suspects. People v. Thomas, 2014 WL 641516 (N.Y. 2014). In Thomas, the defendant had been prodded by police to take responsibility for injuries suffered by his four-month-old son, who died from intracranial injuries purportedly caused by abusively inflicted head trauma, in order to save his wife from arrest. The Court held that the defendant’s confession,  admitting that he had inflicted traumatic head injuries on the infant, was involuntary as a result of “[t]he various misrepresentations and false assurances used [by] [police] to elicit and shape [the] defendant’s admissions.” Id. The court explained that the police officers false representations to the defendant had manifestly raised a substantial risk of false incrimination. The Court was extremely troubled by police lying to the defendant “that his wife had blamed him for [their] [son’s] injuries and then threatened that, if he did not take responsibility, they would “scoop” Ms. Hicks out from the hospital and bring her in, since one of them must have injured the child.” Id.  The Court also observed that “there [was] not a single inculpatory fact in defendant’s confession that was not suggested to him. He did not know what to say to save his wife and child from the harm he was led to believe his silence would cause.” Id.

The New York Court of Appeals also recently affirmed the Second Department’s decision in People v.  Aveni, 100 A.D.3d 228 (2d Dep’t 2012) where the appellate court  had also found that the defendant’s confession was coerced  as a result of the police repeatedly deceiving the defendant about the status of his girlfriend’s health condition. In Aveni, the defendant had been prompted by police to make incriminating statements about the herion overdose of his girlfriend. During interrogation, the police had falsely told the defendant that his girlfriend was still alive, “and implicitly threaten[ed] him with a homicide charge if he remained silent.” The court explained that the police made the defendant believe that “the consequences of remaining silent would lead to the [girlfriend’s] death, since the physicians would be unable to treat her, which “could be a problem” for him.” Id. In upholding the Second Department’s decision, the NY Court of Appeals observed that “[t]he false prospect of being severely penalized for remaining silent, raised by defendant’s interrogators, was, in the court’s view, incompatible with a finding that defendant’s confession was voluntary beyond a reasonable doubt.” People v. Aveni, 2014 WL 641511 (N.Y. 2014).  It noted that “the Appellate Division used the correct legal standard in its reversal, [and] [i]ts determination that the potential to overwhelm defendant’s free will was realized was plainly one of fact.” Id.

Steven Drizin, clinical professor at Northwestern University School of Law in Chicago commented on the recent decisions in New York, noting that “[t]he court did not set any hard and fast rules, but it did issue some clear warnings that these tactics will be scrutinized closely in future.”  He explained that until now “[t]here’s been too much deference given to police officers, and they’re accustomed to having free rein with suspects behind interrogation doors.”

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NY Appellate Court Upholds Vacatur of Conviction Based Upon DNA Evidence

On February 27, 2014, the NY Appellate Division, First Department, unanimously affirmed a prior judgment entered in Bronx County of New York (Clark, D.), vacating Tyrone Hicks’ conviction for Attempted Rape in the First Degree (PL § 110/130.35[1]) and Attempted Sodomy in the First Degree (PL § 110/130.50[1]), based upon his presentation of DNA evidence that had been unearthed by his lawyer, Professor Adele Bernhard of New York Law School. At trial, the only evidence linking Hicks to the crime was the uncorroborated eyewitness identification by the victim. The jury rejected Hicks’ alibi defense, which consisted of testimony from his son-in-law, who claimed that Hicks was home when the attack occurred.

In 2009, Professor Bernhard, who directs the NYLS Post-Conviction Innocence Clinic, successfully obtained testing of genetic material found under the victim’s fingernails that had been collected shortly after the crime. The results of such testing concluded that there was male genetic material recovered from the victim’s fingernail scrapings that did not match the defendant’s DNA. Professor Bernhard petitioned the court to vacate Hick’s conviction based upon both the DNA results, and the likelihood that Hicks had been misidentified as the assailant.

In vacating Hicks’ conviction, the Bronx County Court concluded that a new trial was warranted under CPL § 440.10 (1) (g), since the results of the DNA testing “could not have been discovered prior to [Hicks’] trial,” and were “unquestionably material to the issues of identity” – undermining the “sole evidence connecting [Hicks] to the crime.” The court observed that “the DNA test results ruling out the defendant’s genetic profile [had] pronounced forensic value where there [was] multiple differing descriptions of the perpetrator by the sole identifying witness and no physical evidence linking the defendant to the crime.” Id. at 4.  The court explained that the jury may have seen it to be “a particularly powerful piece of evidence, especially where the identity of [the] attacker was the primary issue at trial.”

The Appellate Court upheld the lower court’s decision to vacate the conviction based upon the defendant’s showing that the DNA results created a “reasonable probability that he would have obtained a more favorable verdict.” The Court also concluded that “the DNA evidence [was] material and exculpatory because it support[ed] identifying someone other than defendant as the attacker.” Notably, the Court rejected the government’s claim that the DNA results were cumulative, and not newly discovered under CPL 440.10 (g). Specifically, the Court noted that given the recent amendments to CPL 440.10, namely CPL 440.10 (1) (g-1), the defendant “no longer ha[d] to show that the results of [DNA] testing is newly discovered evidence in order to seek vacatur of a judgment of conviction.”

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Compensation for Exonerees

Providing compensation for wrongfully convicted individuals has been an ongoing dilemma within the United States and for governments abroad. A recent blog, Compensating Exonerees: US v. UK, by Professor Lissa Griffin of Pace Law School discusses the UK’s current struggle to articulate a standard of proof for exonerees who are seeking compensation.

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Developments in Compensation for Exonerees

Two developments in New York State took place last week that may reveal a less strict approach to compensating exonerees. First, David Ranta, a man who was framed by Brooklyn detective Louis Scarcella and served 23 years in prison for a murder he did not commit  reached an agreement with the office of the City Comptroller, Scott Stringer, to receive $6.4 million in compensation. Ranta’s $150 million claim was settled by the city comptroller, Scott Stringer, without a law suit ever being filed and thus without involving the City’s legal department.  This was the first case to be disposed of by the new Conviction Integrity Unit in the Brooklyn District Attorney’s office, and that office joined in the application to vacate the conviction. While Stringer took some heat for this decision, he made clear that spending millions of dollars and many years in litigation would not do anyone justice in a case where the district attorney joined in the motion to vacate the conviction.

Second, New York State Attorney General Eric Schneiderman announced legislation that would allow people who have confessed or pleaded guilty to a crime they did not commit to sue the state for damages.  This change seemingly would go hand in hand with the amendment to N.Y. CPL § 440 that allowed convicted defendants who had plead guilty to bring a post-conviction motion for DNA testing.  As Schneiderman noted in his announcement, 10 of the 27 people in New York who have had their convictions vacated based on DNA had falsely confessed or pleaded guilty.  Such people will be able to sue for compensation even if they cannot prove that their confession or guilty plea was coerced. The proposed bill would also extend the statute of limitations for wrongful conviction compensation claims from two to three years.

These developments make sense.  NYC Comptroller Stringer’s decision to settle a claim without years of expensive litigation is a welcome breath of fresh air in our overly contentious adversary system and will allow the millions that would have been spent on defending the indefensible to be used to pay other wrongfully convicted individuals or for other important criminal justice purposes.  Similarly, given what we now know about the causes of wrongful conviction, we should welcome the end of our pretending that false confessions do not exist.

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